(a) Do you agree with the view that Aristotle was more successful than Plato in steering a middle course between 'Statism' and…

(a) Aristotle's middle course

Plato’s Republic is often read as statism: the city is organised around the philosopher-king, guardians are separated from private family and property, and the common good is pursued through class discipline. Aristotle criticises this excessive unity in Politics, arguing that a household is not a city and that a state should not dissolve the family or private ownership. He defends private property because it encourages care, reduces disputes and supports household management, while still subordinating it to civic virtue. His preferred polity is a mixed constitution, blending oligarchic and democratic elements, which moderates extremes. Yet Aristotle is not an atomistic individualist. For him the individual is teleological: human beings achieve eudaimonia only in the polis, through friendship, law and participation. His preference for rule by a large middle class, and his view that the state is prior by nature yet exists for the sake of the good life of its citizens, reinforce this balance. The balance is limited, however, since he defends natural slavery and excludes women and labourers from citizenship. Thus he steers a golden mean between Plato’s absorption of the individual in the state and modern individualism that treats the person as prior to the community.

(b) Capital punishment as a deterrent

Deterrence arguments for capital punishment rest on the idea that the most severe penalty prevents murder by creating fear. Bentham's utilitarian calculus supports punishment if it prevents greater harm, and J.S. Mill (1868) defended the death penalty for aggravated murder as the most deterrent yet least cruel option; Beccaria, though a founder of deterrence theory, opposed the death penalty and argued that certainty, not severity, deters. Abolitionists counter that empirical evidence does not show a clear deterrent effect; Amnesty International has repeatedly found no reliable evidence that the death penalty deters murder more than life imprisonment. There are also wrongful execution risks, which make deterrence morally dangerous. Retributive arguments, classically Kant's and Hegel's, justify punishment as a deserved response to the criminal's own act rather than as a means to deterrence; abolitionists reply that human dignity forbids the state from killing. In India, the 262nd Law Commission Report (2015) recommended abolition except in terrorism-related offences and waging war, while Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) retained it under the 'rarest of rare' doctrine, and Mithu v. State of Punjab (1983) struck down mandatory death sentences. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 retains capital punishment for grave offences. Delay in execution has been debated in Supreme Court cases such as Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India (2014) as raising torture concerns. Internationally, over two-thirds of countries have abolished it in law or practice, and Protocol No. 13 to the European Convention on Human Rights bans it in all circumstances. On balance, since deterrence is unproven and error is irreversible, the deterrence case alone does not justify it; any retention must rest on retributive grounds and be confined to the rarest cases with the strongest safeguards.

(c) Economic development and social progress

Logically, a necessary condition must be present for social progress, while a sufficient condition guarantees it. Economic development is often treated as necessary because it expands education, health, infrastructure and opportunity, as reflected in HDI beyond GDP. But it is not sufficient: growth can coexist with inequality, environmental damage and social fragmentation. The Kerala and Sri Lanka experiences show high social indicators at low per capita income ('support-led security', in Drèze and Sen's phrase), while several fast-growing economies have seen widening inequality. Bhutan’s Gross National Happiness adds well-being and ecology to economic measures. Counter-examples include Nigeria’s resource curse, where oil wealth has not translated into broad social progress. Amartya Sen’s capability approach argues that development must expand real freedoms, not merely income. Rawlsian distribution of primary goods suggests that social progress requires fair basic liberties, opportunities and social bases of self-respect. Gandhian critique warns that development without ethics, self-reliance and non-violence may deepen exploitation. Thus economic development is not sufficient, and strictly it is not necessary either: social reform movements and public action have produced progress before high incomes. It is best seen as an important enabling condition, needed to sustain progress in the long run, whose value depends on distribution, institutions and public policy.