(a) Analyse the workers' movement in India in the pre-Independence period. (10 marks) (b) The Preamble of the Indian Constitution…

(a) Workers’ movement in pre-Independence India The pre-Independence workers’ movement evolved from defensive welfare associations in the 1880s–1910s to militant trade unionism after World War I. Early bodies such as N.M. Lokhande's Bombay Mill-hands Association (1890) sought wages, hours and basic protections under the Factory Acts, but were elite-led and confined to skilled workers; B.P. Wadia's Madras Labour Union (1918) was the first modern trade union, and Gandhi's Ahmedabad Textile Labour Association (1920) pioneered arbitration. Post-war inflation, the Khilafat–Non-Cooperation climate and strikes pushed the movement toward militancy. The AITUC (1920, with Lala Lajpat Rai as its first president) gave it a national platform, and the Trade Unions Act of 1926 gave unions legal recognition, while communists, trade-unionists and later Congress socialists linked labour demands to anti-imperialism. The 1920s saw mass strikes, such as the 1928 Bombay textile strike led by the Girni Kamgar Union, answered by the restrictive Trade Disputes Act (1929), and the 1929 Meerut Conspiracy Case showed both state fear and radicalisation. These phases acted cumulatively: welfare associations created organisational habits, militancy expanded class consciousness, and socialist leadership connected labour to national politics. In the 1930s, the Congress Socialist Party (1934) broadened the struggle, but communal divisions, weak peasant-worker alliance and colonial repression limited its mass base and coherence.

(b) Preamble as a social contract The Preamble functions as a social contract because it records the transfer of sovereign authority from ‘We the People’ to a constitutional state, in exchange for guaranteed rights and public duties. Drawing on Locke and Rousseau, it implies that government exists not to dominate but to secure justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. ‘We the People’ is the source of legitimacy: the state’s power is delegated, not inherent. The contract is made visible in the Constitution’s dual obligations. Fundamental Rights protect individual liberty by limiting state power, while Directive Principles obligate the state to pursue collective welfare, social justice and economic equality. Thus the Preamble is not merely aspirational; it frames the mutual bargain—citizens accept constitutional authority and the state accepts enforceable rights and non-enforceable but guiding duties. Adopted, enacted and given to themselves by the people on 26 November 1949, it was held in Kesavananda Bharati (1973), overruling Berubari (1960), to be part of the Constitution, and courts have used it to interpret the Constitution, confirming its role as the foundational compact.

(c) Legislative Council The Legislative Council is called a house of review, but its powers are constitutionally subordinate. Article 171 deals with its composition, while its limited authority flows from Articles 196–197 and related provisions. It cannot initiate Money Bills, cannot vote a vote of no confidence against the Council of Ministers, and cannot dissolve the Assembly. For ordinary bills, it may amend, return with recommendations, or reject them; under Article 197, however, rejection is not final. The Assembly may pass the bill again, and thereafter the Council can only delay it for one month. Thus it lacks a final veto. It also has no real say on Money Bills, which it must return within fourteen days with only recommendations (Article 198). Its real strength is delay, scrutiny and functional representation of graduates, teachers and local bodies. In Andhra Pradesh the Council's referral of the capital-decentralisation bills to a select committee in January 2020 so annoyed the government that the Assembly resolved to abolish it, and in Karnataka the Council held up the anti-conversion bill until the ruling party gained a majority there in 2022 - showing it is not wholly impotent. Yet, because it cannot stop legislation permanently, the criticism of democratic deficit and limited effectiveness remains valid.

(d) National Commission for Backward Classes The National Commission for Backward Classes is empowered in form but limited in practice. The 102nd Amendment (2018) gave it constitutional status under Article 338B, enabling it to investigate, monitor and recommend safeguards for Other Backward Classes. Yet its role is recommendatory, not adjudicatory: like the NCSC and NCST it investigates and monitors safeguards, inquires into complaints with the powers of a civil court and must be consulted on major policy matters, but inclusion in the Central List is decided by Parliament under Article 342A. After the Supreme Court held in the Maratha reservation case (May 2021) that states had lost the power to identify backward classes, the 105th Amendment (August 2021) restored that power to the states. It must apply objective criteria of social, educational and economic backwardness, and backwardness is not indelible, so inclusion must be periodically reviewed. In the context of rising demands from dominant communities—Jat, Maratha and Patidar agitations, with the Court setting aside the central OBC listing of Jats in 2015 and the Maratha quota in 2021—the Commission faces political pressure to expand the OBC category, while also needing to exclude the creamy layer and prevent caste-based privilege. Its reports may be accepted or rejected by the government, and it has no binding authority. So, while constitutional status strengthens legitimacy, it remains a weak check against political mobilisation and needs transparent criteria, independent data and enforceable recommendations.

(e) Post-liberalisation economy and environmental movements Post-liberalisation environmental movements in India have been weakened because economic growth became concentrated in large-scale, state-backed projects and consumption patterns shifted toward middle-class lifestyle concerns. Special Economic Zones, mining corridors, infrastructure projects and corporate investment made environmental conflict a question of development versus ecology, often framed by states as growth. The Narmada Bachao Andolan showed that sustained mobilisation could achieve partial success, but the POSCO and Vedanta controversies revealed how movements could be fragmented, delayed or contained when projects were backed by state-corporate networks. Rising consumption patterns produced a more individualistic, middle-class environmentalism focused on air quality, green spaces and lifestyle, rather than mass class-based resistance to displacement and resource extraction. At the same time, weak Environmental Impact Assessment enforcement, regulatory capture and state-corporate nexus allowed clearances despite local opposition. The failure is not merely of movements but of a political economy that prioritises concentrated economic activity over environmental justice. "Failure" is also too strong: the Niyamgiri gram sabhas' rejection of the Vedanta bauxite project (2013) and POSCO's withdrawal from its Odisha steel project (2017) show that local movements can still prevail.