(a) Why does Śaṃkara consider Sāṃkhya Philosophy as his chief opponent (pradhāna malla) ? Examine his arguments against Sāṃkhya…

(a) Śaṃkara and Sāṃkhya

Śaṃkara calls Sāṃkhya his chief opponent (Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya I.4.28, the maxim of pradhāna-malla-nibarhaṇa: defeat the chief wrestler and the lesser ones fall) for three reasons. Sāṃkhya claims support from the Upaniṣads themselves, which is why the Sūtra's first sections (I.1.5, īkṣater nāśabdam: the cause "thought", so it cannot be the insentient pradhāna) are directed against it. It is respected by smṛti authors. And it is structurally close to Advaita. Both are jñāna-yoga systems that accept mokṣa, renunciation and the transcendence of duḥkha, yet Sāṃkhya makes prakṛti, not Brahman, the ultimate material ground. This makes it the most dangerous rival: it offers a plausible path to liberation while denying the non-dual identity of jīva and Brahman. In the Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya, especially II.2.1–10 (the racanānupapatti section), Śaṃkara does not reject satkāryavāda as such; he rejects Sāṃkhya’s parināmavāda, the claim that the world is a real transformation of prakṛti. For Śaṃkara, if prakṛti were an independent cause, Brahman would become unnecessary; if Brahman is the only reality, prakṛti is only an apparent manifestation. If prakṛti is insentient, it cannot be the efficient cause of a conscious, purposeful universe. Teleology cannot arise from an unconscious cause: no house or palace is ever built by unintelligent clay alone. Nor can inert prakṛti begin to act (pravṛtti) and disturb the equilibrium of the guṇas. The Sāṃkhya example of milk flowing spontaneously to nourish the calf fails, because the milk flows under the influence of the conscious cow and the calf's sucking (II.2.3). If puruṣa is pure witness, how can it be affected by prakṛti? Real contact is impossible for consciousness, while mere dependence gives no agency; the Sāṃkhya analogy of the lame man (puruṣa) guiding the blind man (prakṛti) fails, since the lame man can speak and act, whereas puruṣa is inactive and indifferent (II.2.7). Śaṃkara also presses the Sāṃkhya problem of how one prakṛti can respond to many puruṣas without an intelligent controller. Thus the Sāṃkhya account of puruṣa-prakṛti interaction is either unintelligible or collapses into a hidden cause. Scripturally, dualism conflicts with jīva-brahma-aikya: the Upaniṣads teach recognition of one’s identity with Brahman, not separation from a material principle. Hence Sāṃkhya is the pradhāna malla because it shares Advaita’s soteriology but contests its metaphysical foundation.

(b) Īśvara and kaivalya in Yoga

In Pātañjala Yoga, Īśvara is not a creator or world-governor. He is a viśeṣa-puruṣa, a special puruṣa untouched by kleśas, karma, vipāka and latent impressions (āśaya) (YS I.24). In him the seed of omniscience is unsurpassed (I.25); he is the teacher even of the ancient teachers, being unlimited by time (I.26); and his designator is praṇava, Om, whose repetition with meditation on its meaning is the practice (I.27–28). He is eternal consciousness, distinct from ordinary puruṣas and from prakṛti. In Yoga-sūtra I.23–29, īśvara-praṇidhāna is presented as an alternative means to samādhi, and it is also part of kriyā-yoga (II.1) and of the niyamas (II.32, II.45: "from devotion to Īśvara comes perfection in samādhi"): Īśvara is the object of devotion, the model yogin and the omniscient teacher. His role in kaivalya is not to grant liberation directly. Through devotion and concentration, the practitioner's citta-vṛttis are stilled and the kleśa-karma-vipāka-āśaya cycle is overcome, enabling samādhi. Kaivalya is the isolation of puruṣa in its own svabhāva, the complete cessation of citta-vṛttis and return to intrinsic consciousness. Īśvara is the witness of all, but not the doer; his bhakti is not theistic salvation but a yogic aid. Vyāsa and Vācaspati Miśra add that Īśvara's grace removes obstacles (I.29) and that his will brings prakṛti and puruṣa into contact. Īśvara therefore functions as a support and exemplar, not as the one who confers kaivalya; this is why critics call Yoga theism an addition to Sāṃkhya rather than its foundation.

(c) Jaina pluralism and realism

Jaina philosophy is ontologically pluralistic: it accepts six substances (dravya), namely jīva (soul), pudgala (matter, made of countless atoms), dharma (medium of motion), adharma (medium of rest), ākāśa (space) and kāla (time), and it holds that jīvas are infinite in number, each a distinct real. It is epistemologically pluralistic because anekāntavāda rejects ekānta, the claim that one standpoint exhausts reality. Reality has many aspects, and different nayas disclose different determinations. Syādvāda and saptabhaṅgī-nyāya express this by predicating existence, non-existence, both, and indescribability conditionally, thereby avoiding absolutism. It is also realist: jīva and ajīva are accepted as independently real categories, and sat is defined as utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya-yuktaṃ sat, that is, existence involving production, destruction and permanence. Reality is not merely a mental construction; it has a permanent essence amid pariṇāma. The critical question is whether this realism is robust. Jaina epistemology is perspectival, since every statement is conditioned by a naya; this can appear constructivist. Yet syādvāda is not subjectivism: it claims multiple determinations of an objective reality, and saptabhaṅgī aims at completeness rather than denial. This pluralism is not relativism, because the seven-fold formula is meant to capture the full ontological status of an entity, not to deny it. Critics disagree. Śaṃkara (Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya II.2.33, naikasminn asambhavāt) argues that contradictory predicates such as existence and non-existence cannot belong to one thing at once, and Dharmakīrti likewise charges the doctrine with contradiction. Jainas reply that the predicates are asserted from different standpoints (of substance and of mode), so no contradiction arises. Thus Jaina thought is pluralistic and realist, but a qualified, perspectival realism.