(a) Evaluate the nature and object of Religious Experience as explained by Radhakrishnan in 'The Hindu View of Life'. (20…

(a) Radhakrishnan on religious experience: nature, object and evaluation

In The Hindu View of Life, S. Radhakrishnan distinguishes between the external "religion of the letter" (creed, dogma, and ritual) and the authentic "religion of the spirit". The nature of religious experience is defined as an integral experience (anubhava), which is self-luminous (svataḥ-siddha), non-sensuous, and direct, transcending discursive intellect (tarka) while synthesizing thought, feeling, and will. The object of this experience is the Absolute or the Supreme Spirit, apprehended not through rational abstraction but through spiritual intuition (prajñā), wherein the distinction between subject and object is overcome in unitive consciousness.

Evaluating this position reveals a profound synthesis of Advaitic non-dualism and Western absolute idealism (Bradley) and Bergsonian intuitionism. Radhakrishnan contends that while religious experience is universal and foundational to all faiths, it finds its most catholic and tolerant expression in Hinduism, which accepts diverse doctrines as provisional paths (mārgas). Critics argue that his thesis borders on an apologetic defense of neo-Vedānta rather than a purely descriptive epistemology, occasionally homogenizing distinct sectarian traditions under an Advaitic canopy. Nevertheless, on the standard of experiential coherence, Radhakrishnan successfully validates religion against dogmatism and positivism by showing that religious experience is an experiential fact of spiritual consciousness, self-certifying in its own domain.

(b) Normative principles, God and moral obligation

The necessity of God for moral obligation is classically defended by Divine Command Theory (William of Ockham, Karl Barth), which holds that normative principles derive their binding force solely from divine will. On this view, without a transcendent lawgiver and cosmic accountability, moral duty reduces to subjective preference or social convention.

However, critical examination shows that moral obligation can be fully autonomous. Immanuel Kant demonstrated that the feeling of obligation (Achtung) arises from the autonomy of the rational will acting under the Categorical Imperative, rendering theological grounding not only unnecessary but heteronomous. Kant does postulate God, but only afterwards, to secure the highest good (the union of virtue and happiness), not as the source of obligation. Moral intuitionism and contemporary social contract theories similarly anchor normativity in rational consistency and mutual recognition.

Indian philosophy offers robust non-theistic frameworks for moral obligation. The Law of Karma operates as an autonomous, self-regulating moral order where actions inexorably yield fruits, internalizing duty without divine intervention in the Mīmāṃsā, Jaina and Buddhist views (Nyāya, by contrast, makes Īśvara the dispenser of karmic fruits). In Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, dharma binds through the impersonal potency of apūrva, entirely independent of Īśvara. Furthermore, Mahatma Gandhi reinterpreted God as Truth, identifying obligation with the inner voice of conscience. Thus, normative obligation does not logically require a theological referent; it is inherently grounded in moral reason and conscience.

(c) Advaitic anirvachanīyatā and religious language

In Advaita Vedānta, Śaṅkara articulates anirvachanīyatā as that which is indescribable in the categories of absolute real (sat) and absolute unreal (asat). While ontologically designating māyā and the phenomenal world (jagat), the principle directly informs the Advaitic view of religious language regarding Nirguṇa Brahman. Because Brahman is non-dual, infinite, and beyond sensory categories (avāṅmanasagocara), literal designation (vācyārtha) fails.

Religious language must therefore function through lakṣaṇā (secondary signification, yielding the lakṣyārtha) and the via negativa (*neti neti*—"not this, not this", Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2.3.6), stripping away empirical superimpositions. When positive language is used (Sat-Cit-Ānanda), it serves as svarūpa-lakṣaṇa (essential indicator) rather than descriptive qualification. This parallels Ludwig Wittgenstein’s distinction in the Tractatus regarding the mystical—that which cannot be spoken of in empirical propositions but only "shown"—as well as Paul Tillich’s theory of religious symbols pointing beyond themselves. Anirvachanīyatā establishes that religious language is pedagogical (upāya), functioning as a raft to be discarded upon direct non-dual realization.