(a) Differentiate between Plato's and Aristotle's conceptions of form. 10 marks (b) How does Kant respond to Hume's scepticism…

(a) Plato's and Aristotle's Conceptions of Form

Plato conceives Forms (Eide) as transcendent, eternal, and immutable archetypes residing in a separate intelligible realm, independent of spatiotemporal particulars. Sensible objects are mere imperfect copies that exist by participating in (methexis) or imitating (mimesis) these Forms. Consequently, genuine knowledge (episteme) is attained not through sense experience, but through intellectual recollection (anamnesis).

Conversely, Aristotle rejects this transcendent dualism through his doctrine of hylomorphism, arguing that forms are immanent principles inseparable from primary substances (ousia). Form is actuality (*energeia*/*entelecheia*) and matter (hyle) is potentiality (dynamis); form determines an object's essence, function, and telos. Except for the pure actuality of the Prime Mover, form never exists independently of matter. Aristotle also objects that separate Forms generate an infinite regress (the 'Third Man') and that 'participation' is an empty metaphor that explains neither being nor change. Epistemologically, Aristotle substitutes Platonic recollection with empirical abstraction (epagoge), deriving universal forms directly from sensory particulars. While Plato’s transcendent model explains objective moral ideals, Aristotle’s immanent formulation provides a more coherent metaphysical grounding for change, natural sciences, and the physical world.

(b) Kant's Response to Hume on A Priori Judgments

David Hume's radical empiricism divided knowledge into relations of ideas (analytic a priori) and matters of fact (synthetic a posteriori), asserting that necessary connections like causation are mere psychological habits derived from constant conjunction, thereby undermining metaphysical and scientific certainty.

Immanuel Kant responds by executing a "Copernican Revolution" in epistemology, establishing the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. Rather than the mind passively conforming to external objects, objects must conform to the cognitive apparatus of the subject. Kant demonstrates that while all knowledge begins with experience, it does not originate from experience. Pure forms of sensible intuition (space and time) and twelve pure categories of the understanding (including causality and substance) function as necessary, universal a priori conditions for the very possibility of coherent experience (transcendental deduction).

Kant successfully rescues Newtonian science and mathematical certainty from Humean scepticism, though at the critical cost of limiting genuine knowledge to the phenomenal realm while declaring the noumenal thing-in-itself strictly unknowable.

(c) Moore's Defence of Common Sense Truisms

G. E. Moore, in A Defence of Common Sense and Proof of an External World, defends the common-sense view of the world against absolute idealism and Cartesian scepticism by enumerating a list of mundane "truisms." These include the propositions that he possesses a living human body, that this body existed in the past, and that an external world of material objects and other minds exists independently of perception.

Moore argues that he knows these propositions with certainty, and that anyone who denies them presupposes them (for example, that other philosophers exist). The certainty of these common-sense truisms is far greater than the plausibility of any abstract metaphysical premises used to deny them. He also distinguishes knowing that a truism is true from knowing its correct analysis, which may remain unclear. He famously provides an ostensive proof of an external world by holding up his two hands.

Critically, while Moore effectively exposes the unlivable artificiality of radical scepticism, his argument borders on dogmatism by confusing subjective psychological certainty with rigorous philosophical justification. As Ludwig Wittgenstein noted in On Certainty, Moore’s truisms are not empirical propositions awaiting proof, but rather ungrounded, non-epistemic "hinges" that form the scaffolding of all inquiry.

(d) Later Wittgenstein on Private Language

In Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein rejects the possibility of an essentially private language—one whose words refer to sensations accessible solely to the solitary speaker, such that another person cannot understand it.

Wittgenstein’s critique rests on rule-following and the need for normative correctness. Using language requires following rules; however, to follow a rule requires a meaningful distinction between being right and merely thinking one is right. In a purely private realm, the speaker has no independent, objective criterion or standard of verification to validate whether a sign is applied consistently over time, collapsing the distinction between correctness and the illusion of correctness.

Using the "beetle-in-the-box" analogy, Wittgenstein demonstrates that if an inner sensation has no public behavioral manifestation, it drops out of consideration as semantically irrelevant. Meaning is not an act of private mental ostension, but a socially scaffolded enterprise grounded in public criteria, shared human forms of life (Lebensformen), and interactive language-games.

(e) Kierkegaard on Truth as Subjectivity

In Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Søren Kierkegaard defines truth not as objective, propositional accuracy, but as "an objective uncertainty, held fast through appropriation with the most passionate inwardness." He launches a trenchant critique against Hegelian speculative idealism, arguing that comprehensive objective systems reduce the concrete, existing individual to an abstract spectator, neutralizing personal ethical responsibility.

For Kierkegaard, existential and religious truths cannot be settled by detached rational inquiry or empirical proofs. Truth emerges dynamically through the subject's mode of relation to the object: the how of belief supersedes the what. Navigating existence through the aesthetic and ethical stages culminates in the religious stage, which requires an existential "leap of faith" across the abyss of rational paradox, exemplified by Abraham.

Critically, Kierkegaard's formulation risks collapsing into radical fideism, unbridled irrationalism, and ethical relativism. Nevertheless, it remains a profound corrective to systemic dogmatism, restoring personal authenticity, lived commitment, and passionate inward decision as the core constituents of human existence.