Philosophy 2023 Paper I 50 marks Discuss

Q8

(a) "Ignorance of dependent origination is suffering while its knowledge is cessation of suffering." Present an account of Buddhist soteriology in the light of above statement. (20 marks) (b) Write a note on Nyāya notion of Prāgabhāva (prior non-existence). How does this notion help Naiyāyikas in defending their position on causation against the Sāṃkhya view of causation ? Critically discuss. (15 marks) (c) Do words refer to universals or particulars or both ? Present an exposition of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā position with regard to above question along with suitable examples. (15 marks)

हिंदी में प्रश्न पढ़ें

(a) "प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाद को न जानना दुःख है जबकि उसका ज्ञान दुःख का अंत है ।" उपरोक्त कथन के आलोक में बौद्धों के मोक्षशास्त्र की व्याख्या प्रस्तुत कीजिए । (20 अंक) (b) न्यायदर्शन में प्रागभाव के अवधारणा पर एक टिप्पणी लिखिए । यह अवधारणा किस प्रकार सांख्य के कारणता सिद्धांत के प्रतिपक्ष में नैयायिकों की अपने कारणता सिद्धांत की प्रतिरक्षा में सहायता करती है ? आलोचनात्मक विवेचना कीजिए । (15 अंक) (c) क्या पद/शब्द सामान्य को अथवा विशेष को अथवा दोनों को इंगित करते हैं ? इस विषय पर न्याय तथा मीमांसा मतों की उदाहरणों सहित व्याख्या कीजिए । (15 अंक)

Evaluate your answer to this question → See all 2023 Philosophy questions

Directive word: Discuss

This question asks you to discuss. The directive word signals the depth of analysis expected, the structure of your answer, and the weight of evidence you must bring.

See our UPSC directive words guide for a full breakdown of how to respond to each command word.

How this answer will be evaluated

Approach

Begin with a brief introduction acknowledging the three distinct philosophical problems across Buddhist, Nyāya, and Mīmāṃsā traditions. Allocate approximately 40% of content to part (a) on Buddhist soteriology through pratītyasamutpāda, 30% to part (b) on Nyāya's Prāgabhāva and the causation debate with Sāṃkhya, and 30% to part (c) comparing Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā theories of word-meaning. Ensure each part has internal structure with clear subheadings, and conclude by briefly synthesizing how all three parts illuminate Indian epistemological concerns with knowledge, existence, and meaning.

Key points expected

  • Part (a): Explanation of pratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination) as the middle path between eternalism and annihilationism; analysis of avidyā as the root cause of duḥkha and prajñā/vidyā as leading to nirodha; connection to Four Noble Truths and Noble Eightfold Path
  • Part (a): Distinction between samvṛti-satya (conventional truth) and paramārtha-satya (ultimate truth) in Madhyamika soteriology; role of śūnyatā in liberation
  • Part (b): Definition of Prāgabhāva as prior non-existence (effect before its production) with examples like curd before milk transformation; distinction from atyantābhāva, anyonyābhāva, and dhvaṃsābhāva
  • Part (b): Nyāya's asatkāryavāda (non-existence of effect before causation) vs. Sāṃkhya's satkāryavāda (pre-existence of effect); how Prāgabhāva enables Nyāya to maintain real change and avoid the 'useless cause' objection
  • Part (c): Nyāya theory of word-meaning: words primarily refer to sāmānya (universals/ākṛti) through vyakti (particulars) as locus, with jāti as primary meaning; example of 'cow' referring to gotva
  • Part (c): Mīmāṃsā theory: Bhāṭṭa view (words refer to both universal and particular via śakti and lakṣaṇā) vs. Prābhākara view (words directly refer to universal-qualified particulars, samūha); example of 'bring the cow' where go-tva and individual cow are comprehended
  • Critical comparison: Nyāya's realism about universals vs. Mīmāṃsā's functional approach; how both differ from Buddhist apoha theory (optional advanced point)

Evaluation rubric

DimensionWeightMax marksExcellentAveragePoor
Concept correctness20%10Precise exposition of pratītyasamutpāda's 12 links in (a); accurate technical treatment of Prāgabhāva's four characteristics in (b); correct distinction between jāti, vyakti, and ākṛti in Nyāya and the Bhāṭṭa-Prābhākara divergence in (c); no conflation of abhāva typesGenerally correct definitions but imprecise on technical details—e.g., conflating Prāgabhāva with dhvaṃsābhāva, or oversimplifying Mīmāṃsā as holding a single unified position; minor errors in the 12 nidānas sequenceFundamental conceptual errors—e.g., interpreting pratītyasamutpāda as linear causation rather than mutual dependence, confusing satkāryavāda with asatkāryavāda, or claiming Nyāya accepts only particulars without universals
Argument structure20%10Clear logical progression in (a) from avidyā to saṃskāra to duḥkha and reversal through vidyā; in (b), systematic presentation of Nyāya's five-membered inference defending asatkāryavāda; in (c), structured comparison showing how each school solves the akhaṇḍa-padārtha problem; effective use of examples (pot-clay, curd-milk, cow-recognition)Adequate structure within each part but weak transitions between (a), (b), and (c); arguments present but not explicitly linked to the questions asked; examples given but not fully integrated into logical demonstrationDisorganized or fragmented response; no clear thesis in any part; failure to address 'how' and 'why' questions in (b) and (c); mere listing of concepts without argumentative connection; missing examples entirely
Schools / thinkers cited20%10Citation of Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā for (a); Gautama's Nyāyasūtra and Vātsyāyana's bhāṣya for Prāgabhāva in (b); Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara Miśra with specific works (Ślokavārttika, Bṛhatī) for (c); reference to Uddyotakara's Nyāyavārttika on the Sāṃkhya debateGeneric reference to 'Buddhists,' 'Nyāya philosophers,' and 'Mīmāṃsakas' without specific thinkers; or correct names mentioned but without textual grounding; awareness of subschools but no precise attribution of viewsNo thinkers or texts named; conflation of schools (e.g., attributing satkāryavāda to Nyāya); anachronistic or irrelevant citations; confusion between Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara positions
Counter-position handling20%10In (a), anticipation of Vedāntic critique (Brahman as permanent) and Svābhāvika response; in (b), detailed presentation of Sāṃkhya's satkāryavāda arguments (na hy asataḥ, etc.) and Nyāya's systematic rebuttal including the 'lamp-in-darkness' objection; in (c), awareness of Buddhist apoha as alternative and brief indication of why Nyāya/Mīmāṃsā reject itMention of opposing views but superficial treatment—e.g., noting Sāṃkhya holds opposite view without explaining their reasoning; or presenting counter-position without Nyāya's response; missing the critical dimension in (c)No counter-positions presented; one-sided exposition that reads like school advocacy; failure to engage with 'critically discuss' directive in (b); ignoring that (c) invites comparison between two schools
Conclusion & coherence20%10Brief synthetic conclusion showing how all three parts illuminate Indian philosophy's central concern with the relationship between knowledge and reality—pratītyasamutpāda as knowledge of causal dependence, Prāgabhāva as ontological analysis of change, and śābdabodha as linguistic knowledge; balanced treatment reflecting mark distribution; no part disproportionately neglectedSeparate conclusions for each part without overarching synthesis; or adequate coverage of (a) and (b) with rushed (c); word allocation roughly follows marks but integration is mechanicalMissing conclusion entirely; severe imbalance (e.g., 70% on (a), minimal on (b) and (c)); or conclusion that merely repeats introduction; failure to demonstrate that the three parts form a coherent examination of Indian epistemology and metaphysics

Practice this exact question

Write your answer, then get a detailed evaluation from our AI trained on UPSC's answer-writing standards. Free first evaluation — no signup needed to start.

Evaluate my answer →

More from Philosophy 2023 Paper I