(a) "Ignorance of dependent origination is suffering while its knowledge is cessation of suffering." Present an account of Buddhist soteriology in the light of above statement. (20 marks)

(b) Write a note on Nyāya notion of Prāgabhāva (prior non-exi

Question

(a) "Ignorance of dependent origination is suffering while its knowledge is cessation of suffering." Present an account of Buddhist soteriology in the light of above statement. (20 marks)

(b) Write a note on Nyāya notion of Prāgabhāva (prior non-existence). How does this notion help Naiyāyikas in defending their position on causation against the Sāṃkhya view of causation ? Critically discuss. (15 marks)

(c) Do words refer to universals or particulars or both ? Present an exposition of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā position with regard to above question along with suitable examples. (15 marks)

UPSC Answer Check · Accepted Answer

Classical Indian philosophy systematically integrates metaphysics, semantics, and soteriology to address liberation, causation, and linguistic reference.

Buddhist Soteriology and Pratītyasamutpāda

In Buddhism, pratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination) functions as the ontological Middle Path between eternalism (śāśvatavāda) and annihilationism (ucchedavāda). It asserts that all phenomena arise dependently (asmin sati idam bhavati). Within the twelve links of causation (dvādaśa-nidāna), avidyā (primal ignorance of impermanence and non-self) is the root condition generating suffering (duḥkha). The Four Noble Truths articulate this causal nexus: diagnosing duḥkha, tracing its origin (samudaya) to craving rooted in avidyā, envisioning its cessation (nirodha) upon dispelling ignorance, and providing the praxis via the Noble Eightfold Path (mārga) to cultivate prajñā (transformative wisdom).

In Mādhyamika philosophy, Nāgārjuna develops this soteriology through the doctrine of Two Truths (satya-dvaya). Empirical existence operates under conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya), governed by causal dependencies. However, ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya) reveals śūnyatā (emptiness of inherent existence, svabhāva). Equating pratītyasamutpāda with śūnyatā, Nāgārjuna demonstrates that realization of universal non-substantiality dissolves all mental proliferations (prapañca), culminating in liberation (nirvāṇa).

Nyāya Notion of Prāgabhāva and Causation

Nyāya defines prāgabhāva as prior non-existence—the absence of an effect in its material cause before its generation (such as curd before milk is curdled, or a jar before clay is fashioned). It is beginningless (anādi) but has an end (sānta), terminating precisely when the effect is produced. Nyāya distinguishes it from the three other forms of non-existence: dhvaṃsābhāva (posterior non-existence; having a beginning but endless), atyantābhāva (absolute non-existence, e.g., the son of a barren woman), and anyonyābhāva (mutual non-identity, e.g., a jar is not a cloth).

This concept is vital for Nyāya’s defense of asatkāryavāda (or ārambhavāda), which holds that the effect is an entirely new entity that did not exist prior to its production. Naiyāyikas deploy prāgabhāva against Sāṃkhya’s satkāryavāda (pre-existence of the effect in the cause). If the effect were already existent in the cause, causal agency (kārakavyāpāra) would be futile, leading to the objection of a "useless cause." By establishing prāgabhāva, Nyāya affirms the reality of causal transformation and genuine novelty without lapsing into absolute non-existence, as the effect emerges from a real, determinate material substratum.

Linguistic Reference in Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā

The semantic debate on whether a word denotes a universal (jāti), a particular (vyakti), or both reveals fundamental realistic commitments.

Gautama’s Nyāya-sūtra presents a composite doctrine: a word signifies the universal (jāti), the individual particular (vyakti), and the generic structure (ākṛti) simultaneously (vyakty-ākṛti-jātayastu padārthaḥ). When the word "cow" is uttered, it primarily denotes the universal gotva (cowness) as qualifying the concrete individual (vyakti) possessing the bovine configuration (ākṛti).

Mīmāṃsā approaches the problem through Vedic injunctions. The Bhāṭṭa school asserts that words denote only the universal (jāti) through primary expressive power (śakti); the particular (vyakti) is apprehended secondarily through implication (lakṣaṇā). In the directive "bring the cow" (gām ānaya), while action physically applies to an individual, the word strictly designates the universal gotva. Conversely, the Prābhākara school, advocating anvitābhidhāna-vāda, holds that words directly denote universal-qualified particulars (viśiṣṭa-vyakti) as connected in a sentence. Both schools uphold semantic realism, standing in sharp contrast to the Buddhist nominalist apoha theory, which conceives word-meaning purely as the exclusion of opposites (anyāpoha

(a) "Ignorance of dependent origination is suffering while its knowledge is cessation of suffering." Present an account of…

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