Philosophy 2023 Paper I 50 marks Discuss

Q4

(a) Why does Strawson consider person to be a primitive concept ? What implication does it have for the mind-body dualism ? Discuss. (20 marks) (b) Why according to Russell is the proposition – "The present king of France is bald" problematic ? Critically discuss. (15 marks) (c) What were the main reasons that led Wittgenstein to shift from picture-theory of meaning to use-theory of meaning ? Critically discuss. (15 marks)

हिंदी में प्रश्न पढ़ें

(a) स्ट्रॉसन व्यक्ति को एक आध अवधारणा क्यों मानते हैं ? मनस्-शरीर द्वैतवाद के लिए इसका क्या निहितार्थ है ? विवेचना कीजिए । (20 अंक) (b) रसेल के अनुसार यह प्रतिज्ञा – "फ्रांस का वर्तमान राजा गंजा है" क्यों समस्याप्रस्त है ? आलोचनात्मक विवेचना कीजिए । (15 अंक) (c) किन प्रमुख कारणों से विट्टजेन्स्टाइन अपना खण्ड अर्थ के चित्र-सिद्धान्त से अर्थ के प्रयोग-सिद्धान्त की ओर कर लेते हैं ? आलोचनात्मक विवेचना कीजिए । (15 अंक)

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Directive word: Discuss

This question asks you to discuss. The directive word signals the depth of analysis expected, the structure of your answer, and the weight of evidence you must bring.

See our UPSC directive words guide for a full breakdown of how to respond to each command word.

How this answer will be evaluated

Approach

The directive 'discuss' demands a balanced exposition with critical analysis across all three parts. Allocate approximately 40% of word budget (~400-450 words) to part (a) given its 20 marks, and roughly 30% each (~300-350 words) to parts (b) and (c). Structure: brief unified introduction noting the trajectory from Strawson's metaphysics to Russell's logic to Wittgenstein's linguistic turn; then dedicated sections for each sub-part with internal critical discussion; conclude by synthesizing how these three thinkers collectively transformed analytic philosophy's approach to meaning and reference.

Key points expected

  • For (a): Strawson's critique of Cartesian dualism through the 'person' as primitive—neither reducible to pure consciousness nor to bodily states, but as the basic particular to which both M-predicates and P-predicates apply
  • For (a): The implication that mind-body dualism is a 'category mistake' (Ryle) or conceptual confusion; Strawson's rejection of the 'no-ownership' theory and his argument that personhood is logically prior to individual states
  • For (b): Russell's theory of definite descriptions—how 'The present King of France is bald' is meaningful despite lacking referent, analyzed as ∃x(Kx ∧ ∀y(Ky → y=x) ∧ Bx); the problem of negative existentials and Meinong's paradox
  • For (b): Critical evaluation of Strawson's objection (presupposition failure vs. truth-value gap) and whether Russell's paraphrase captures ordinary language use
  • For (c): Wittgenstein's shift from Tractarian picture theory (propositions as logical pictures of facts, isomorphism, naming-relation) to Philosophical Investigations' use-theory (language games, family resemblance, rule-following)
  • For (c): Key reasons for shift: recognition of language's diversity (religious, aesthetic, command uses), private language argument's impossibility, and the Augustinian picture critique; critical assessment of whether this constitutes genuine discontinuity or evolution

Evaluation rubric

DimensionWeightMax marksExcellentAveragePoor
Concept correctness20%10Precisely defines 'primitive concept' in Strawson's sense (irreducible logical subject); accurately states Russell's analysis with proper quantificational structure; correctly distinguishes Tractatus 2.1-2.225 picture theory from PI 43 use-theory without conflating early and late WittgensteinGenerally understands person as basic unit and Russell's concern with non-referring terms, but misstates the quantificational analysis or conflates picture theory with correspondence theory; vague on what 'use' means for late WittgensteinMisidentifies 'primitive' as 'simple' or 'ancient'; thinks Russell declares the proposition meaningless; confuses picture theory with mental imagery; fundamental errors in all three thinkers' core positions
Argument structure20%10For (a): clear progression from Strawson's argument for primitiveness → dualism implications → evaluation; for (b): presents Russell's solution then Strawson's critique with adjudication; for (c): traces internal development with textual evidence from both works; smooth transitions between partsCovers all three parts but with uneven depth—strong on (a) but rushed on (c); some logical gaps in connecting Strawson's metaphysics to dualism implications; lists reasons for Wittgenstein's shift without showing how they undermine picture theoryDisorganized treatment—mixes thinkers without part demarcation; no clear thesis in any section; for (c) merely contrasts two theories without explaining the transition; missing argumentative links throughout
Schools / thinkers cited20%10For (a): cites Ryle's 'category mistake' and Bennett's criticisms; for (b): brings in Meinong, Frege (sense/reference), and Strawson's 'On Referring'; for (c): references Waismann, Malcolm, and Kripke's 'Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language'; demonstrates awareness of secondary literatureMentions Ryle in connection with Strawson and Strawson's reply to Russell; identifies early vs. late Wittgenstein but without specific commentators; limited engagement with broader analytic tradition beyond the three named thinkersOnly names the three required thinkers with no additional figures; or introduces irrelevant names (Kant, Hegel) without justification; confuses Strawson P.F. with Galen Strawson; attributes positions to wrong thinkers
Counter-position handling20%10For (a): considers Cartesian rejoinder and Strawson's response; for (b): evaluates whether Strawson's pragmatic objection undermines Russell's semantic analysis; for (c): assesses 'new Wittgenstein' vs. 'old Wittgenstein' interpretations and whether use-theory solves the problems it identifies; balanced critical stance throughoutAcknowledges obvious objections—e.g., notes that Russell's analysis seems counterintuitive, or that use-theory risks circularity—but develops responses superficially; one part may have adequate critique while others are descriptive onlyPurely expository with no critical dimension; or presents strawman objections easily dismissed; dismissive of alternative readings without engagement; 'critical discuss' directive unfulfilled in any substantive sense
Conclusion & coherence20%10Synthesizes the three thinkers' contributions to analytic philosophy's linguistic turn—showing how Strawson's descriptive metaphysics, Russell's logical analysis, and Wittgenstein's therapeutic philosophy collectively moved philosophy from substance to concept to use; returns to the theme of 'primitive' concepts in conclusion; demonstrates how 20th century analytic philosophy progressively internalized the critique of metaphysicsBriefly summarizes each part separately without synthetic vision; or attempts synthesis but forces artificial connection; conclusion restates main points without advancing understanding of the tradition's developmentMissing or perfunctory conclusion; ends abruptly with part (c) discussion; no attempt to connect the three thinkers despite their shared tradition; or introduces entirely new material in conclusion

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