(a) Present a detailed account of Gautama's definition of Perception. 20 (b) How is Brahman conceptualised in Advaita philosophy…

(a) Gautama’s definition of perception

In Nyāya Sūtra 1.1.4 Gautama defines pratyakṣa as indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṃ jñānam, cognition produced by sense-object contact, qualified as avyapadeśya, avyabhicāri and vyavasāyatmakā. Avyapadeśya means that perception is not produced by or dependent on verbal expression; it chiefly excludes śabda/testimonial cognition, while inference is excluded mainly by the requirement of sense-object contact. Avyabhicāri means non-erroneous: it excludes illusions such as the mirage seen as water, which also arise from sense contact. Vyavasāyatmakā means determinate or decisive: it excludes doubt, such as "is it a post or a man?", giving a settled cognition of the object. In later Nyāya, pratyakṣa is divided into laukika and alaukika. The laukika type is sixfold: it proceeds through the five external indriyas and manas, the internal sense that serialises sensory contact and turns it into determinate object-awareness. Thus perception is not merely raw contact; it becomes knowledge when manas organises the contact and the mind fixes the object. Alaukika perception includes samanyalakṣaṇa, jñānalakṣaṇa and yogajñāna, where the object is not directly before the external sense but is known through a prior valid cognition or yogic power. The key internal distinction is between nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka perception. Vātsyāyana reads avyapadeśya as excluding cognition that depends on words, and vyavasāyatmakā as the determinate character of perception. Vācaspati Miśra reads the two terms as naming two kinds of perception: avyapadeśya points to nirvikalpaka, the bare apprehension of an object before name, universal and relation are supplied, and vyavasāyatmakā to savikalpaka, the determinate judgement "this is a pot". In Navya-Nyāya, Gaṅgeśa holds that nirvikalpaka is not itself introspected but inferred as the necessary first stage. The debate was sharpened by Dignāga, who defined perception as kalpanāpoḍha (free from all conceptual construction), so that only the nirvikalpaka stage counts as perception; Nyāya replied that determinate perception is equally produced by sense contact and so equally perceptual.

(b) Brahman as efficient and material cause

In Advaita, Brahman is conceived as both nimitta and upadāna kāraṇa of the world (abhinna-nimittopādāna-kāraṇa), on the authority of Brahma Sūtra 1.4.23 (prakṛtiś ca pratijñā-dṛṣṭāntānuparodhāt). Strictly, it is Brahman associated with māyā, Īśvara, that is the cause. The Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad (1.1.7) gives the classic example of the spider, which both wills its web (efficient cause) and spins it out of itself (material cause). As nimitta, Brahman is like the potter who brings the pot into being; as upadāna, Brahman is like the clay that constitutes the pot, or the rope misapprehended as a snake. The Chāndogya Upaniṣad’s teaching that “all this is Brahman” (3.14.1), and its example that by knowing one lump of clay all clay things are known (6.1.4), support the material-cause analogy: the world is not something other than Brahman. Śaṅkara resolves this through vivartavāda: Brahman is satya, the world mithyā; it is not real parināma but apparent transformation due to adhyāsa, explained in the Adhyāsa-bhāṣya, where name and form are superimposed on Brahman. The three levels of reality clarify this: paramārthika is Brahman alone; vyāvahārika is the empirical world; pratibhāsika is the dream or rope-snake appearance. The world is real enough for action, but not ultimately real.

(c) Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara on abhāva

The Mīmāṃsā debate turns on whether non-existence is a real object of knowledge. The Bhaṭṭa school, especially Kumārila, treats abhāva as an independent padārtha, known by a separate pramāṇa, anupalabdhi. It classifies abhāva into four types: prāgabhāva, pradhvamsabhāva, atyantabhāva and anyonyabhāva. For Bhaṭṭa, the cognition “there is no jar on the ground” is a valid cognition of absence, not merely a failure to perceive. Prabhākara rejects abhāva as a separate padārtha and anupalabdhi as a separate pramāṇa. For him, the absence of the jar is nothing over and above the bare locus (kevala-adhikaraṇa), the ground by itself; prior absence is simply the cause, and destruction is simply the effect. The cognition of absence is the perception of the bare ground, together with the thought that the jar, if present, would have been perceived. The jar-on-ground example shows the issue: Bhaṭṭa says the absence itself is apprehended through a sixth pramāṇa; Prabhākara says we perceive only the bare ground, so no new entity or pramāṇa is needed. Kumārila objects that the bare ground cannot be the same as the absence, since the ground is present even when the jar is on it; Prabhākara replies that "bare" (kaivalya) is exactly what differs. The debate therefore concerns ontological economy and the number of pramāṇas: Bhaṭṭa admits six, Prabhākara five.