(a) Discuss critically the distributive theory of justice as propounded by R. Nozick. (10 marks) (b) How does Rousseau…

(a) Nozick's entitlement theory of distributive justice

In Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) Nozick holds that a distribution is just if it arises from just steps, whatever its pattern. The theory is historical and unpatterned, resting on three principles: justice in acquisition (Lockean, subject to the proviso that others are not made worse off), justice in transfer (voluntary exchange and gift) and rectification of past injustice. His Wilt Chamberlain example shows that any favoured pattern is upset by free transactions, so maintaining it needs continual interference with liberty. Taxation of earnings is therefore akin to forced labour, and only a minimal state is justified.

Critics argue as follows. The history of acquisition in real societies includes force and fraud, so the starting holdings are not clearly just. The proviso is weakly specified. Need and the worst-off count for nothing, and Cohen challenges the self-ownership premise. Markets also depend on a state's institutions, which are funded by taxes. Rawls and Sen would add that justice should attend to the position of the disadvantaged.

(b) Rousseau on natural and artificial inequality

In the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (1755) Rousseau distinguishes two kinds. Natural or physical inequality is established by nature and consists in differences of age, health, bodily strength and qualities of mind. Artificial or moral (political) inequality depends on a convention, authorised by the consent of men, and consists in privileges enjoyed by some at the expense of others: being richer, more honoured, more powerful, or able to command obedience.

Natural inequality is small and does not by itself yield domination. It becomes magnified once private property arises ("the first man who enclosed a piece of land...") and amour-propre (comparative self-regard) replaces amour de soi. Political institutions then fix and legitimise the advantage of the rich through a deceptive contract. Rousseau's remedy, in the Social Contract, is a legitimate order of the general will in which citizens are equal under law.

(c) Austin's sovereignty and democracy

Austin's command theory (The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, 1832) says law is the command of a sovereign backed by sanction. The sovereign is a determinate human superior who is not in the habit of obeying anyone and whom the bulk of society habitually obeys. Sovereignty is indivisible and legally illimitable.

Partial compatibility: in a representative democracy Austin identifies the sovereign as the electoral body together with the rulers it appoints, so popular rule can fit his scheme. Yet the fit is poor. Constitutional limits, a bill of rights, judicial review and federal division of powers contradict illimitability and indivisibility. Hart argues that law rests on rules and not mere habit of obedience, and that continuity of law outlasts the lawgiver. Popular sovereignty also locates authority in the constitution and the people, not in a determinate person or body. Austin's theory is thus compatible only with a majoritarian, unlimited democracy and not with constitutional democracy.

(d) Monarchy and individual freedom

The answer depends on the type of monarchy. Absolute monarchy concentrates law-making in one person, so liberty is whatever the ruler leaves open. Hobbes, who favoured monarchy, said liberty lies "in the silence of the law". Where the king's will is law, individual freedom has no firm guarantee.

Constitutional monarchy is different. In the United Kingdom, Japan and the Scandinavian states the crown is ceremonial, while an elected government and independent courts protect rights, so such states rank high in individual freedom. Montesquieu too held that a moderate monarchy, with intermediary bodies such as nobility, parliaments and courts, restrains arbitrary power.

Hence monarchy does not by itself guarantee or exclude freedom: what matters is whether power is limited by law and institutions.

(e) Land and property rights in women's empowerment

Bina Agarwal (A Field of One's Own, 1994) argues that secure land rights raise women's economic security, bargaining power within the household and social standing. Evidence from Kerala (Panda and Agarwal, 2005) links women's property ownership with lower risk of marital violence. Independent holdings also improve a family's nutrition and children's schooling.

Legal change has followed. The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act 2005 gave daughters equal coparcenary rights, and Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma (2020) held that these accrue by birth, whether or not the father was alive in 2005.

But rights alone fall short. Women often cannot claim their share because of social pressure to relinquish it to brothers, weak record-keeping, lack of awareness, and a gap between ownership and effective control of land. Property rights are most effective when combined with credit, education and administrative support.