(a) Electoral behaviour of voters is governed more by the social and economic factors than the political factors. Explain. (20 marks)
(b) The Doctrine of Basic Structure of the Constitution has enhanced the power of judicial review of the Supreme Cou

Question

(a) Electoral behaviour of voters is governed more by the social and economic factors than the political factors. Explain. (20 marks)
(b) The Doctrine of Basic Structure of the Constitution has enhanced the power of judicial review of the Supreme Court. Examine. (15 marks)
(c) Discuss the composition and functions of the Inter-State Council. To what extent has this body been successful in achieving its objectives? (15 marks)

UPSC Answer Check · Accepted Answer

The primary directive is 'explain' for part (a), while parts (b) and (c) require 'examine' and 'discuss' respectively. Allocate approximately 40% of time/words to part (a) given its 20 marks, and roughly 30% each to parts (b) and (c). Structure with a brief composite introduction, then address each sub-part sequentially with clear sub-headings, ensuring part (a) establishes the theoretical framework of voting behaviour before moving to constitutional doctrines and federal institutions. Conclude with an integrated synthesis on how electoral dynamics, judicial review, and federal mechanisms collectively shape Indian democracy.
- Part (a): Analysis of social determinants (caste, religion, ethnicity, region) and economic factors (class, income, employment, welfare schemes) as primary drivers of voting behaviour, with nuanced acknowledgment of political factors (party identification, leadership, ideology, campaign strategies) as secondary or mediating variables
- Part (a): Theoretical frameworks including Michigan model, Columbia school, and Indian adaptations by scholars like Rajni Kothari, Yogendra Yadav; empirical evidence from post-2014 and post-2019 elections showing class-caste convergence
- Part (b): Evolution of Basic Structure Doctrine from Kesavananda Bharati (1973) through Minerva Mills (1980), S.R. Bommai (1994), I.R. Coelho (2007), and NJAC case (2015); distinction between judicial review and judicial overreach
- Part (b): Critical examination of how Article 368's amending power limitation expanded SC's review scope, with analysis of both empowerment and democratic critique regarding judicial supremacy vs parliamentary sovereignty
- Part (c): Constitutional basis under Article 263, composition (PM as Chairman, CMs of states, Union Cabinet ministers, Governors of UTs), and seven mandated functions including dispute resolution and policy coordination
- Part (c): Assessment of effectiveness through Sarkaria Commission and Punchhi Commission recommendations; reasons for limited success including advisory nature, infrequent meetings, dominance by Centre, and comparison with NITI Aayog and GST Council
- Part (c): Recent developments including 2021 restructuring and need for institutional strengthening to achieve true cooperative federalism

Dimension	Weight	Max marks	Excellent	Average	Poor
Demand-directive understanding	20%	10	Correctly interprets 'explain' in (a) to require causal analysis with theoretical depth; 'examine' in (b) to demand critical evaluation of both supportive and critical perspectives; 'discuss' in (c) to necessitate balanced coverage of composition, functions, and evaluative assessment; maintains appropriate analytical weight across all three directives without conflating them	Addresses all three sub-parts but treats directives somewhat interchangeably; provides description where explanation or critical examination is required; coverage is present but analytical distinction between directives is blurred	Misinterprets directives—describes when explanation is needed, or explains without critical examination where 'examine' is asked; significant imbalance in treatment suggesting failure to understand mark allocation; may omit one sub-part entirely
Content depth & accuracy	20%	10	Demonstrates command across all three domains: for (a) synthesizes behavioural political science with Indian electoral studies; for (b) accurately traces doctrinal evolution with precise constitutional articles and case details; for (c) correctly identifies Article 263, Sarkaria/Punchhi recommendations, and institutional limitations; no factual errors	Covers main content areas with acceptable accuracy but lacks depth in one or more parts; may confuse specific case details in (b) or misstate composition in (c); theoretical frameworks in (a) mentioned but not applied rigorously; minor factual inaccuracies present	Significant content gaps—misses Basic Structure evolution or Inter-State Council's advisory nature; major factual errors (wrong articles, incorrect case chronology, confused institutional composition); superficial treatment of electoral behaviour without theoretical grounding
Structure & flow	20%	10	Clear tripartite organization with explicit (a), (b), (c) sub-headings; proportional length reflecting 20:15:15 mark distribution; smooth transitions between theoretical (electoral behaviour), constitutional (Basic Structure), and institutional (Inter-State Council) sections; integrated introduction and conclusion that tie the three domains together thematically	Identifiable structure with sub-headings but uneven length distribution; parts may feel disconnected without thematic linkage; introduction and conclusion present but generic; some organizational clarity despite mechanical treatment of sub-parts	Poorly organized with no clear demarcation between sub-parts; severely disproportionate length (e.g., excessive (a) at expense of (b) and (c)); rambling or bullet-point dumping without coherent flow; missing introduction or conclusion
Examples / case-law / data	20%	10	Rich empirical grounding: for (a) cites specific election studies (CSDS-NES data, Yadav's 'second democratic upsurge'), regional variations (DMK/AIADMK in Tamil Nadu, BSP/SP in UP), welfare scheme impacts (MGNREGA, PM-KISAN); for (b) precisely references Kesavananda, Minerva Mills, S.R. Bommai, I.R. Coelho, NJAC with years and key holdings; for (c) notes specific Sarkaria/Punchhi recommendations and meeting frequency data	Some relevant examples in each part but limited specificity—mentions 'caste voting' without regional illustration, names Kesavananda without elaborating ratio, refers to Sarkaria without specific recommendations; examples support argument but lack precision and depth	Sparse or absent examples; generic references without application ('caste matters' without evidence, 'courts decided cases' without naming them); no mention of Sarkaria/Punchhi commissions; fails to substantiate any claims with concrete evidence
Conclusion & analytical edge	20%	10	Synthesizes three sub-parts into coherent thesis on Indian democracy's institutional dynamics—how electoral socialization shapes constitutional demands, how judicial review protects federal structure, and how inter-state mechanisms require democratic legitimacy; offers forward-looking prescriptions (electoral reform, structured Basic Structure dialogue, empowered ISC); demonstrates independent critical judgment on tensions between representation, rights, and federalism	Separate conclusions for each sub-part without integration; restates main points without advancing synthesis; limited critical engagement—mostly descriptive closing; prescriptions if present are generic and unconnected to specific analysis	Abrupt ending or missing conclusion; purely summary without analytical advancement; no critical perspective on any of the three topics; fails to address 'to what extent' evaluative component in (c); no forward-looking or prescriptive element

(a) Electoral behaviour of voters is governed more by the social and economic factors than the political factors. Explain. (20…

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