(a) State and evaluate Buddhism as a religion without God. (20 marks) (b) What kind of epistemic justifications are possible with…

(a) Buddhism as a religion without God

Buddhism challenges classical Western and orthodox Indian definitions of religion by rejecting a personal creator (Ishvara), an absolute first cause, and an eternal soul (atman). The architecture of Buddhist soteriology rests upon the tri-lakshana: anicca (universal impermanence), dukkha (suffering), and anatta (non-self), governed by the natural causal law of pratityasamutpada (dependent origination). Liberation (nirvana) is achieved through personal ethical discipline (sila), meditative absorption (samadhi), and discriminative wisdom (prajna), rather than divine grace. Buddhism does not deny gods (devas) altogether, but places them within saṃsāra; the Brahmajāla Sutta mocks Mahābrahmā's belief that he created the world, and the Buddha left speculative questions unanswered (avyākṛta) as not conducive to liberation. Durkheim cited Buddhism as proof that religion cannot be defined by belief in gods.

Evaluating its non-theistic character reveals an ontological divergence between traditions. Theravada strictly preserves an empirical, psychological non-theism where the historical Buddha is an enlightened guide (marga-data), not a savior (moksha-data). Conversely, Mahayana introduces cosmic Bodhisattvas and the Trikaya doctrine. Concepts like Tathagatagarbha (innate Buddha-nature) and Dharmakaya (the ultimate reality) function structurally as transpersonal absolutes. This led S. Radhakrishnan to argue that Mahayana covertly reintroduces the Upanishadic Brahman under a negative dialectic. Max Weber similarly classified early Buddhism as an exemplary soteriology for monk-elites, noting that popular religion inevitably seeks devotional objects. In modern India, B.R. Ambedkar formulated Navayana Buddhism, explicitly divesting the Dhamma of all supernaturalism and theism, evaluating it as a rational, social religion of liberty, equality, and fraternity.

Evaluated against the standard of whether religion requires a transcendent deity to provide moral order and ultimate salvation, Buddhism demonstrates that God is not an indispensable category for religion; it functions as a complete spiritual system, even though its devotional developments emulate functional theism.

(b) Epistemic justification of revelation

Revelation may be propositional (truths communicated in scripture) or non-propositional (God's self-disclosure in events and experience). Classical Indian thought offers two models: for Mīmāṃsā the Veda is authorless (apauruṣeya), so free of the defects of speakers, and valid in itself (svataḥ prāmāṇya); for Nyāya it is valid as the testimony of a reliable author (āpta), God. In the West, Aquinas and Locke held that reason must judge whether a claim is revealed, using miracles and prophecy as credentials, while Hume argued that testimony to miracles can hardly outweigh uniform experience. Contemporary justifications fall into three further frameworks:

Evidentialist justification models treat revelation as valid testimony grounded in direct superconscious experience. Swami Vivekananda defended Vedic revelation by asserting that shruti is not dogmatic decree but the recorded spiritual data of ancient rishis, verifiable through repeatable personal realization (anubhuti).

Coherentist justification, exemplified in Sri Aurobindo’s integral epistemology, posits that revelation is validated when intuitive, supramental illumination harmonizes with rational coherence and empirical evolution, resolving antinomies that discursive reason cannot bridge.

Reformed Epistemology, articulated by Alvin Plantinga, argues for the proper basicality of revelation. Bypassing propositional evidence, Plantinga contends that beliefs grounded in divine testimony are properly basic with respect to warrant, produced by an innate sensus divinitatis functioning in an appropriate epistemic environment.

In critical assessment, Plantinga’s proper basicality risks subjective fideism and epistemic relativism, as it cannot adjudicate between conflicting sectarian revelations. Vivekananda's experiential model, like William Alston's view of mystical perception, is more promising because it invites testing through practice, but conflicting experiences still need rational and ethical criteria. In my view a revelation claim is justified only to the degree that it coheres with reason and morality, is corroborated by transformed lives, and does not rest solely on its own authority.

(c) The ontological proof and its criticism

St. Anselm formulated the a priori ontological argument in Proslogion II, defining God as aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit (that than which nothing greater can be conceived). Since existing in reality (in re) is greater than existing merely in the intellect (in intellectu), this greatest conceivable being must exist in reality, lest a contradiction arise. In Proslogion III, Anselm advanced the modal version: a being whose non-existence is impossible is greater than one whose non-existence is possible; therefore, necessary existence belongs intrinsically to the concept of God. Descartes (Meditation V) argued that existence is a perfection contained in the idea of a supremely perfect being, as having angles equal to two right angles is contained in the idea of a triangle. Modern thinkers like Norman Malcolm and Alvin Plantinga reformulated this via S5 modal logic: if the existence of a Maximally Great Being is logically possible, it must exist in all possible worlds, and hence in the actual world.

Major criticisms dismantle this logical transition: Gaunilo of Marmoutiers raised the Lost Island objection, demonstrating that Anselm's logic commits an illicit parity: one could define a "perfect island" into actual existence. Immanuel Kant demonstrated that "existence is not a real predicate." Saying "God exists" adds no new descriptive property to the concept of God; it merely posits the subject with all its predicates. Frege and Russell developed this point: existence is not a property of individuals but of concepts or propositional functions, expressed by the quantifier (∃x); 'God exists' says only that the concept God is instantiated, which no definition can guarantee.

Modal reformulations are valid, but their key premise, that a maximally great being is possibly exemplified, is no more evident than the conclusion; a parallel argument from the possibility of its non-existence yields the opposite result. Thus, the proof remains a brilliant conceptual analysis that cannot bridge the gap between logical necessity and ontological reality.