Philosophy 2025 Paper I 50 marks Discuss

Q6

(a) Present a detailed account of Gautama's definition of Perception. 20 (b) How is Brahman conceptualised in Advaita philosophy as both Nimitta and Upādāna Kāraṇa of the World ? Discuss with suitable examples. 15 (c) Discuss the debate between the Bhatta and the Prabhākara mīmāṃsakas with reference to the nature of Non-existence (Abhāva) and its knowledge. 15

हिंदी में प्रश्न पढ़ें

(a) गौतम की प्रत्यक्ष की परिभाषा का विस्तृत विवरण प्रस्तुत कीजिए । 20 (b) अद्वैत दर्शन में किस प्रकार जगत के निमित्तोपादान कारण के रूप में ब्रह्म की अवधारणा की गयी है, उपयुक्त उदाहरण के साथ विवेचन कीजिए । 15 (c) 'अभाव' के स्वरूप एवं इसके ज्ञान के संदर्भ में भट्ट एवं प्रभाकर मीमांसकों के बीच संवाद का विवेचन कीजिए । 15

Directive word: Discuss

This question asks you to discuss. The directive word signals the depth of analysis expected, the structure of your answer, and the weight of evidence you must bring.

See our UPSC directive words guide for a full breakdown of how to respond to each command word.

How this answer will be evaluated

Approach

The directive 'discuss' demands a comprehensive, analytical treatment with balanced exposition across all three parts. Allocate approximately 40% of word budget to part (a) given its 20 marks, and roughly 30% each to parts (b) and (c). Structure as: brief introduction establishing the interconnectedness of epistemology, metaphysics, and hermeneutics in classical Indian philosophy; systematic treatment of each sub-part with clear demarcations; conclusion synthesizing how these debates reflect broader tensions between realism and idealism in Indian thought.

Key points expected

  • For (a): Gautama's Nyayasutra definition of perception as 'avyapadesya, avyabhicari, vyavasayatmaka'—explaining each term, the six types of perception (laukika and alaukika), and the role of manas in transforming sensory contact into determinate knowledge
  • For (a): Distinction between nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka perception, with Vatsyayana's and Uddyotakara's interpretations, and the debate with Buddhist Dinnaga's sakaravada
  • For (b): Brahman as Nimitta Karana (efficient cause) through the analogy of the potter and clay, and as Upadana Karana (material cause) through the rope-snake or clay-pot examples from Chandogya Upanisad
  • For (b): Sankara's resolution of the apparent paradox via vivartavada—Brahman as satya and jagat as mithya, with reference to adhyasa-bhasya and the three levels of reality (paramarthika, vyavaharika, pratibhasika)
  • For (c): Bhatta Mimamsa (Kumarila) view of abhava as an independent padartha known through anupalabdhi, with five-fold classification (pragabhava, pradhvamsabhava, atyantabhava, anyonyabhava, samavaya)
  • For (c): Prabhakara rejection of abhava as padartha—non-existence as merely the absence of pramanasiddha satta, with knowledge of absence arising from non-apprehension of presence rather than separate pramana
  • For (c): The epistemological implications: whether anupalabdhi is a separate pramana (Bhatta) or reducible to perception/inference (Prabhakara), with reference to the 'absence of jar on ground' example

Evaluation rubric

DimensionWeightMax marksExcellentAveragePoor
Concept correctness22%11Precise exposition of Gautama's technical terms (avyapadesya, etc.); accurate distinction between vivartavada and parinamavada in (b); correct representation of the five abhavas and anupalabdhi debate in (c); no conflation of Nyaya's pratyaksa with Advaita's anubhavaBroadly correct definitions but missing technical nuances—e.g., conflating nirvikalpaka/savikalpaka, or oversimplifying vivartavada as 'illusion'; partial coverage of abhava typesFundamental errors—e.g., attributing parinamavada to Sankara, confusing Bhatta/Prabhakara positions, or presenting perception as direct contact without manas; Sanskrit terms used incorrectly or gratuitously
Argument structure20%10Clear tripartite structure with explicit transitions; for (a), logical progression from definition → types → epistemological status; for (b), systematic unpacking of the Nimitta-Upadana tension with vivartavada resolution; for (c), dialectical presentation of opposing positions with their respective groundsAll three parts addressed but uneven development—e.g., (a) over-detailed at expense of (c), or (b) lacking clear resolution; some logical gaps in connecting sub-sectionsDisorganized or merged parts without demarcation; missing one sub-part entirely; repetitive or circular arguments; failure to address the 'how' and 'discuss' directives through mere description
Schools / thinkers cited20%10For (a): Vatsyayana, Uddyotakara, Jayanta Bhatta, and Buddhist interlocutors (Dinnaga, Dharmakirti); for (b): Sankara, Mandana Misra (Sambandha-vartika), Padmapada; for (c): Kumarila Bhatta (Slokavartika), Prabhakara (Brhati), Salikanatha; secondary scholarship (Hiriyanna, Dasgupta, Potter) judiciously usedMajor figures mentioned (Sankara, Kumarila) but missing commentators—e.g., no Vatsyayana for Nyaya, no Mandana for Advaita; generic references without specific textual anchorsOnly generic school names without thinkers; anachronistic attributions; confusion between pre-Sankara and post-Sankara Advaita; omission of Prabhakara or conflation with Bhatta
Counter-position handling18%9For (a): Nyaya response to Buddhist asatkaryavada and the momentariness critique; for (b): Sankara's refutation of Samkhya parinamavada and Nyaya asatkaryavada; for (c): Bhatta's reply to Prabhakara's pramana-reduction and the anyathakhyati vs. akhyati implications; each position evaluated on its own termsSome counter-positions noted but superficially—e.g., mentioning Buddhist critique without elaborating Nyaya defense; or presenting Bhatta-Prabhakara debate as mere disagreement without philosophical stakesOne-sided presentation without opposition; strawman representations of rival views; failure to recognize that (c) itself constitutes a debate requiring balanced exposition; missing the soteriological implications of abhava-knowledge for Mimamsa
Conclusion & coherence20%10Synthesizing conclusion showing how these three debates illuminate the realism-idealism spectrum in Indian epistemology—Nyaya's robust realism, Advaita's transcendental idealism, Mimamsa's hermeneutic realism; connects to contemporary relevance (e.g., perception theory, theories of absence); no new arguments introducedBrief summary of three parts without integration; or generic statement about 'Indian philosophy's richness'; some new point introduced in conclusionMissing conclusion; or abrupt ending with last sub-part; conclusion contradicts body; excessive length on conclusion relative to substantive parts

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