(a) Critically examine the arguments of Nyaya for the existence of God. (20 marks) (b) Examine the significance of the concept…

(a) Nyāya arguments for the existence of Īśvara

Nyāya (Gautama, Nyāya Sūtra IV.1.19–21: Īśvara is the cause, since fruits of action are seen not to come from the doer alone; Udayana, Nyāyakusumāñjali) argues: Kārya (effect) argument: the earth, mountains and sea are effects, being composite, and every effect has a maker, like a pot; as no human can make them, an intelligent cause is needed, Īśvara, who is the efficient cause, while atoms are the material cause. Āyojana: the combination of atoms, which are inert, into ordered wholes needs an intelligent agent to move them. Dhṛti and saṃhāra: the support and dissolution of the world need a sustainer. Adṛṣṭa: the unseen results of karma are unconscious and so need a conscious dispenser to allot fruits justly. Pada, pratyaya and śruti: the use of words and the validity of Vedic knowledge, which is reliable, point to an omniscient author. Saṅkhyā-viśeṣa: the origin of numbers of atoms in a dyad, which needs the mind of a being. Criticism. Buddhists (Ratnakīrti), Sāṃkhya (Sāṃkhya Sūtra I.92: Īśvara is not proved), Mīmāṃsā and Jains object: not every effect has a conscious maker (sprouts); the inference from pots to the world is an analogy, and the world's parts, such as mountains, are not shown to be made; a maker would need a body and, being an effect, a cause, so regress; the proof does not establish one, omniscient, omnipotent and good God, for a team of makers could do; the Veda argument is circular; and the problem of evil remains. Nyāya replies that Īśvara is eternal and not an effect, and that his knowledge is eternal and bodiless; and that inequalities are explained by karma, with Īśvara only dispensing its fruit. Judgment: the arguments are ingenious and coherent inside a realist and atomist framework, but they are probable inferences, not demonstrations.

(b) Significance of rebirth in the theory of karma

The law of karma says that morally significant action produces results that fall on the agent. Rebirth (punarjanma) makes this workable. First, it gives continuity: many deeds do not bear fruit in one lifetime, since the good suffer and the wicked prosper, so the fruit must ripen in later lives. Second, it explains the inequalities of birth, health and circumstance as the result of prior action (prārabdha), saving the world's justice without blaming God. Third, it connects the three types of karma: sañcita (stored), prārabdha (what has begun to bear fruit) and āgāmi (new action), thus making present effort significant and the future open. Fourth, it gives meaning to saṃsāra and liberation: mokṣa is the end of the cycle, by knowledge (Advaita), by right conduct and austerity (Jainism), or by insight into non-self (Buddhism, where rebirth occurs without a permanent self). The Gītā (II.22, 27) speaks of the soul changing bodies like garments. Critics (Cārvāka, modern sceptics) say that rebirth cannot be verified, that karma without memory of past lives cannot teach, and that the doctrine may justify existing inequality, as caste. Defenders reply that karma stresses personal responsibility and compassion, and that it is the best account of moral order. Without rebirth the theory loses its moral coherence; with it the theory binds ethics, metaphysics and soteriology.

(c) Tillich on the symbolic nature of religious language

Tillich holds that religion concerns "ultimate concern", which cannot be expressed in ordinary literal language. The only non-symbolic statement is that God is Being-itself, the ground of being; all else is symbolic. A symbol differs from a sign: a sign, like a traffic light, points to something and can be replaced by convention; a symbol points beyond itself, participates in the power of what it symbolises, opens levels of reality and of the soul that are otherwise closed, cannot be made at will, and is born and dies in the life of a community. "God as Father", "Kingdom of God", and the cross are symbols, not descriptions of a being among beings, so taking them literally ("literalism") is idolatry, and denying them because they are not literal is a misunderstanding of their kind. Symbols are not mere decoration; they are the only way to express the depth of being. Merit: it avoids both crude literalism and positivist dismissal, and explains the power of myths and rites. Criticism (Alston, Hick): if all talk is symbolic, what do the symbols stand for, and what makes some better than others? The one literal claim, "Being-itself", seems to be unproved and empty.