(a) Does the rejection of metaphysics as proposed by Logical Positivists relate to problem of meaning or problem of knowledge or…

Logical Positivism and the Rejection of Metaphysics

The Logical Positivist elimination of metaphysics is primarily a critique of meaning, but it simultaneously redefines epistemology and dissolves traditional questions regarding the nature of things. By deploying the Verifiability Criterion of Meaning, the Vienna Circle and A.J. Ayer (Language, Truth and Logic) argued that a proposition is cognitively meaningful if and only if it is either analytic (tautologies of logic and mathematics) or empirically verifiable (synthetic). Metaphysical assertions such as "The Absolute is perfect" or "God exists" do not assert matters of empirical fact, nor are they formal definitions; hence, they are not false, but literal pseudo-propositions devoid of cognitive sense.

Epistemologically, this restricts human knowledge strictly to the bounds of sense-experience and tautological transformations, echoing Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (Proposition 7: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent"). Ayer distinguished between "strong" verification (conclusive experiential proof) and "weak" verification (rendering an empirical hypothesis probable in principle). Because metaphysical concepts fail even weak verification, metaphysics cannot yield genuine knowledge. Consequently, the critique expands to ethics, aesthetics, and theology, reducing their claims to non-cognitive, emotive expressions. Regarding the "nature of things," positivism does not offer an alternative ontology (like materialism or idealism), but dissolves ontology entirely as an illusory byproduct of linguistic misuse. However, the criterion faces the classic charge of self-refutation, as the verification principle itself is neither tautological nor empirically verifiable.

Bracketing and Reduction in Husserl’s Phenomenology

Edmund Husserl developed the phenomenological method to overcome both psychologism and naturalism, establishing philosophy as a rigorous, presuppositionless science (strenge Wissenschaft). Central to this are epoché (bracketing) and the two-fold reduction.

Epoché demands the methodical suspension of the "natural attitude"—our naive, unexamined belief in the independent existence of the spatio-temporal world. Rather than doubting the world's existence (as in Cartesian skepticism), the phenomenologist brackets all existential claims and ontological presuppositions. Following this, the eidetic reduction strips away contingent, factual particulars to intuit universal essences (eidos) through imaginative variation. The transcendental reduction then suspends the empirical, psychological ego to uncover the "phenomenological residue"—pure, transcendental consciousness.

The profound significance of this process lies in securing an apodictic, absolute foundation for knowledge. Within this domain, consciousness is characterized by intentionality (noesis-noema correlation)—meaning is actively constituted by the transcendental ego. The world is thereby recovered not as a dogmatic, mind-independent substance, but as a validly constituted phenomenon of pure consciousness.

Sartre’s Paradox and the Conception of Consciousness

Jean-Paul Sartre’s formulation that consciousness "is what it is not and is not what it is" encapsulates the fundamental ontology of the Pour-soi (Being-for-itself) in Being and Nothingness. Rooted in intentionality, consciousness cannot exist in isolation; it is always consciousness of an object. Because it is directed outward toward the En-soi (Being-in-itself, the opaque, fully self-identical, solid object), consciousness in itself is an emptiness, a radical lack, or pure nothingness (néant).

The paradox illustrates the dynamic temporality and freedom of the For-itself: Consciousness is not what it is because it constantly nihilates its past facticity (its fixed history, body, and socio-historical situatedness), transcending it through perpetual choice. Consciousness is what it is not because its being is defined by its future possibilities and projects, which do not yet exist.

Unlike the In-itself, the For-itself lacks fixed essence; its existence precedes its essence. Attempting to evade this absolute freedom and its accompanying anguish results in mauvaise foi (bad faith)—exemplified by the café waiter who pretends to be a fixed object ("a waiter in-itself"). For Sartre, human beings are "condemned to be free," constitutionally incapable of freezing consciousness into a substantial identity.

Conclusion

Logical Positivism, Husserlian phenomenology, and Sartrean existentialism represent radically divergent responses to modern epistemology. While Positivism linguistically eliminated metaphysics, Husserl re-grounded first philosophy in the transcendental ego, which Sartre subsequently radicalized by stripping the ego of substantiality and locating pure freedom in existence. This trajectory continues to guide contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind regarding the irreducible nature of intentionality and first-person subjective experience.