(a) Budget proposals in the Parliament / State Legislatures fail to ensure their effective scrutiny. Identify the factors which…

(a) Constraints on effective scrutiny of budget proposals

Budget scrutiny is constrained because the process is compressed, technical and executive-led. The Union Budget, presented on 1 February since 2017, and the merger of the Railway Budget into it (2017) leave little separate time for sectoral examination. Only a few ministries' demands for grants are discussed and the rest are passed together by the guillotine; in 2023 the entire set was passed without discussion. Debate is mostly on general policy rather than line-item expenditure.

Technical complexity limits legislators: estimates, appropriation bills, supplementary grants and CAG reports demand specialised knowledge. The executive dominates formulation through the Finance Ministry, leaving Parliament largely to ratify. Department-Related Standing Committees (since 1993) examine demands for grants, but their reports are advisory and party discipline rarely lets them change allocations. Follow-up is weak: PAC and CAG recommendations are not binding and implementation is monitored mainly by the executive itself.

State legislatures fare worse, meeting for only a few weeks a year, so budgets are often passed with little debate and fewer committees, researchers and staff.

(b) Third tier: the 73rd and 74th Amendments in practice

The Amendments gave panchayats and municipalities constitutional status, regular elections, reservation for women, SCs and STs, five-year terms, State Election Commissions and State Finance Commissions. The goal of empowered decentralisation, however, has only partly been realised.

First, local bodies remain creatures of State legislation: Article 243G leaves devolution of functions to the State, and many States have not transferred meaningful functions, funds and functionaries. Second, fiscal autonomy is weak: local bodies depend on grants, have narrow own-tax bases and limited capacity to collect them, and State Finance Commission reports are often delayed or ignored. Third, elections are delayed in some States; the Supreme Court in 2025 had to push Maharashtra to hold overdue local body polls. Fourth, bureaucratic capture persists in rural areas, where the district CEO works close to the Collector, while in cities parastatal bodies such as water boards and development authorities control key services and municipal corporations have weak revenue bases.

The Second ARC's sixth report, on Local Governance (2007), urged clear delineation of functions and stronger municipal finances. Panchayats and municipalities differ in their legal basis and tasks, so the progress is uneven. The Amendments strengthened representation more than real authority.

(c) NHRC and the armed forces

Under Section 19 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, in complaints against the armed forces the NHRC cannot investigate independently. It can only seek a report from the Central Government and make recommendations on it. For alleged abuses in areas under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, this limits the Commission, and its recommendations, as for all matters, are not enforceable like court orders. State Human Rights Commissions are further limited to matters in the State and Concurrent Lists. The 2019 amendment changed composition and tenure but left Section 19 untouched.

Courts have partly filled the gap: in Extra Judicial Execution Victim Families Association v. Union of India (2016) the Supreme Court held that there is no absolute immunity for the use of excessive force even in AFSPA areas, and later directed CBI investigation of the cases. Security needs and human rights accountability must be balanced.