(a) What is non-cognitive theory of religious language? Explain critically in the light of R.B. Braithwaite's views. (20…

(a) The non-cognitive theory of religious language and Braithwaite

The non-cognitive theory holds that religious statements do not state facts, and so are neither true nor false in the way factual claims are. They express attitudes, commitments or intentions. It grew from the verificationist challenge (Ayer, Flew), which asked what observation could verify "God exists". Rather than defending religious assertions as factual, non-cognitivists change their function.

In "An Empiricist's View of the Nature of Religious Belief" (1955), Braithwaite accepts that religious statements are not verifiable factual assertions and are not analytic. They resemble moral statements: their use is to declare an intention to follow a policy of life, such as Christian love (agape). To assert "God is love" is to commit oneself to an agapeistic way of life. Stories and parables (Christ's life, resurrection) are associated with this policy, as psychological support, without being believed as literally true. Religions differ in their stories, not in their policies.

Evaluation: the theory answers the verification challenge and values the practical, moral side of religion. But it has serious weaknesses. Believers do take religious statements as claims about reality, and Braithwaite's reading changes what they mean (Hick, Mitchell). It makes religion almost indistinguishable from ethics, since a secular person can follow the same policy. If stories need not be believed, their power to sustain the intention is doubtful. It also gives no account of religion's claims about God, an afterlife or the world. Hick's "eschatological verification" aims to keep religious claims cognitive.

(b) The doctrine of karma as a postulate of Hinduism

Karma is the law that actions produce results (phala) that return to the agent, in this life or later ones, by a moral causation with no need of external supervision. Its roots lie in Vedic ṛta and sacrifice, and in the Upaniṣads (Bṛhadāraṇyaka 3.2.13, Yājñavalkya on merit and demerit). Karma is classed as sañcita (accumulated), prārabdha (begun to bear fruit) and kriyamāṇa or āgāmi (being done now).

Its role: it explains inequalities of birth and fortune, grounds moral responsibility, and requires rebirth. It is joined to liberation, since the Gītā teaches niṣkāma karma (action without desire for fruit) to avoid fresh bondage, and Advaita holds that knowledge ends karma's hold. The schools differ: Mīmāṃsā explains it through apūrva, Nyāya through God as dispenser of fruits, and Advaita takes karma to rest on ignorance. It is shared by Buddhism and Jainism, and only the Cārvākas reject it.

Evaluation: for, it gives a moral order, hope and an agent's responsibility. Against, it cannot be verified, and it can slide into fatalism or blaming sufferers, and has been used to justify social inequality, as Ambedkar and others criticised. It also faces a question of how the first action began. Defenders reply that the cycle is beginningless (anādi), and that present effort (puruṣārtha) can shape the future, so karma explains but does not excuse.

(c) The symbolic nature of religious language in Tillich

Tillich (Dynamics of Faith, 1957) defines faith as ultimate concern. Since the ultimate transcends finite things, ordinary literal language cannot describe it. Religious language is therefore symbolic. The one non-symbolic statement about God is that "God is being-itself", the ground of all being; everything else (Father, King, Judge, love) is symbolic.

Symbols differ from signs. A sign merely points to something by convention and can be replaced at will (a traffic light). A symbol has four features: it points beyond itself, it participates in the reality it points to, it opens levels of reality and of the soul that are otherwise closed, and it is not invented but grows from the collective life of a community, and dies when it no longer speaks to it.

A symbol can be misused when taken literally, which is idolatry, and Tillich calls for "deliteralisation" of myths.

Criticism: if everything except "being-itself" is symbolic, one cannot say what the symbols point to, and "being-itself" is itself hard to understand (Alston). It may also be unclear how to judge a symbol's adequacy, and believers may think their language is more than symbolic.