(a) Present an account of Design argument to prove the existence of God along with its criticism by David Hume. (20 marks) (b)…

(a) The design argument and Hume’s critique

The teleological argument infers an intelligent creator from the observed order, intricacy, and adaptation in nature. In its classical analogical form, William Paley compares the universe to a watch: just as the intricate coordination of gears toward an end necessitates an intelligent watchmaker, the vastly superior mechanical complexity of nature necessitates an omnipotent designer. Richard Swinburne updates this into a probabilistic, inductive argument: given the cosmic fine-tuning and temporal regularities of the universe, theism provides the simplest and most probable cumulative explanation for cosmic order. This resembles the classical Nyāya inference (anumāna) where the cosmos, possessing the character of an effect (kāryatva), implies an intelligent agent (kartā).

In Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779), David Hume, speaking mainly through Philo against Cleanthes' analogical version, dismantles the argument, anticipating the form Paley later gave it (1802). First, he challenges the analogy: the universe is unique, organic, and vast; comparing it to a human-made mechanical artifact is a weak analogy, and since we have experienced no other universes being made, we have no basis for inferring how universes arise. The universe resembles an animal or a vegetable as much as a machine, so generation or growth are equally good models. Second, finite and flawed effects cannot warrant an infinite, perfect cause; the argument fails to rule out multiple, imperfect, or infant designers. Third, the Epicurean hypothesis demonstrates that given finite matter and infinite time, particles randomly organizing into temporary states of apparent order is statistically inevitable without teleology. Finally, the prevalence of suffering and dysteleology undermines the inference of a morally perfect, benevolent deity. Hume's critique exposes the limits of analogy and of reasoning from finite effects to an infinite cause, but it does not settle the matter: Darwin later supplied the natural mechanism Hume lacked, while probabilistic fine-tuning versions and inference to the best explanation keep the argument in serious debate.

(b) Process theodicy

Process theodicy, grounded in Alfred North Whitehead's metaphysics (Process and Reality, 1929) and developed by Charles Hartshorne and David Ray Griffin, answers the problem of evil by revising the classical idea of omnipotence. Process theology reconstructs theism on a dipolar model: God possesses an eternal, immutable Primordial nature (providing the conceptual lure of possibilities) and a temporal, dynamic Consequent nature (absorbing and suffering alongside the actualized world).

Rather than creating ex nihilo and wielding coercive omnipotence, God exercises persuasive power. Creation consists of dynamic "actual occasions" endowed with genuine indeterminacy and freedom. Evil is not an illusion—as in Advaita Vedānta’s *māyāvāda*—nor a divinely ordained instrument, but the inevitable metaphysical byproduct of creaturely freedom and cosmic novelty. Because God cannot unilaterally coerce finite entities without annihilating their self-creative agency, God cannot simply prevent evil. By divesting God of coercive omnipotence, Process Theodicy evades Hume’s dilemma: God is wholly benevolent and shares in worldly suffering, but is structurally incapable of preventing discordant actualizations. Critics reply that a God who cannot prevent evil and cannot guarantee its final defeat may not be worthy of worship, and that the classical problem is avoided only by changing the concept of God.

(c) Natural and revealed theology in the propositional view of revelation

The Propositional view of revelation, championed by theologians like B.B. Warfield and Carl Henry, conceptualizes revelation not merely as divine presence, but as the communication of objective, intelligible truth-claims and cognitive propositions in scripture.

Within this framework, Natural Theology and Revealed Theology are distinct in their epistemic foundations. Natural Theology operates via unaided human reason and empirical observation, attempting to establish divine attributes through rational demonstrations like cosmological and teleological arguments. In contrast, Revealed Theology derives its truths strictly from divine self-disclosure in scripture, demanding faith and cognitive assent to divine authority (śabda-pramāṇa; in Nyāya, the Veda as īśvara's word). Aquinas gave the classic two-tier account: reason can prove the "preambles of faith" (God's existence and unity), while mysteries such as the Trinity and Incarnation are known only by revelation. On the propositional view both yield propositions; they differ in source (general revelation in nature versus special revelation in scripture) and in the faculty of assent (reason versus faith). The non-propositional view of Barth, Brunner and later John Hick instead treats revelation as God's self-disclosure in events and encounter, with scripture as a human witness to it.

While Karl Barth rejected Natural Theology entirely as a human attempt at self-justification, propositionalists maintain that while Natural Theology renders humanity without excuse, it remains incomplete without the special, inerrant propositions of Revealed Theology. However, this distinction risks collapsing: if human reason requires the normative grid of divine propositions to correctly interpret natural order, Natural Theology ultimately becomes subordinate to Revealed authority.