(a) "Law as well as justice should try to prevent unjust enrichment." Elucidate the statement in reference to relevant provisions…

(a)

The statement reflects the principle of restitution: no one may keep a benefit obtained at another's expense when retaining it would be unjust. The Indian Contract Act, 1872 does not use the phrase "unjust enrichment", but Chapter V ("Of certain relations resembling those created by contract", Sections 68–72) and Section 65 give it statutory form. These obligations arise from law, not from agreement.

• Section 68: a person who supplies necessaries to someone incapable of contracting (or to their dependants) may be reimbursed from that person's property.
• Section 69: a person interested in the payment of money, who pays what another is bound by law to pay, is entitled to be reimbursed.
• Section 70: a person who lawfully does something for another, or delivers something to them, without intending to do so gratuitously, is entitled to compensation if the other person enjoys the benefit.
• Section 71: a finder of goods has the responsibilities of a bailee.
• Section 72: money paid, or a thing delivered, by mistake or under coercion must be repaid or returned.
• Section 65: a benefit received under an agreement discovered to be void, or a contract that becomes void, must be restored.

In B.K. Mondal v. State of West Bengal (1962) and Mulamchand v. State of M.P. (1968), the Supreme Court allowed recovery under Section 70 even though the contracts were unenforceable for non-compliance with Article 299. In Sales Tax Officer v. Kanhaiya Lal Mukundlal Saraf (1959), it held that "mistake" in Section 72 includes a mistake of law, so tax paid under a statute later held invalid is recoverable. Restitution thus complements contract: contract enforces bargains, while quasi-contract reverses unjust gains.

(b)

The Sale of Goods Act, 1930 gives both parties a set of remedies that mirror each other, so that whichever side breaches, the other has an effective remedy.

Seller's remedies

• Unpaid seller's rights against the goods (Sections 45–54): lien (Sections 47–49), stoppage in transit on the buyer's insolvency (Sections 50–52), and resale (Section 54).
• Remedies against the buyer personally: a suit for the price where property has passed or the price is payable on a day certain (Section 55), and damages for non-acceptance (Section 56).

Buyer's remedies

• Damages for non-delivery (Section 57).
• Specific performance of a contract for specific or ascertained goods, at the court's discretion (Section 58).
• For breach of warranty, the buyer may set up the breach in diminution or extinction of the price, or sue for damages (Section 59). The buyer may also reject the goods for breach of a condition (Section 13).

Common to both: a suit for damages on repudiation before the due date, i.e. anticipatory breach (Section 60); and interest and special damages (Section 61), with damages measured on the principles of Section 73 of the Contract Act.

The statement is therefore correct: the remedies are reciprocal but not identical. The seller's real-security rights (lien, stoppage, resale) have no counterpart for the buyer, while specific performance is essentially a buyer's remedy because damages are usually adequate for a seller who is owed money.

(c)

Under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, retirement does not wipe the slate clean at once.

• Pre-retirement acts: the retiring partner remains liable for acts done before retirement. They are discharged only by an agreement with the third party and the reconstituted firm, which may be implied from a course of dealing (Section 32(2)).
• Post-retirement acts: the partner remains liable as a partner, even for acts after retirement, until public notice of the retirement is given (Section 32(3)); public notice is given as Section 72 requires. The proviso protects a dormant partner: they are not liable to a third party who dealt with the firm without knowing they were a partner. Without notice, the holding-out rule in Section 28 can also fix liability.
• Competing business: an outgoing partner may carry on a competing business but may not use the firm name, represent that they carry on the firm's business, or solicit its old customers, unless there is a valid restraint agreement (Section 36).
• Subsequent profits: where the continuing partners carry on the business with the firm's property without a final settlement of accounts with the outgoing partner, the outgoing partner (or their estate) may choose either the share of profits attributable to the use of their share of the property, or interest at 6% per annum on it (Section 37).

So the statement is true only in a qualified sense. Freedom from liability for post-retirement acts depends on public notice, while the right to subsequent profits depends on the capital being retained unsettled, and it is an option, not a partnership share.

(d)

The statement is not correct as the law stands. Under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, the certifying officer's function is quasi-judicial.

Before 1956, the certifying officer could only check that the draft standing orders provided for every matter in the Schedule and conformed to the model standing orders; the officer could not go into their fairness. That function was largely administrative. The 1956 amendment changed this:

• Section 4 now requires the officer to adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of the provisions.
• Section 5 requires the officer to hear the employer and the workmen's representatives.
• Section 6 provides an appeal to the appellate authority.
• Section 11 gives the officer the powers of a civil court for receiving evidence, administering oaths and compelling attendance.

There is a lis between the employer and the workmen, a duty to act judicially, and a decision that binds both sides. Those are the classic tests of a quasi-judicial body (Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas Advani; Radheshyam Khare v. State of M.P.).

In Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. P.D. Vyas (1960), the Supreme Court held that after the amendment the certifying officer and the appellate authority must decide fairness and reasonableness on the merits, and it examined their decision in an appeal under Article 136. The certifying officer is therefore amenable to the principles of natural justice and to writ review.

The Industrial Relations Code, 2020 (in force from 21 November 2025) now governs standing orders. It retains certification by a Certifying Officer, followed by an appeal.

(e)

Public Interest Litigation (PIL) relaxed two procedural barriers: locus standi and the need for a formal pleading. This let courts protect the fundamental rights of people who cannot approach them because of poverty, illiteracy or social disadvantage.

Contribution

• Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979) secured the release of undertrial prisoners and recognised speedy trial as part of Article 21.
• S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981) allowed any member of the public acting bona fide to sue on behalf of those who cannot.
• Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1984) accepted a letter as a writ petition (epistolary jurisdiction) and addressed bonded labour.
• The M.C. Mehta cases, Vishaka (1997) and the right-to-food orders extended Articles 21 and 32 to the environment, workplace safety and welfare delivery.

Limitations

• Frivolous, publicity-seeking or proxy petitions clog dockets.
• Continuing mandamus and policy directions raise concerns about judicial overreach and the separation of powers.
• Compliance with PIL orders is often weak.

The Court has responded. Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary (1992) warned against "busybodies" with private motives. State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal (2010) laid down guidelines: verify the petitioner's credentials and bona fides, and impose exemplary costs for abuse.

Assessment: PIL remains an important instrument for enforcing fundamental rights. Its legitimacy depends on genuine public purpose, judicial restraint in policy matters, and the Balwant Singh Chaufal filters.