Philosophy 2021 Paper II 50 marks Critically examine

Q8

(a) What is non-cognitive theory of religious language? Explain critically in the light of R.B. Braithwaite's views. (20 marks) (b) Discuss and evaluate the doctrine of Karma as an essential postulate of Hinduism. (15 marks) (c) Explain the symbolic nature of religious language with special reference to Paul Tillich. (15 marks)

हिंदी में प्रश्न पढ़ें

(a) धार्मिक भाषा संबंधी असंज्ञानात्मक सिद्धांत क्या है ? आर.बी. ब्रेथवेट के विचारों के आलोक में आलोचनात्मक व्याख्या कीजिए । (20 अंक) (b) हिंदू धर्म की एक आवश्यक पूर्व-मान्यता के रूप में कर्म के सिद्धांत की विवेचना एवं मूल्यांकन कीजिए । (15 अंक) (c) पॉल टिलिच के विशेष संदर्भ में धार्मिक भाषा के प्रतीकात्मक स्वरूप की व्याख्या कीजिए । (15 अंक)

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Directive word: Critically examine

This question asks you to critically examine. The directive word signals the depth of analysis expected, the structure of your answer, and the weight of evidence you must bring.

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How this answer will be evaluated

Approach

Critically examine demands balanced exposition and evaluation across all three parts. Allocate approximately 40% of word budget to part (a) given its 20 marks, with 30% each to parts (b) and (c). Structure as: brief introduction on religious language theories → systematic treatment of (a) Braithwaite's non-cognitive theory with critical assessment → (b) Karma doctrine exposition with evaluation of its essentiality to Hinduism → (c) Tillich's symbolic theology with critical appreciation → integrated conclusion on cognitive vs non-cognitive approaches.

Key points expected

  • Part (a): Definition of non-cognitive theory (religious statements as emotive/expressive rather than truth-claims); Braithwaite's 'empiricist's view' reducing religious language to moral commitment stories; his agnostic stance on metaphysical claims; critical evaluation via criticisms from Hick, Phillips, and theological realists on the 'reductionist' charge
  • Part (b): Karma as cosmic moral law linking action-phala; its textual basis in Upanishads (Brihadaranyaka, Chandogya), Gita, and Dharmaśāstra traditions; evaluation of 'essential postulate' claim through comparison with Buddhist anatta-karma, Jain karma-pudgala, and Hindu bhakti traditions that relativize ritual-karmic emphasis
  • Part (c): Tillich's distinction between sign and symbol; symbol as participatory and self-transcending; his 'God as Ground of Being' as symbolic expression; critical assessment via MacIntyre's 'disguised metaphysics' critique and questions about verification of symbolic correspondence
  • Comparative thread: Contrast Braithwaite's anti-realist reduction with Tillich's symbolic realism; evaluate whether both escape falsification problem differently
  • Indian philosophical context: Reference to Mīmāṃsā (Jaimini-Kumarila) on apūrva and karma as linguistic-practical nexus; Śaṅkara's advaitic sublation of karma in jñāna-mārga as internal critique

Evaluation rubric

DimensionWeightMax marksExcellentAveragePoor
Concept correctness20%10Precisely distinguishes Braithwaite's empiricist non-cognitivism from logical positivism and emotivism; accurately captures Tillich's ontological symbolism against allegorical/mythic reduction; correctly identifies karma's soteriological function across orthodox and heterodox schools without conflating Hindu-specific and pan-Indian variantsBasic grasp of non-cognitive theory but conflates Braithwaite with Ayer or confuses symbolic with mythic language; describes karma mechanistically without soteriological context; minor inaccuracies in attributing positionsFundamental confusion between cognitive and non-cognitive theories; misidentifies Tillich as literalist or atheist; presents karma as fatalistic or exclusively ritualistic; significant conceptual errors across all three parts
Argument structure20%10Clear tripartite organization with proportional weighting (a:b:c ≈ 4:3:3); each part follows thesis-exposition-critical evaluation pattern; explicit transitions between Braithwaite's empiricism and Tillich's ontology showing dialectical progression; conclusion synthesizes tensions between reductionist and realist approachesAll three parts addressed but with uneven development; some critical evaluation present but often appended rather than integrated; weak transitions between parts; conclusion merely summarizes without synthesisDisproportionate treatment (e.g., excessive on karma, neglecting Braithwaite); descriptive narrative without critical structure; missing parts or conflation of (a) and (c); no coherent argumentative arc
Schools / thinkers cited20%10For (a): Braithwaite's 'An Empiricist's View of the Nature of Religious Belief' (1955) with precise citations; secondary engagement with Hick's 'Philosophy of Religion' or Phillips' 'The Concept of Prayer'; for (b): Śaṅkara's Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya, Gita's niṣkāma-karma-yoga, and at least one smṛti/dharmaśāstra reference; for (c): Tillich's 'Systematic Theology' Vol.1-2 with specific symbolic theology passages; MacIntyre or Gilkey for critiqueNames Braithwaite and Tillich correctly but without textual specificity; generic reference to 'Hindu scriptures' for karma; mentions one or two critics per part without elaboration; some conflation of thinkers (e.g., Tillich with Bultmann)Misattributes positions (e.g., Braithwaite to Wittgenstein's language games, Tillich to Barth); no Indian philosophical sources for karma; confuses schools (e.g., Mīmāṃsā with Vedānta); reliance on secondary generalizations only
Counter-position handling20%10For (a): Engages theological realist critique (Hick's eschatological verification), Wittgensteinian fideist objection (Phillips), and Braithwaite's response on moral empiricism; for (b): Evaluates karma's 'essentiality' via bhakti critique (Rāmānuja's prapatti), Buddhist rejection of ātman-karma link, and modern reformist (Gandhi/Roy) reinterpretations; for (c): Assesses MacIntyre's 'metaphysical smuggling' charge and questions about symbolic adequacy criteriaSome critical awareness present but one-dimensional; for (a) notes verificationism critique without Braithwaite-specific response; for (b) mentions caste critique without theological engagement; for (c) notes 'God as Ground' obscurity without systematic evaluationNo genuine critical engagement—either pure description or dismissive polemic; ignores obvious objections (e.g., Braithwaite's inability to distinguish religious from secular moral stories; karma's theodicy problem; Tillich's apparent pantheism); strawman representations of counter-positions
Conclusion & coherence20%10Synthesizes three parts into coherent typology of religious language theories: Braithwaite's non-cognitive reduction, Tillich's symbolic realism, with karma doctrine illustrating how 'essential postulates' function differently in descriptive vs symbolic registers; evaluates which approach better preserves religious practice's integrity; may propose qualified pluralism or defend one approach with acknowledged limitationsBrief conclusion restating main points without integration; some attempt to connect (a) and (c) on religious language but omits (b)'s relevance; or treats karma separately without linking to language theory; coherent but not illuminatingMissing or extremely perfunctory conclusion; contradictory positions across parts without acknowledgment; no recognition that (a) and (c) address same broad topic differently; abrupt ending or irrelevant digression

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