(a) State and evaluate Buddhism as a religion without God. (20 marks) (b) What kind of epistemic justifications are possible with…

Buddhism as a Religion without God

Buddhism challenges classical Western and orthodox Indian definitions of religion by rejecting a personal creator (Ishvara), an absolute first cause, and an eternal soul (atman). The architecture of Buddhist soteriology rests upon the tri-lakshana: anicca (universal impermanence), dukkha (suffering), and anatta (non-self), governed by the natural causal law of pratityasamutpada (dependent origination). Liberation (nirvana) is achieved through personal ethical discipline (sila), meditative absorption (samadhi), and discriminative wisdom (prajna), rather than divine grace.

Evaluating its non-theistic character reveals an ontological divergence between traditions. Theravada strictly preserves an empirical, psychological non-theism where the historical Buddha is an enlightened guide (marga-data), not a savior (moksha-data). Conversely, Mahayana introduces cosmic Bodhisattvas and the Trikaya doctrine. Concepts like Tathagatagarbha (innate Buddha-nature) and Dharmakaya (the ultimate reality) function structurally as transpersonal absolutes. This led S. Radhakrishnan to argue that Mahayana covertly reintroduces the Upanishadic Brahman under a negative dialectic. Max Weber similarly classified early Buddhism as an exemplary soteriology for monk-elites, noting that popular religion inevitably seeks devotional objects. In modern India, B.R. Ambedkar formulated Navayana Buddhism, explicitly divesting the Dhamma of all supernaturalism and theism, evaluating it as a rational, social religion of liberty, equality, and fraternity.

Evaluated against the standard of whether religion requires a transcendent deity to provide moral order and ultimate salvation, Buddhism demonstrates that God is not an indispensable category for religion; it functions as a complete spiritual system, even though its devotional developments emulate functional theism.

Epistemic Justifications of Revelation

Claims to revelation (shruti or divine self-disclosure) seek epistemic justification through three primary frameworks:

Evidentialist justification models treat revelation as valid testimony grounded in direct superconscious experience. Swami Vivekananda defended Vedic revelation by asserting that shruti is not dogmatic decree but the recorded spiritual data of ancient rishis, verifiable through repeatable personal realization (anubhuti).

Coherentist justification, exemplified in Sri Aurobindo’s integral epistemology, posits that revelation is validated when intuitive, supramental illumination harmonizes with rational coherence and empirical evolution, resolving antinomies that discursive reason cannot bridge.

Reformed Epistemology, articulated by Alvin Plantinga, argues for the proper basicality of revelation. Bypassing propositional evidence, Plantinga contends that beliefs grounded in divine testimony are properly basic with respect to warrant, produced by an innate sensus divinitatis functioning in an appropriate epistemic environment.

In critical assessment, Plantinga’s proper basicality risks subjective fideism and epistemic relativism, as it cannot adjudicate between conflicting sectarian revelations. Vivekananda’s experiential model remains epistemologically superior, as it subjects subjective revelation to universal empirical-experiential verification.

Ontological Proof for the Existence of God and its Criticism

St. Anselm formulated the a priori ontological argument in Proslogion II, defining God as aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit (that than which nothing greater can be conceived). Since existing in reality (in re) is greater than existing merely in the intellect (in intellectu), this greatest conceivable being must exist in reality, lest a contradiction arise. In Proslogion III, Anselm advanced the modal version: a being whose non-existence is impossible is greater than one whose non-existence is possible; therefore, necessary existence belongs intrinsically to the concept of God. Modern thinkers like Norman Malcolm and Alvin Plantinga reformulated this via S5 modal logic: if the existence of a Maximally Great Being is logically possible, it must exist in all possible worlds, and hence in the actual world.

Major criticisms dismantle this logical transition: Gaunilo of Marmoutiers raised the Lost Island objection, demonstrating that Anselm's logic commits an illicit parity: one could define a "perfect island" into actual existence. Immanuel Kant demonstrated that "existence is not a real predicate." Saying "God exists" adds no new descriptive property to the concept of God; it merely posits the subject with all its predicates. Bertrand Russell formalized this critique using the Theory of Definite Descriptions, arguing that Anselm commits a category mistake by treating existence as an individual attribute rather than a second-order quantifier (∃ x).

Modal reformulations preserve internal logical validity but fail to establish the initial premise—that the actual existence of a Maximally Great Being is uniquely possible in the real world. Thus, the proof remains a brilliant conceptual analysis that cannot bridge the gap between logical necessity and ontological reality.

Conclusion

These three philosophical inquiries demonstrate that ultimate reality and religious meaning do not depend exclusively on rational theistic deduction or uncritical scripture. While Anselmian ontology remains trapped in conceptual circularity and revelation requires rigorous experiential testing, Buddhism proves that religion can sustain profound ethical and soteriological efficacy through empirical non-theism.