(a) Public Management takes 'what' and 'why' from Public Administration and 'how' from Business Management. Elaborate. (10…

(a) Public Management: ‘What’ and ‘Why’ versus ‘How’

Public Management represents a functional synthesis that fuses the democratic ends of Public Administration with the operational means of Business Management. Public management inherits its 'what' and 'why' from traditional public administration; Graham Allison’s essay ‘Public and Private Management: Are They Fundamentally Alike in All Unimportant Respects?’ (1979) captured this, arguing that the techniques may be shared but the purposes, constraints and accountability of government are different. This encompasses the teleological rationale of governance: upholding public interest, constitutional equity, accountability, social justice, and creating 'public value' (Mark Moore).

Conversely, it borrows its 'how' from business administration, integrating private-sector managerialism to achieve these democratic ends. This incorporates the 'Three Es'—economy, efficiency, and effectiveness—alongside performance monitoring, customer orientation, decentralisation, and contract management, the doctrines Christopher Hood grouped as New Public Management (1991). In India, this synthesis is visible in initiatives like the Citizen's Charters, Sevottam model, and the Performance Monitoring and Evaluation System (PMES, 2009), where bureaucratic authority is married with corporate performance metrics to deliver public goods efficiently without compromising public accountability.

(b) Likert’s System-I to System-IV

Rensis Likert, drawing on Michigan research in New Patterns of Management (1961) and The Human Organization (1967), conceptualised leadership through a continuum of four organisational systems: System-I (Exploitative-Authoritative), System-II (Benevolent-Authoritative), System-III (Consultative), and System-IV (Participative Group). Likert found that the most productive units operated closest to System-IV and argued that organisations should deliberately move towards it as they respond to complexity, human aspirations and communication needs; the movement is a prescription, not an automatic law. System-IV relies on mutual trust, overlapping group structures ('linking pins'), decentralised decision-making, and high-performance goals.

While Likert viewed this evolution as an imperative for long-term productivity, contingency theorists argue that System-IV is not optimal everywhere (crisis management, military or routine regulatory work may need more directive systems), and empirical reality reveals that structural inertia and environmental constraints often stall progress. In developing public bureaucracies like India's, administrative systems frequently oscillate between System-II and System-III due to rigid hierarchy and procedural compliance. However, recent paradigms like Mission Karmayogi and agile, cross-functional project teams reflect an intentional shift toward Likert’s System-IV by embedding collaborative, participative problem-solving within the civil services.

(c) Tribunals and Courts

The statement needs care, because the settled judicial dictum runs the other way. In Harinagar Sugar Mills v. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala (1961) and Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P.N. Sharma (1965), the Supreme Court held that ‘all courts are tribunals, but all tribunals are not courts’: every court exercises the judicial power of the State and is therefore a tribunal, but many tribunals, though they decide disputes and have some ‘trappings of a court’, are not courts in the strict sense. The statement can be accepted only in a functional sense: tribunals, like courts, derive adjudicatory authority from the State to resolve disputes and deliver binding decisions.

However, traditional courts (established under Articles 124 and 214 and governed by the CPC and the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, which replaced the CrPC) possess universal jurisdiction and strict adherence to technical rules of evidence. In contrast, tribunals—such as those under Articles 323-A and 323-B (e.g., Central Administrative Tribunal, State Administrative Tribunals)—are specialized, statutory, quasi-judicial bodies. They are guided by principles of natural justice rather than rigid procedure, and incorporate domain experts alongside judicial members to deliver expeditious, technocratic justice without replacing the constitutional courts (L. Chandra Kumar case). In Madras Bar Association v. Union of India (November 2025) the Supreme Court struck down key provisions of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 and directed the creation of a National Tribunals Commission to secure their independence.

(d) Classical Theory as the Bedrock of Modern Organisation Theory

Classical Organisation Theory—anchored by F.W. Taylor’s Scientific Management, Henri Fayol’s Administrative Theory, Gulick and Urwick’s POSDCORB (1937), and Max Weber’s Bureaucratic Model—established the fundamental architecture of formal organisations. It introduced indispensable foundational concepts: functional division of labour, scalar chain, hierarchy, unity of command, span of control, and rational-legal authority.

Rather than rendering Classical Theory obsolete, subsequent paradigms evolved by responding directly to its foundational premises. Elton Mayo’s Human Relations Theory addressed the classical neglect of informal groups and human social needs. Chester Barnard and Herbert Simon refined classical structuralism by analysing informal systems and bounded rationality, even as Simon’s ‘The Proverbs of Administration’ (1946) attacked classical principles as contradictory. Furthermore, Systems and Contingency theories (Kast, Rosenzweig, Lawrence, and Lorsch) built upon classical formal frameworks by integrating dynamic open-system interactions. Consequently, the classical school remains the structural bedrock upon which all contemporary organisational designs and behavioural modifications are constructed.

(e) State–Civil Society Interaction in Developing Countries

In post-colonial developing nations, the interaction between the State and Civil Society was historically underdeveloped. The post-independence state assumed the "commanding heights" of socioeconomic transformation through a paternalistic, top-down bureaucratic apparatus. This state-centric model viewed civil society either as an administrative rival or as a passive beneficiary, resulting in weak institutional interfaces and chronic consultative deficits.

The neglect was never total in India, where Gandhian constructive work and later voluntary organisations were active, but the relationship was episodic. In recent decades, governance failures and fiscal limitations necessitated a paradigm shift toward collaborative governance. In India, this transformation is institutionalised through mechanisms such as the Right to Information Act 2005, mandatory Social Audits under MGNREGA (now succeeded by the VB-G RAM G Act, 2025), CSR spending under Section 135 of the Companies Act, 2013, the NGO-Darpan registration portal, and partnerships with Self-Help Groups (e.g., Kudumbashree) for service delivery. Bridging this historical divide through institutionalised Jan Bhagidari (citizen participation) is now recognised as essential for deepening democracy and ensuring transparent, accountable administration, although tighter regulation of foreign funding under the FCRA amendment of 2020 shows that the state still sets the terms of this engagement.