(a) Examine the power of the Governor to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment, or to suspend, remit or…

(a) Governor’s clemency power

Article 161 lets the Governor grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions, or suspend, remit or commute sentences for offences against laws relating to matters to which State executive extends. A pardon extinguishes conviction and sentence; a reprieve delays execution; a respite awards a lesser sentence on special grounds such as pregnancy; a remission shortens sentence; suspension stays execution; commutation substitutes a lesser punishment. The power is limited by State executive competence and is distinct from the President’s Article 72 power over Union matters and courts-martial. Maru Ram v. Union of India (1980) held that the power is exercised on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, not by the Governor personally, and that it operates independently of the statutory remission power; A.G. Perarivalan v. State (2022) reaffirmed that the Governor is bound by that advice. Where a death sentence is imposed under a law on which both the Union and the State can legislate, Article 72(1)(c) gives the President power, while Article 72(3) preserves the Governor's power to suspend, remit or commute it. In State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar (2021), the Court held that the Article 161 power is not fettered by the fourteen-year minimum in Section 433A CrPC (now Section 475 BNSS), though it must be exercised on the State's advice. Kehar Singh v. Union of India (1989) held that there is no right to an oral hearing on a mercy petition. Judicial review is narrow: in Epuru Sudhakar v. Government of A.P. (2006), the Court quashed a remission and held that clemency orders can be reviewed if passed without application of mind, mala fide, on irrelevant or political considerations, arbitrarily or ignoring relevant material. In K.M. Nanavati v. State of Bombay (1961), the Governor's suspension of sentence was held not to override the Supreme Court's rules while the matter was pending before it. In death-penalty cases, the Governor must consider relevant factors, and in Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India (2014) the Court held that unexplained delay in deciding mercy petitions is a ground for commuting a death sentence and laid down guidelines for their disposal. Thus, the power is wide but constitutionally bounded.

(b) 44th Amendment and emergency safeguards

The Forty-fourth Amendment Act, 1978, responded to the 1975-77 Emergency. Article 352 replaced “internal disturbance” with “armed rebellion”; the proclamation requires the written decision of the Union Cabinet, not merely the Prime Minister, ceases after one month (earlier two months) unless approved by both Houses by a special majority, lasts six months at a time, and must be revoked if the Lok Sabha passes a disapproval resolution by a simple majority, for which one-tenth of its members can require a special sitting within fourteen days. The 38th Amendment's clause making the President's satisfaction immune from judicial review was deleted. Article 358 suspends only Article 19, and only when the emergency is declared on the ground of war or external aggression, not armed rebellion. Article 358 applies only to laws that recite that they relate to the emergency, and Article 359 cannot suspend the right to move court for enforcement of Articles 20 and 21. The Amendment also limited President's Rule beyond one year under Article 356(5) to periods of national emergency with an Election Commission certificate, omitted Article 257A on deploying Union forces in States, and restored the Lok Sabha's normal term to five years. These changes are substantially efficacious: they raise the threshold, add collective Cabinet responsibility, parliamentary approval and revocation, and protect life and liberty. Yet they are not absolute. The President’s satisfaction remains political; “armed rebellion” can be stretched; a dominant-party Parliament may grant special majority; there is no independent pre-declaration review; and Articles 358 and 359 still permit suspension of other rights. Judicial review can check abuse — Minerva Mills (1980) treated the proclamation as open to challenge and S.R. Bommai (1994) applied such review to Article 356 — but it cannot replace political restraint. No national emergency has been proclaimed since 1977, which suggests the safeguards have worked so far.

(c) Lokpal and Lokayuktas

The idea has roots in Indian governance culture: Kautilya's Arthashastra described elaborate checks on the conduct of officials; the First Administrative Reforms Commission in 1966 recommended a Lokpal and Lokayuktas; the Second ARC in 2007 reiterated the need for a Lokpal. The Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013, creates the Lokpal and State Lokayuktas. The Lokpal has jurisdiction over public functionaries, including the Prime Minister (with safeguards), Ministers, MPs and officers of Groups A, B, C and D, as well as bodies receiving government funds or foreign contributions above set limits, and over corruption connected with public office, including by public functionaries outside India. The Selection Committee appoints the Lokpal; it includes the Prime Minister, Speaker of the Lok Sabha, Leader of Opposition (or leader of the largest opposition party) in the Lok Sabha, Chief Justice of India (or a nominated judge) and an eminent jurist. The Lokpal has a Chairperson and up to eight Members, at least half of them judicial. For the States, Section 63 required each State to set up a Lokayukta by its own law within a year, so their composition and powers vary. The Lokpal, not the Selection Committee, directs the Inquiry Wing, Prosecution Wing and CBI referrals. Transparency comes from any person’s right to file a complaint, acceptance or rejection disclosed to the complainant, reasoned orders, annual reports presented to the President and laid before Parliament, and the multi-party, judicially represented Selection Committee; though the Act creates no public registry of complaints, annual reports and reasoned decisions provide public accountability. The Act applies to public servants both in and outside India, so corruption by Indian officials abroad is covered, and it aligns India with the UN Convention Against Corruption, which India ratified in 2011. The Lokpal can also order provisional attachment of assets acquired by corruption and recommend transfer or suspension of officials. The 2016 amendment revised public servants’ asset-declaration requirements, but weaknesses remain: the first Lokpal was appointed only in March 2019, the number of complaints actually investigated has been small, and State Lokayuktas are uneven.