Philosophy 2024 Paper I 50 marks Differentiate

Q6

(a) Differentiate between the Cārvākas' refutation of self as a transcendental category and the Buddhist rejection of ātmā. 20 marks (b) How do the two schools of Buddhism arrive at two opposed conclusions, namely "everything is void" and "everything is real" from the same doctrine of Pratītyasamutpāda? Answer with arguments. 15 marks (c) What is the distinction between Bhāvabandha and Dravyabandha, according to the Jainas? Discuss. 15 marks

हिंदी में प्रश्न पढ़ें

(a) चार्वाकों द्वारा स्व का अतांत्रिक कोटि के रूप में खंडन तथा बौद्धों द्वारा आत्मा के खंडन के बीच विभेद कीजिए। 20 अंक (b) प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाद के समान मत से ही बौद्ध दर्शन के दो सम्प्रदाय विपरीत निष्कर्षों जैसे कि "सभी वस्तुएँ शून्य हैं" तथा "सभी वस्तुएँ यथार्थ हैं" तक किस प्रकार पहुँचते हैं? युक्तियों सहित उत्तर दीजिए। 15 अंक (c) जैनों के अनुसार भावबन्ध तथा द्रव्यबन्ध में क्या अंतर है? विवेचना कीजिए। 15 अंक

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Directive word: Differentiate

This question asks you to differentiate. The directive word signals the depth of analysis expected, the structure of your answer, and the weight of evidence you must bring.

See our UPSC directive words guide for a full breakdown of how to respond to each command word.

How this answer will be evaluated

Approach

Differentiate requires systematic comparison of distinct positions. Structure as: brief intro noting all three heterodox schools; for (a) spend ~40% (800-900 words) comparing Cārvāka's dehātmavāda (body-as-self) with Buddhist anātman/anekānta, highlighting that Cārvāka rejects transcendental self as unverifiable while Buddhism rejects permanent self through pratītyasamutpāda; for (b) spend ~30% (600-700 words) explaining how Madhyamika's śūnyatā and Yogācāra's vijñapti-mātratā diverge from common pratītyasamutpāda; for (c) spend ~30% (600-700 words) on Jaina bandha typology; conclude with synthesis on Indian materialism vs. middle-path vs. pluralistic realism.

Key points expected

  • (a) Cārvāka's dehātmavāda: self is identical to physical body (deha), consciousness arises from four elements (bhūta), rejects ātmā as unperceivable and hence non-existent; cites Bṛhaspati Sūtra/Barhaspatya doctrines
  • (a) Buddhist anātman: rejects permanent self through pratītyasamutpāda and anitya, accepts five skandhas as conventional self, distinguishes from Cārvāka's materialism by accepting rebirth without transmigrating soul; cites Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
  • (b) Madhyamika (Nāgārjuna): pratītyasamutpāda implies śūnyatā of svabhāva, all dharmas lack intrinsic nature, 'everything is void' means dependent origination itself is empty of inherent existence
  • (b) Yogācāra (Vasubandhu/Asaṅga): pratītyasamutpāda proves vijñapti-mātratā, consciousness (vijñāna) is ultimately real as basis of appearance, 'everything is real' refers to the reality of consciousness-only
  • (c) Bhāvabandha: bondage of states/conditions (bhāva) of soul due to karma influx, concerned with psychological/spiritual states; Dravyabandha: bondage of soul-substance (dravya) by karmic matter (pudgala), ontological entanglement
  • (c) Jaina distinction: bhāva-bandha is modification of soul, dravya-bandha is actual material karmic particles attaching to soul; liberation requires stopping both through samvara and nirjarā; cites Tattvārtha Sūtra (Umasvāti)

Evaluation rubric

DimensionWeightMax marksExcellentAveragePoor
Concept correctness20%10Precisely distinguishes Cārvāka's epistemological rejection (pratyakṣa-only) from Buddhist metaphysical rejection (anātman); accurately captures Madhyamika's two truths vs. Yogācāra's three natures; correctly identifies bhāva as modal and dravya as substantial bondage in Jaina ontologyGenerally understands all schools reject permanent self but conflates Cārvāka's materialism with Buddhist conventional self; describes both Buddhist schools as 'void' without explaining Yogācāra's realism; mentions bandha types without clear ontological distinctionConfuses Cārvāka with Lokāyata nuances, misrepresents Buddhist anātman as nihilism, conflates śūnyatā with nihilism, or treats bhāva/dravya as synonymous; fundamental errors in pratītyasamutpāda interpretation
Argument structure20%10Clear tripartite structure with proportional weighting (40:30:30); each sub-part has thesis-evidence-synthesis; logical progression from epistemological (Cārvāka/Buddha) to metaphysical (Buddhist schools) to ontological (Jaina); effective transitions between heterodox systemsCovers all three parts but with uneven development; some logical gaps between Cārvāka's empiricism and Buddhist dependent origination; explains Buddhist divergence adequately but Jaina section lacks systematic organization; conclusion merely summarizesDisproportionate treatment (e.g., excessive detail on one Buddhist school, neglecting Jaina bandha); no clear separation between (a), (b), (c); rambling structure without argumentative progression; missing conclusion or abrupt ending
Schools / thinkers cited20%10For (a): cites Bṛhaspati Sūtra, Lokāyata fragments (Jayarāśi's Tattvopaplavasiṃha), and Buddha's Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta; for (b): names Nāgārjuna (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā), Candrakīrti, Vasubandhu (Viṃśatikā/Trimiśikā), Asaṅga; for (c): references Umasvāti's Tattvārtha Sūtra, Kundakunda's works; demonstrates textual groundingMentions generic 'Cārvāka' and 'Buddha' without specific texts; names Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu but not their key works; cites Umasvāti for Jaina philosophy; some anachronisms or misattributions (e.g., confusing Yogācāra with Hinayana)Vague references like 'Indian materialists' or 'Mahayana philosophers'; no primary source citation; confuses schools (e.g., attributing śūnyatā to Yogācāra or vijñapti-mātratā to Madhyamika); omits all textual anchors
Counter-position handling20%10In (a), anticipates objection that both are 'materialist' by showing Buddhism's middle path avoids Cārvāka's annihilationism and Brahmanical eternalism; in (b), explains how each school critiques the other (Madhyamika's charge of essentialism against Yogācāra, Yogācāra's charge of nihilism against Madhyamika); in (c), addresses why Jaina pluralism avoids both extremesAcknowledges differences between schools but doesn't develop dialectical engagement; mentions that Buddhist schools debated but doesn't specify arguments; notes Jaina syncretism without explaining how it positions against Buddhist schoolsPresents positions in isolation without any comparative tension; ignores internal Buddhist debates entirely; no recognition that Cārvāka and Buddhism were historical opponents; Jaina section lacks any comparative horizon
Conclusion & coherence20%10Synthesizes three heterodox responses to Brahmanical ātmavāda: Cārvāka's radical empiricism, Buddhism's dependent origination (with internal pluralism), Jaina's anekāntavāda; reflects on how pratītyasamutpāda functions differently across traditions; evaluates which resolution best addresses the self-problem in Indian philosophyRestates main points without deeper synthesis; notes all three schools are 'heterodox' but doesn't develop thematic unity; conclusion summarizes rather than evaluates; some coherence between parts but no overarching philosophical argumentMissing or perfunctory conclusion; no connection between the three disparate parts; ends with last sub-part without returning to question's implicit theme of self/bondage/reality; contradictory claims across sections unresolved

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