(a) Elucidate Naiyāyikas account of fallacies of the middle term in relation to five characteristics of valid middle term. (20…

(a) Fallacies of the middle term and the five characteristics of a valid hetu

In Nyāya, a hetu gives valid inference only if it has five characteristics: pakṣadharmatā (present in the subject), sapakṣasattva (present in similar instances), vipakṣāsattva (absent from dissimilar instances), abādhitaviṣayatva (its sādhya not contradicted by a stronger pramāṇa), and asatpratipakṣatva (no counter-hetu of equal force). The first three together secure vyāpti, the invariable concomitance. A hetvābhāsa is a hetu that seems valid but lacks one of them, so the five fallacies correspond to the five conditions. Asiddha (unproved), where the hetu is not present in the pakṣa, violates pakṣadharmatā: "the sky-lotus is fragrant because it is a lotus". Viruddha (contradictory), where the hetu is present only where the sādhya is absent, violates sapakṣasattva: "sound is eternal because it is produced"; being produced occurs only in non-eternal things. Savyabhicāra (inconclusive), where the hetu is present in both sapakṣa and vipakṣa, violates vipakṣāsattva: "sound is eternal because it is knowable", as knowable things are both eternal and non-eternal. Its sub-types include the sādhāraṇa and asādhāraṇa (a hetu found only in the pakṣa, with no sapakṣa). Satpratipakṣa (counter-balanced) violates asatpratipakṣatva: "sound is eternal because audible" is matched by "sound is non-eternal because produced". Bādhita (contradicted) violates abādhitaviṣayatva: "fire is cold because it is a substance", refuted by perception. Gautama's Nyāya Sūtra (I.2.4–9) lists five: savyabhicāra, viruddha, prakaraṇasama (satpratipakṣa), sādhyasama (asiddha) and kālātīta (bādhita). The five are fallacies of the middle term, not of the major term.

(b) "Attainment of the already attained" in Advaita

For Advaita, mokṣa is not produced, acquired, modified or purified (BSB I.1.4): since it is the Self, Brahman, which is eternal and ever-present, it cannot be a new result of action. Ignorance (avidyā) hides it, and knowledge (jñāna) removes the ignorance and nothing more. So liberation is the "attainment of the already attained" (prāptasya prāpti). Illustrations: The rope taken for a snake: the snake was never real, and on knowing the rope nothing new is gained; the error ends. The nacre mistaken for silver, and the mirage for water, show adhyāsa and its sublation. The tenth man of the Advaita tradition, who counts nine, forgets to count himself, grieves that the tenth is lost, and is told "you are the tenth": he gains nothing, only knowledge of what was his. Comments. The idea resolves the paradox of a finite effort reaching an infinite goal and explains why liberation cannot be lost. But if Brahman is already attained, why is there sādhana? The answer is that practice removes ignorance and operates at the vyāvahārika level, whereas the Self is realised at the pāramārthika level. Critics such as Rāmānuja object that this makes bondage unreal and the path a game, and that avidyā itself needs explaining. It also loses the idea of a goal for ethical striving, though Advaita would say that purification of mind prepares for knowledge.

(c) Citta and its vṛttis in Yoga; why their cessation

Citta in Yoga is the product of prakṛti, the mind-stuff, covering buddhi, ahaṃkāra and manas, which is insentient and reflects puruṣa's consciousness. Its modifications (vṛttis) are five (YS I.5–11): pramāṇa (perception, inference, testimony), viparyaya (error), vikalpa (verbal imagination), nidrā (sleep) and smṛti (memory). They are of two types, kliṣṭa, rooted in the kleśas and causing bondage, and akliṣṭa, which lead toward freedom. Yoga is defined as citta-vṛtti-nirodha (YS I.2). Reasons: When citta fluctuates, puruṣa the seer appears identical with its vṛttis (YS I.4), mistaking changing states for the Self; when they cease, the seer abides in its own nature (I.3). The vṛttis are the vehicle of the kleśas (avidyā, asmitā, rāga, dveṣa, abhiniveśa), which bring karma and suffering, and "future suffering is to be avoided" (II.16). Discriminative knowledge of puruṣa and prakṛti (viveka-khyāti, II.26) arises only in a still mind, and ends in kaivalya. Even the akliṣṭa vṛttis are to be stilled in the end, in asamprajñāta samādhi. The means are abhyāsa and vairāgya (I.12) and the eight limbs. The cessation is therefore the condition of liberation, not mere inertness.