(a) Explain the ground on which Cārvāka rejects inference (anumāna) as a valid source of knowledge. 10 (b) Present an exposition…

(a) Cārvāka's rejection of inference

Cārvāka accepts only pratyakṣa as a pramāṇa. Inference depends entirely on vyāpti, the universal and invariable concomitance of middle term and major term (wherever there is smoke, there is fire), and Cārvāka argues that vyāpti can never be established.

1. Not by perception: perception reaches only present, particular cases. It cannot cover all past, future and distant instances of smoke and fire, and a universal cannot be perceived.
2. Not by inference: inferring vyāpti would need another vyāpti, and that one another still, which leads to infinite regress (anavasthā).
3. Not by testimony or comparison: both depend on inference or on the credibility of the speaker, which again needs inference.
4. Hidden conditions (upādhi) cannot be ruled out: smoke goes with fire only when the fuel is wet (ārdrendhana). Since we can never be sure that no such condition is at work, a universal link is never secured.

Inference therefore yields at most probability, and practical success is a matter of chance, as when a gem is found by accident. The tradition is reported mainly by critics (Mādhava's Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha), and the sceptic Jayarāśi (Tattvopaplavasiṃha) extends the attack to all pramāṇas. The later Cārvāka Purandara accepted ordinary inference about the perceivable world (smoke to fire) and rejected only inference to the supra-sensible (God, soul, afterlife).

(b) Nyāya and Buddhists on pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala

For Nyāya, pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala are distinct, like an axe and the cutting of wood. The pramāṇa is the most efficient instrument (karaṇa): in perception, the sense-object contact, or later the indeterminate cognition. The phala is the resulting valid cognition (pramā), and further the attitude it produces: to take up, reject or ignore the object (hāna-upādāna-upekṣā-buddhi). Instrument, act and result are really different things in a causal series.

Dignāga (Pramāṇasamuccaya) and Dharmakīrti (Pramāṇavārttika) hold that pramāṇa and phala are one and the same cognition, distinguished only conceptually. Because the cognition takes on the form of its object (sārūpya, viṣayākāratā), this form-likeness is called the pramāṇa; the cognition's awareness of the object, or its self-awareness (svasaṃvitti), is called the phala. The relation is that of what determines and what is determined (vyavasthāpaka–vyavasthāpya), not cause and effect, because a momentary cognition cannot be the instrument of a later cognition that belongs to itself.

Nyāya objects that an act needs a distinct instrument and that cognition is not self-luminous but known by a later introspection (anuvyavasāya). The Buddhist replies that Nyāya's separate instrument is an unperceived fiction. The debate thus rests on deeper differences: realism about an external object and enduring causal relations for Nyāya, and momentariness and self-luminous cognition for the Buddhists.

(c) Svataḥ and parataḥ prāmāṇyavāda

The question is whether the validity (prāmāṇya) and invalidity (aprāmāṇya) of a cognition arise from, and are known through, the very conditions that produce the cognition (svataḥ), or from and through something extra (parataḥ). Four positions result:

1. Sāṃkhya: both validity and invalidity are intrinsic.
2. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika: both are extrinsic. Validity arises from an excellence (guṇa) in the causes, such as a healthy eye, and is known by inference from successful activity (pravṛtti-sāmarthya). Invalidity arises from a defect (doṣa) and is known from failure. Gaṅgeśa gives the classical defence.
3. Buddhists: invalidity is intrinsic, and validity is extrinsic, confirmed by practical efficacy (arthakriyā).
4. Mīmāṃsā (Kumārila, Prabhākara) and Advaita: validity is intrinsic and invalidity extrinsic. A cognition is accepted as valid as soon as it arises and is overturned only by a later sublating cognition (bādhaka-jñāna) or the discovery of a defect.

The Mīmāṃsaka argues that if validity always needed external confirmation, the confirming cognition would need confirmation too, which leads to infinite regress. This matters for them because the Veda, being authorless, would then have no defect to doubt. Nyāya replies that when practice raises doubt, we do look for confirmation, so validity cannot simply be self-evident. The difference therefore decides whether knowledge is presumed trustworthy until defeated or remains provisional until verified.

(d) Rāmānuja's seven objections (saptavidha anupapatti) against māyāvāda

In the Śrībhāṣya, Rāmānuja argues that the Advaita doctrine of avidyā/māyā is untenable on seven counts:

1. Āśraya-anupapatti (no locus): avidyā cannot reside in Brahman, which is pure knowledge, nor in the jīva, which is itself a product of avidyā.
2. Tirodhāna-anupapatti (no concealment): self-luminous Brahman cannot be concealed, since concealing luminosity would destroy Brahman's own nature.
3. Svarūpa-anupapatti (no coherent nature): if avidyā is real, non-dualism fails; if unreal, it cannot produce the world.
4. Anirvacanīya-anupapatti (no indescribable): every cognition is of the real or the unreal, so a third category "neither real nor unreal" is impossible.
5. Pramāṇa-anupapatti (no proof): no perception, inference or scripture establishes a positive, beginningless avidyā. The texts on māyā speak of Brahman's wonderful creative power.
6. Nivartaka-anupapatti (no remover): the knowledge of an attributeless Brahman that is supposed to remove avidyā is impossible, because scripture teaches Brahman with qualities.
7. Nivṛtti-anupapatti (no cessation): a positive, beginningless avidyā cannot be destroyed by mere knowledge, and the world experienced as real cannot simply vanish.

Rāmānuja concludes that the world and souls are real modes (prakāra), the body of Brahman. Advaitins reply that avidyā rests in the jīva (Vācaspati) or in Brahman (Vivaraṇa) without affecting it, and that anirvacanīya is established by the fact of sublation.

(e) Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation

A cause (kāraṇa) is the invariable and unconditional antecedent of an effect (kārya-niyata-pūrva-vṛtti, ananyathā-siddha). Accidental antecedents, such as the colour of the potter's stick or the potter's father, are excluded as anyathā-siddha (there are five kinds).

The theory is ārambhavāda or asatkāryavāda: the effect is a new entity that does not exist in its cause before production (before it is made there is only the prior absence, prāgabhāva, of the pot). Against Sāṃkhya's satkāryavāda, Nyāya argues that if the effect already existed, the causal activity would be pointless, and pot and clay would not have different names and uses.

There are three kinds of cause:

1. Samavāyi-kāraṇa (inherent cause): the substance in which the effect inheres. For a pot it is the two halves (kapāla); for cloth it is the threads.
2. Asamavāyi-kāraṇa (non-inherent cause): a quality or action inhering in the inherent cause that helps produce the effect, such as the conjunction of the two halves (kapāla-saṃyoga), or the colour of the threads for the colour of the cloth.
3. Nimitta-kāraṇa (efficient cause): all other causes, such as the potter, the wheel, the stick, and in theistic Nyāya, Īśvara and adṛṣṭa.

At the cosmic level the same scheme runs from atoms through dyads (dvyaṇuka) and triads (tryaṇuka) to gross objects. Change is thus real production, not manifestation (Sāṃkhya) or appearance (Advaita vivartavāda).