(a) "Ignorance of dependent origination is suffering while its knowledge is cessation of suffering." Present an account of…

(a) Buddhist soteriology in the light of dependent origination

Pratītyasamutpāda says that when this exists, that comes to be; when this ceases, that ceases. It is the middle path between eternalism and annihilationism. The twelve links run from avidyā (ignorance), saṃskāras, vijñāna, nāma-rūpa, the six sense-bases, sparśa, vedanā, tṛṣṇā (craving), upādāna (clinging), bhava and jāti to old age and death. Avidyā, taking the impermanent, painful and selfless to be permanent, pleasant and a self, is the root; with its cessation the whole chain stops. The Four Noble Truths give the same structure: duḥkha, its origin (samudaya) in craving rooted in ignorance, cessation (nirodha), and the eightfold path (mārga). The path works through śīla, samādhi and prajñā; prajñā, direct insight into dependent origination, is what ends avidyā ("who sees dependent origination sees the Dhamma", Majjhima Nikāya). Because there is no permanent self (anattā), there is nothing to be saved except the stopping of a conditioned process, and nirvāṇa is the extinction of craving, hatred and delusion, the cessation of rebirth. Schools differ. Theravāda stresses arhat nirvāṇa through insight into the three marks. In Madhyamaka, Nāgārjuna equates dependent origination with emptiness (śūnyatā) of svabhāva, and with the middle path (MMK XXIV.18); seeing this dissolves conceptual proliferation (prapañca), and nirvāṇa is not different from saṃsāra in nature. Mahāyāna adds the bodhisattva ideal of compassion. So the statement summarises the Buddhist programme: bondage is a mistake about how things arise, and freedom is accurate understanding that is made effective by practice.

(b) Prāgabhāva and Nyāya causation against Sāṃkhya

Prāgabhāva is the absence of an effect in its cause before it is produced, as of the pot in the clay. It has no beginning (anādi) but ends when the effect arises (sānta). It differs from dhvaṃsābhāva, the absence after destruction, from atyantābhāva, the absence at all times, and from anyonyābhāva, mutual difference. Nyāya holds asatkāryavāda (ārambhavāda): the effect is a new whole that did not exist in its causes and is brought into being from the causes, by the assemblage of the inherent (samavāyi), non-inherent and instrumental causes. Sāṃkhya satkāryavāda says the effect exists beforehand in the cause: for what is non-existent cannot be produced (asadakaraṇāt), a particular cause gives a particular effect (upādāna-niyama), not everything comes from everything, a capable cause makes only what it can, and the effect is of the cause's nature (Sāṃkhya Kārikā 9). Prāgabhāva helps Nyāya reply. If the effect existed already, causal activity such as the potter's work would be useless, and the pot would be used before it is made. Our experience, "the pot will be", "the pot is not yet", shows its absence is real and perceived. Because prāgabhāva is a specific absence tied to specific causes, the maxim that "what does not exist cannot be produced" is answered: the effect is non-existent only in the sense of prāgabhāva and then comes into being, and the restriction of cause to effect is explained by the specific prāgabhāva of each effect. Evaluation. The argument is strong for ordinary causal work and fits experience; Sāṃkhya replies that a prior absence cannot be the locus of a relation, that causal power must belong to something real, and that the production of the new needs explanation, and satkārya better explains continuity of material. Advaita says both views fail against vivarta.

(c) Do words refer to universals, particulars or both: Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā

Nyāya (Nyāya Sūtra II.2.63): "the object of a word is the individual (vyakti), the form (ākṛti) and the universal (jāti)". A word like "cow" denotes the individual possessing cowness and the characteristic shape: "bring the cow" would be meaningless if only the universal were meant, since a universal cannot be brought, and meaningless if only the individual, since the cows are unlimited. The word is the sign of a universal-qualified particular. Mīmāṃsā. The Bhāṭṭa school (Kumārila) holds that a word primarily denotes the universal (jāti); the individual is presented through it, on the ground that the universal is the constant element and that the individual is understood by implication or by necessity. The Prābhākara school, with its anvitābhidhāna, holds that words give their meaning only as connected with other words in a sentence, and treats the individual qualified by the universal as the meaning. Comparison. Both are realists. Nyāya gives a composite meaning, and Mīmāṃsā gives primacy to the universal, in line with the eternity of word and meaning in the Vedic tradition. Against both, Buddhists (apoha) say that words denote exclusion of what is other, since there are no real universals.