(a) "All human knowledge is empirical and therefore relative." Critically examine Jaina theory of sevenfold judgement…

(a) Saptabhaṅgī and the relativity of empirical knowledge

The statement is partly accepted by the Jainas: all empirical knowledge is from a standpoint (naya) and grasps one aspect of an object that has infinite aspects (anekāntavāda). Saptabhaṅgī, the sevenfold predication, expresses this by prefixing syāt ("in some respect") to each judgement: syād asti, syād nāsti, syād asti-nāsti, syād avaktavya, syād asti-avaktavya, syād nāsti-avaktavya, and syād asti-nāsti-avaktavya. The third combines affirmation and denial in different respects; the fourth records that asserting both at once in one respect cannot be put in words. The Jainas do not conclude that knowledge is merely relative: each judgement is conditionally true, and the kevala-jñāna of the omniscient grasps the whole. Criticism: Śaṅkara (Brahma Sūtra II.2.33) says that a doctrine that makes everything "perhaps so" cannot establish itself; the Jaina reply is that syāt-vāda is itself conditional. Logically, avaktavya looks like a restatement of the first three, and the scheme can seem to weaken truth-claims, though it rightly checks dogmatism.

(b) Śaṅkara's criticism of Sāṃkhya dualism

Sāṃkhya holds two ultimate and independent realities: the conscious, inactive Puruṣa and the unconscious, active Prakṛti (pradhāna), the world's material cause. Śaṅkara's critique (Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya II.2.1–10) rests on the question of relation. If they are independent, there can be no real contact (saṃyoga) between them: Puruṣa is changeless and all-pervading, and Prakṛti is a different order of thing. If Prakṛti is moved to act for Puruṣa's enjoyment and liberation, Prakṛti would need a purpose, yet it is unconscious. If the relation were natural, there could be no liberation, since it would be unending. The "lame man and blind man" analogy of Sāṃkhya fails because the lame man is active and guides. Further, an unconscious cause cannot produce an ordered, purposive world with intelligent beings; only a conscious Brahman can. The plurality of Puruṣas and the inference of Pradhāna are unsupported by śruti, which reveals Brahman as the one cause. Dualism therefore falls short of explaining relation and order, and non-dual Brahman is preferred.

(c) The Advaita reading of "tat tvam asi"

The mahāvākya is from the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (VI.8.7), where Uddālaka teaches his son Śvetaketu. For Advaita it declares the identity of the individual self (tvam, jīva) with Brahman (tat). The literal meanings conflict: tat is Brahman as omniscient and creator (Īśvara), while tvam is the finite, limited self. So a direct reading is impossible, and the sentence is not an identity of two different things. Advaita therefore applies jahad-ajahat-lakṣaṇā (bhāga-tyāga-lakṣaṇā): the contradictory attributes, omniscience and limited knowledge, are given up, and the pure consciousness common to both is retained. The sentence is read as one in which both terms have the same referent, as in "this is that Devadatta", with different attributes (sāmānādhikaraṇya). The upādhis, māyā and ignorance, make the apparent difference; once pure consciousness (sat-cit-ānanda) is realised, there is no difference. The sentence gives immediate knowledge (aparokṣa-jñāna) and removes the ignorance that causes bondage, which is liberation.

(d) Vaiśeṣika view of negation

For Vaiśeṣika, abhāva (non-existence) is a real category, and the later school counts it as the seventh padārtha. It is always the absence of something in some place: it has a counterpositive (pratiyogī), the thing whose absence it is, and a substratum (anuyogī), the locus of the absence. "Absence without a counterpositive" is therefore meaningless. Four kinds of abhāva: Prāg-abhāva: absence before production, as of the pot in the clay, having a beginning not an end. Pradhvaṃsa-abhāva: absence after destruction, as of the pot in the potsherds, having a beginning but no end. Atyanta-abhāva: absence in all times, as of colour in air, neither beginning nor end. Anyonya-abhāva: mutual absence, difference, as the pot is not the cloth. Even absolute absence is relative to a pratiyogī and a locus, so a negation of everything, without any counterpositive, is impossible. Abhāva is perceived by the sense in contact with its locus, as when we see that "there is no pot on the floor" (viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva). Compare the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā view that abhāva is known by non-apprehension (anupalabdhi), a separate pramāṇa.

(e) Supermind in Aurobindo's theory of evolution

For Aurobindo the Absolute, Sachchidānanda, involves itself in matter, and evolution is its unfolding through matter, life, mind and then beyond mind. The Supermind is the "Truth-Consciousness" (ṛta-cit), the creative power of the Absolute, in which knowledge, will and delight are one and unity is held with diversity. It lies between Sachchidānanda and the lower hemisphere of mind, life and matter, and it is the means by which the One becomes many. Overmind, below it, divides this unity. Role. Mind cannot cure the Ignorance, because it works by division; the next stage of evolution must therefore be a supramental, gnostic consciousness. Evolution up to now was involuntary; the descent of the Supermind is what makes it conscious and complete, divinising life and matter and creating a gnostic being and a life divine. The path is the triple transformation: psychic, which brings the soul forward; spiritual, with the descent of higher powers; and supramental, the change of the whole nature. It is not an escape from the world; it is the world's fulfilment.