(a) Budget proposals in the Parliament / State Legislatures fail to ensure their effective scrutiny. Identify the factors which constrain effective scrutiny of the budget proposals. (20 marks)

(b) 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts aimed at

Question

(a) Budget proposals in the Parliament / State Legislatures fail to ensure their effective scrutiny. Identify the factors which constrain effective scrutiny of the budget proposals. (20 marks)

(b) 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts aimed at making the third tier of government more powerful and effective for democratic decentralization. Critically examine the extent to which this goal has been transformed into reality. (20 marks)

(c) National Human Rights Commission is handicapped by its jurisdictional limitations of not being able to investigate the cases of violation of human rights by the armed forces. Discuss. (10 marks)

UPSC Answer Check · Accepted Answer

Indian democracy’s accountability is tested at three levels: Parliament’s control over money, local self-government’s control over services, and institutions’ control over state power. In all three, formal structures exist, but effective operation is constrained by executive dominance, fiscal weakness and jurisdictional limits.

Constraints on budget scrutiny. Budget proposals are not effectively scrutinised because the process is compressed, technical and politically controlled. The presentation of the Union Budget leaves little time for detailed examination, and the merger of the Railway Budget into the main Budget in 2017 reduced the separate window for sectoral scrutiny. Demands for grants are discussed, but often limited to general policy rather than line-item expenditure. Technical complexity defeats legislators: estimates, appropriation bills, contingent and supplementary grants, and CAG reports require specialised knowledge that most MPs and MLAs lack. The executive dominates budget formulation through the Finance Ministry and departmental estimates, leaving Parliament largely to ratify. Whipped voting undermines committee recommendations, as members may vote against PAC or departmental standing committee advice. Follow-up is weak: PAC and CAG recommendations are not binding, and implementation is monitored mainly by the executive itself.

Local self-government under the 73rd and 74th Amendments. The 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts gave panchayats and municipalities constitutional status, mandatory reservation for women, SCs and STs, fixed five-year tenure, State Election Commissions and State Finance Commissions. These were important steps towards democratic decentralisation. Yet the goal has only partially become reality. The amendments created constitutional bodies subordinate to state governments; their powers, functions and finances are largely determined by state legislation. Article 243G and state government orders decide devolution, and many states have not transferred meaningful functions, funds or functionaries. Fiscal autonomy remains inadequate: local bodies depend on grants, have weak own-tax bases, and often lack capacity to levy or collect taxes. Elections have been delayed or irregular in some states. In rural areas, bureaucratic capture persists through the close alignment of the Chief Executive Officer with the District Collector. In urban areas, municipal corporations face weak revenue bases, while parastatal bodies such as water boards and development authorities control key services. 74th Amendment implementation gaps in mega-cities, and limited “meaningful autonomy” recommended by the Sivaramakrishnan Committee, show that the 74th Amendment has not fully transformed urban local government. Thus, the amendments strengthened representation but not real authority.

NHRC and armed forces. The National Human Rights Commission is handicapped by jurisdictional limitations in cases involving the armed forces. Section 19 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 requires prior intimation to the Ministry of Defence before the NHRC investigates violations by armed forces in areas where the Armed Forces Special Powers Act is in operation. AFSPA-operated areas are therefore effectively excluded from direct NHRC investigation, and the Commission often relies on court-monitored inquiries. It also channels investigation through the CBI or other agencies, limiting its direct role. The NHRC has limited follow-up power over the armed forces, and its recommendations are not enforceable like court orders. Some state human rights commissions have had broader access to investigate security-related complaints, highlighting the structural weakness at the national level.

The common finding is a democratic deficit across three tiers: parliamentary oversight is weakened by executive control, local self-government is emasculated by state dominance, and human rights accountability is diluted in the security sector. Strengthening these institutions requires stronger budget committees, genuine fiscal and administrative devolution to local bodies, and removal of jurisdictional safeguards that shield armed forces from independent human rights investigation.

(a) Budget proposals in the Parliament / State Legislatures fail to ensure their effective scrutiny. Identify the factors which…

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