(a) "Right to Information, for citizens to secure access to information under the control of public authorities, is an important…

(a)

The right to know is part of the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a). The Supreme Court recognised it in State of U.P. v. Raj Narain (1975) and S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981), and applied it to voters' right to know candidates' antecedents in Union of India v. ADR (2002) and PUCL v. Union of India (2003). The Right to Information Act, 2005 turns this constitutional principle into an enforceable statutory right (Section 3), with timelines, appeals and penalties.

Significance

• Accountability and anti-corruption: it lets citizens scrutinise decisions, expenditure and service delivery. It has been used to expose irregularities in welfare schemes, public procurement and recruitment.
• Wide reach: "public authority" in Section 2(h) includes bodies owned, controlled or substantially financed by the government (Thalappalam Service Co-operative Bank v. State of Kerala (2013)). The office of the Chief Justice of India is also a public authority (CPIO, Supreme Court v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (2019)). Answer sheets are "information" (CBSE v. Aditya Bandopadhyay (2011)).
• Institutional machinery: independent Information Commissions (Sections 12–17) and penalties for PIOs (Section 20).

Obligations of public authorities

• Records (Section 4(1)(a)): maintain all records duly catalogued and indexed, and computerise those suitable for it.
• Proactive disclosure (Section 4(1)(b)): publish the 17 categories of information listed in the Act (organisation and functions, powers and duties of officers, decision-making norms, budgets, subsidy programmes, the particulars of PIOs, and so on) and update them regularly.
• Policies and decisions (Section 4(1)(c)–(d)): publish relevant facts while formulating important policies, and give reasons for administrative or quasi-judicial decisions to affected persons.
• Dissemination (Section 4(2)–(4)): disseminate information suo motu, widely and in local languages, so that citizens need to use the Act as little as possible.
• Information officers (Section 5): designate Public Information Officers (PIOs) and Assistant PIOs, who must assist applicants. Section 6(1) requires help in reducing oral requests to writing.
• Transfer (Section 6(3)): transfer a request to the proper authority within 5 days.
• Time limits (Section 7): decide within 30 days, or within 48 hours where the life or liberty of a person is involved. Failure to decide is deemed refusal (Section 7(2)). A rejection must state reasons and the details of the appellate authority (Section 7(8)).
• Exemptions (Sections 8–11): withhold information only under the Section 8(1) exemptions, subject to the public-interest override in Section 8(2), and supply the severable non-exempt part (Section 10). Follow the third-party procedure (Section 11).
• First appeal (Section 19): provide a first appeal to a senior officer.

Concerns

• The RTI (Amendment) Act, 2019 lets the Centre fix the tenure and salaries of Information Commissioners, which raises questions about their independence.
• Section 44(3) of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 amends Section 8(1)(j) and removes the public-interest test for personal information.
• Vacancies and backlogs in Information Commissions persist, despite the directions in Anjali Bhardwaj v. Union of India (2019).
• Compliance with Section 4 remains weak.

Conclusion: the statement is correct. The Act is a cornerstone of participatory democracy, but its promise depends on proactive disclosure and independent, adequately staffed Commissions.

(b)

Under Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, an arbitration agreement is an agreement to submit present or future disputes in respect of a defined legal relationship to arbitration.

• It must be in writing, whether in a signed document, an exchange of letters or electronic communications, or pleadings not denied (Section 7(3)–(4)). The 2015 amendment added electronic communications.
• It may be incorporated by reference if the reference makes the clause part of the contract (Section 7(5); M.R. Engineers v. Som Datt Builders (2009)).

Why clarity and certainty matter Arbitration excludes the ordinary jurisdiction of civil courts, so the parties' consent to it must be unequivocal. K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi (1998) and Bihar State Mineral Development Corporation v. Encon Builders (2003) identify the essential attributes of an arbitration agreement:

• an intention to refer disputes to a private tribunal;
• a binding decision;
• impartial adjudication after hearing the parties.

Case law

• ***Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander* (2007):** a clause saying disputes "can, if the parties so determine, be referred to arbitration" shows only a possibility of future agreement, so it is not an arbitration agreement.
• ***Wellington Associates v. Kirit Mehta* (2000):** "may be referred" was held insufficient on the facts.
• ***Babanrao Rajaram Pund v. Samarth Builders* (2022):** use of the word "may" is not fatal where the clause as a whole shows a clear intention to arbitrate and makes the award final and binding.
• ***Mahanadi Coalfields v. IVRCL AMR Joint Venture* (2022):** a clause providing only for internal settlement, without a binding, adjudicatory decision, is not an arbitration clause.
• Pathological clauses name a non-existent institution or contain inconsistent provisions. Courts try to make them workable rather than declare them void (Enercon (India) v. Enercon GmbH (2014); Visa International v. Continental Resources (2009)). Only incurable uncertainty makes the agreement void (Section 29 of the Contract Act).

Supporting principles

• Separability and kompetenz-kompetenz (Section 16): the clause survives even if the main contract is invalid, and the tribunal rules on its own jurisdiction.
• Limited court role: at the reference stage (Section 8) and the appointment stage (Section 11(6A)), courts examine only whether an arbitration agreement prima facie exists (Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading (2021)).
• Stamping: an unstamped agreement is not void; the defect is curable (In re Interplay between Arbitration Agreements and the Stamp Act (2023, seven judges)).

Conclusion: courts favour arbitration and will cure defects in drafting, but they cannot create consent. An agreement that leaves arbitration optional, or lacks an intention to be bound by an award, will not be enforced.

(c)

The Trade Marks Act, 1999 protects registered marks against infringement, a statutory action under Section 29, and Section 27(2) preserves the common-law action for passing off, which protects goodwill whether or not the mark is registered. The two actions differ in scope. Infringement protects the owner's exclusive right to use a registered mark. Passing off protects against misrepresentation that damages goodwill, and there added matter such as get-up can show that there is no deception (Durga Dutt Sharma v. N.P. Laboratories (1965)).

Civil remedies (Section 135, available in both suits)

• Injunction: interim and permanent, including ex parte injunctions, Anton Piller-type orders for discovery and preservation of evidence, and orders restraining disposal of assets.
• Damages or an account of profits, at the plaintiff's option, together with delivery-up and destruction of infringing labels and goods.
• Innocent infringers (Section 135(3)): where the defendant proves they did not know and had no reasonable ground to believe the mark was registered, and stopped the use on learning of the plaintiff's rights, the court will not grant damages (other than nominal damages) or an account of profits.

Jurisdiction and procedure

• Forum: a suit may be filed in a District Court where the plaintiff resides or carries on business (Section 134). This forum rule applies to infringement suits and composite suits, not to a passing-off suit alone.
• Commercial Courts Act, 2015: these are commercial disputes. A suit seeking urgent interim relief is exempt from pre-institution mediation under Section 12A, but the court examines whether the claim to urgency is genuine (Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Keerthi (2023)).
• Imports: counterfeit goods can be stopped at the border under the IPR (Imported Goods) Enforcement Rules, 2007.

Passing off The plaintiff must prove the "classical trinity" (Reckitt & Colman v. Borden (1990)): goodwill, misrepresentation, and damage or likely damage.

• Cadila Health Care v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals (2001) laid down the factors for judging deceptive similarity, and required stricter scrutiny for medicinal products.
• Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah (2002) upheld an interim injunction against the use of a similar trade name.
• N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool (1996) recognised trans-border reputation. However, Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Prius Auto Industries (2018) requires the goodwill to exist in the Indian market.

Criminal remedies (Chapter XII)

• Falsifying or falsely applying a trade mark: 6 months to 3 years' imprisonment and a fine of ₹50,000 to ₹2 lakh (Section 103).
• Selling goods bearing a false trade mark: the same punishment (Section 104).
• Enhanced punishment for second or subsequent offences (Section 105).
• These offences are cognizable, but a police officer must obtain the Registrar's opinion before search and seizure (Section 115(4)).
• There is no criminal remedy for mere passing off, beyond the general offences of cheating and the like.

Conclusion: a registered proprietor usually combines infringement and passing off in one composite suit. Registration makes proof easier and opens criminal remedies, while passing off protects unregistered goodwill.