(a) What is meant by justice as fairness? Explain Rawls' theory of justice. (10 marks) (b) Critically examine the anarchist's…

(a) Justice as fairness: Rawls' theory

In A Theory of Justice (1971) Rawls treats society as a fair system of cooperation among free and equal persons, and says its basic structure is just if its principles would be chosen in a fair initial situation. This is justice as fairness. The original position is a hypothetical choice by rational, mutually disinterested parties behind a veil of ignorance: they do not know their class, talents, gender, or conception of the good. Not knowing where they will end up, they choose impartially, with maximin reasoning. Two principles follow, in lexical order. First, each person has an equal claim to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with the same for all. Second, social and economic inequalities must attach to offices open to all under fair equality of opportunity, and must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged (the difference principle). Rawls offers this against utilitarianism, which may sacrifice individuals for aggregate welfare. Later, in Political Liberalism, he adds that the principles must be reasonable for an overlapping consensus, not only rational.

(b) The anarchist claim that all states are illegitimate

Anarchists such as Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin, and philosophically Robert Paul Wolff (In Defense of Anarchism), argue that the state rests on coercion and a claimed monopoly of force (Weber), that it asks for obedience that conflicts with the autonomy of the moral agent, and that it serves ruling classes. Order, they say, can arise by voluntary association and mutual aid, as in the Paris Commune or Spain in 1936. Strengths: it tests the grounds of authority and warns against abuse of power, surveillance and war. Weaknesses: the claim of "always and everywhere" is too strong. States differ in consent and accountability; the social contract tradition (Locke, Rawls) bases legitimacy on consent or fair terms, and a democratic state with the rule of law and rights protects the weak who would be exposed in a stateless society. Hobbes's insecurity point and the problem of collective action and public goods are not answered; voluntary bodies work at small scale. Anarchism is not chaos, but its case is better as a standard by which states are criticised than as a proof that none can be legitimate.

(c) Land and property rights and women's empowerment

Property gives income, security, credit and a bargaining position within the household (Bina Agarwal, A Field of One's Own). The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 made daughters coparceners by birth, and Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma (2020) held that this applies whether or not the father was alive on 9 September 2005. Joint titling in housing and land schemes also supports it. Yet legal rights have not become effective rights. Women hold only about 14 per cent of operational holdings (Agriculture Census 2015-16). Customary pressure to give up shares (haq-tyag), male control over how the land is used, weak records, and the cost of litigation prevent ownership from turning into control; tribal and some personal laws remain unequal. Evidence from women with land (lower domestic violence, greater say in spending) shows empowerment is real when ownership and control are joined. So the answer is a qualified yes: property rights are necessary but not sufficient, needing awareness, registration, and changes in social norms.

(d) Challenges of a multicultural society: India

India's diversity of religion, language, caste, region and tribe is protected by the Constitution: secularism, Articles 14–16, 25–30 (minority cultural and educational rights), the Eighth Schedule, and federal and autonomous arrangements such as the Fifth and Sixth Schedules. Challenges: Communalism and majoritarian mobilisation, as seen in riots and rising polarisation, strain equal citizenship. Group rights versus individual rights: personal laws and the uniform civil code debate, as in the Shah Bano case. Language and region: the reorganisation of states, Hindi-imposition anxieties, and sub-nationalism, as in Punjab and the North-East. Caste hierarchies cut across religious identity and make recognition and redistribution compete. Migration and nativist demands, tribal rights, and the identity of the Other, as in citizenship disputes. Strength: the Indian model of "principled distance" in secularism and asymmetric federalism has accommodated diversity better than most. The test is whether state and society keep it from turning into a majoritarian or fragmented politics; constitutional morality, deliberation and equal citizenship are the safeguards.

(e) Can monarchy be a systematic form of government if the monarch is above politics?

"Above politics" can mean two things. First, in a constitutional monarchy (the UK, Japan), the monarch is a neutral head of state: Bagehot's "dignified" part, symbolising continuity, while the "efficient" part, cabinet and parliament, governs. Here the system is systematic because of the constitution and conventions, not the monarch. Second, if the monarch is above politics in the sense of above law and criticism, as in absolute monarchy, he is the source of authority, and the rule of one's will tends to be arbitrary. Aristotle called it kingship when rule is for the good of all and tyranny when it is not; Montesquieu held that without intermediate bodies monarchy becomes despotism. Hereditary succession also clashes with equality and accountability, and Nepal ended its monarchy in 2008. So the claim is partly right: monarchy is systematic only when the monarch is bound by a constitution and so is in practice not the ruler. A "supra-political" ruler is either a symbol or a source of unaccountable power.