Philosophy 2021 Paper I 50 marks Critically examine

Q3

(a) What are the main arguments put forward by Moore in his paper "A Defence of Common Sense" to prove that there are possible propositions about the world that are known to be true with certainty? Do you think Moore's arguments provide a sufficient response to objections presented by the sceptic against the possibility of knowledge? Give reasons in support of your answer. (20 marks) (b) What according to Strawson are basic particulars ? What reasons does Strawson offer to believe that 'material bodies' and 'persons' are basic particulars ? Critically discuss. (15 marks) (c) Critically examine Quine's postulate of empiricism without the dogmas with reference to his 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism'. (15 marks)

हिंदी में प्रश्न पढ़ें

(a) मूर अपने प्रपत्र "ए डिफेंस ऑफ कॉमन सेंस" में यह सिद्ध करने के लिए क्या युक्ति प्रस्तुत करते हैं कि इस संसार के विषय में ऐसी प्रतिज्ञाएँ संभव हैं जिन्हें निश्चितता के साथ सत्य जाना जा सकता है ? क्या आप सोचते हैं कि मूर द्वारा दी गई युक्तियाँ संशयवादी द्वारा ज्ञान की संभावना के विरोध में प्रस्तुत आक्षेपों का पर्याप्त प्रत्युत्तर देती हैं ? अपने उत्तर के पक्ष में युक्तियाँ प्रस्तुत कीजिए । (20 अंक) (b) स्ट्रॉसन के अनुसार आधारभूत विशेष क्या होते हैं ? स्ट्रॉसन यह मानने के लिए क्या युक्तियाँ प्रस्तुत करते हैं कि 'पदार्थीय शरीर' तथा 'व्यक्ति' आधारभूत विशेष होते हैं ? समालोचनात्मक विवेचना प्रस्तुत कीजिए । (15 अंक) (c) "टू डॉगमास ऑफ एम्पीरिसिस्म" के संदर्भ में क्वाइन की मताग्रह रहित अनुभववाद की संकल्पना का आलोचनात्मक परीक्षण कीजिए । (15 अंक)

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Directive word: Critically examine

This question asks you to critically examine. The directive word signals the depth of analysis expected, the structure of your answer, and the weight of evidence you must bring.

See our UPSC directive words guide for a full breakdown of how to respond to each command word.

How this answer will be evaluated

Approach

The directive 'critically examine' for part (a) and 'critically discuss' for part (b) demand balanced exposition and evaluation. Structure: Introduction (≈100 words) locating Moore, Strawson and Quine within analytic philosophy's linguistic turn; Body allocating ~40% word budget to part (a) given highest marks, ~30% each to (b) and (c); for (a) present Moore's truisms, hand-waving proof and certainty claims before assessing adequacy against scepticism; for (b) explain Strawson's ontology of basic particulars with asymmetry of identification; for (c) analyse Quine's attack on analyticity/synonymy and reductionism, then evaluate holistic empiricism; Conclusion (≈100 words) synthesising how these thinkers differently address scepticism and meaning through ordinary language or naturalised epistemology.

Key points expected

  • Part (a): Moore's list of truisms (existence of body, past, other minds), the 'hand-waving' proof as response to external world scepticism, and the claim that knowing entails being certain
  • Part (a): Assessment of whether Moore's proof is question-begging versus providing a paradigm case; contrast with sceptic's demand for proof of premises, invoking Wittgenstein's 'hinge propositions' or contextualist responses
  • Part (b): Strawson's definition of basic particulars as entities identifiable without reference to other particulars, with asymmetric dependence relations in identification
  • Part (b): Material bodies as basic due to re-identification across time/space; persons as basic due to primitive concept combining physical and psychological predicates irreducible to either
  • Part (c): Quine's first dogma (analyticity/synonymy) attacked through circularity of definitions, verificationism, and interchangeability salva veritate; second dogma (reductionism) rejected
  • Part (c): Replacement by confirmational holism and ontological relativity; evaluation of whether Quine eliminates or merely relocates empiricist dogmas, with reference to Grice-Strawson objections or Davidson's critique

Evaluation rubric

DimensionWeightMax marksExcellentAveragePoor
Concept correctness20%10Precisely defines Moore's 'truisms' versus 'propositions of common sense', Strawson's 'identification without ostension' and asymmetric identification, Quine's 'verification theory of meaning' and 'ontological commitment'; distinguishes certainty as psychological state from epistemic status; correctly identifies that Strawsonian persons are primitive, not reducible to Cartesian dualism or materialismGenerally accurate on Moore's common sense claims and Quine's rejection of analytic-synthetic distinction but conflates Strawson's basic particulars with merely 'important' entities or misrepresents Quine's holism as absolute relativismFundamental errors such as treating Moore as proving external world via inference, confusing Strawson's basic particulars with Aristotelian primary substances, or presenting Quine as rejecting all of empiricism rather than reformulating it
Argument structure20%10Clear logical progression in each part: for (a) Moore's argument form → sceptic's objection → Moore's rejoinder → evaluative verdict; for (b) criteria for basicness → application to bodies → application to persons → critical assessment of Strawson's metaphysics; for (c) exposition of two dogmas → Quine's arguments → holistic replacement → evaluation of success; effective signposting and proportional treatmentCoherent structure within parts but weak transitions between (a)-(b)-(c); some repetition of Moore's proof without moving to evaluation, or descriptive rather than analytical treatment of QuineDisorganised narrative jumping between thinkers without part-wise integrity; mere bullet-point listing of claims without argumentative connections; conclusion that merely summarises without synthesising
Schools / thinkers cited20%10Appropriately invokes Wittgenstein's On Certainty on hinge propositions to contextualise Moore; cites Russell's theory of descriptions as background to Strawson's critique in 'On Referring'; references Grice-Strawson 'In Defence of a Dogma' against Quine; mentions Indian philosophers like Kalidas Bhattacharyya or Daya Krishna on common sense realism where relevant; distinguishes early from later Wittgenstein accuratelyMentions Russell, Wittgenstein, and perhaps Austin for ordinary language but without specific textual references; generic citation of 'logical positivists' without names; misses Grice-Strawson response to QuineNo secondary literature; confuses thinkers (e.g., attributing 'paradigm case argument' to Moore directly, or treating Strawson as Quinean); anachronistic citations; irrelevant Indian philosophy references
Counter-position handling20%10For (a): presents sceptic's dream/hallucination scenarios and Moore's alleged question-begging, then defends or critiques via epistemic externalism or contextualism; for (b): addresses reductionist challenges to primitive status of persons (Dennett, Parfit); for (c): engages with Carnap's reply on analyticity as conventional, and evaluates whether Quine's naturalised epistemology escapes circularity; balanced weighing without strawmanningAcknowledges sceptical challenge to Moore and conventionalist defence of analyticity but superficial treatment; one-sided advocacy for or against Quine without considering rehabilitation attemptsIgnores counter-positions entirely or dismisses scepticism as 'obviously wrong'; no engagement with critics of Strawson's descriptive metaphysics; presents Quine's view as unproblematic truth
Conclusion & coherence20%10Synthesises three thinkers' shared concern with scepticism and meaning while distinguishing their methods: Moore's common sense as bedrock, Strawson's descriptive metaphysics of conceptual scheme, Quine's naturalised epistemology dissolving traditional questions; evaluates which approach best preserves knowledge claims; connects to broader themes in Indian philosophy (Nyaya realism vs Buddhist scepticism) if appropriate; forward-looking assessment of analytic philosophy's legacySeparate summaries for each part without synthetic vision; generic conclusion that 'all three contributed to philosophy' without evaluative comparison; misses thematic connectionsNo conclusion or abrupt ending; conclusion contradicts body; fails to address the evaluative demands of 'critically examine' and 'critically discuss' directives

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