(a) The recommendations of National Finance Commissions are more norms based than the need based. In the light of this statement…

The 15th NFC’s Terms of Reference (ToR) show that NFC awards are formula-driven: they set normative criteria and leave need-based adjustment to later judgment.

(a) 15th NFC ToR: norms over needs The ToR asked for principles for sharing net proceeds of taxes and grants-in-aid between the Union and States, and for local-body grants. It listed population as per the latest available census (2011), area, forest/ecological assets, tax-collection efficiency, income distance, demographic performance and debt holding. These are mostly normative: population, area and forest cover are fixed, easily measurable and politically stable. The components interact: fixed population/area norms anchor the formula, while income distance and demographic factors adjust it; fiscal consolidation and local-body grants extend the same normative logic. The ToR did not assign weights; the 15% population, 15% area, 10% forest/ecology and 45% income distance figures were the Commission’s final award, not ToR mandates. This matters because the population criterion freezes shares around 2011 demographics, limiting response to later demographic transition costs, urbanisation or disaster vulnerability. Income distance and demographic performance are need-based, but the ToR gives them no hierarchy or explicit weight, and disaster vulnerability is absent. The 14th FC had innovated by introducing income distance, but the 15th ToR merely carried it forward. Other ToR items reinforce norm-based control: fiscal consolidation and performance incentives are framed as compliance with targets, while local-body grants are likely to be tied to population, area and revenue capacity rather than local service deficits. Thus the ToR creates a rules-based architecture in which need-based factors are present but subordinate.

(b) Mission Karmayogi: capacity and governance Mission Karmayogi operationalises this need for better administration by shifting civil services from rule-based to role-based HR management. Its iGOT Karmayogi platform provides role-specific, competency-based learning, while the competency framework identifies 70 roles and 280 competencies, enabling continuous upskilling rather than one-time training. The objective is governance outcomes: a civil servant trained in data analytics, grievance redressal, project management and citizen-centric delivery can implement schemes more effectively. This linkage is visible in programmes such as PM Gati Shakti, where integrated logistics and last-mile delivery require trained officers to coordinate departments, and the Aspirational Districts Programme, where district-level monitoring, data use and capacity building have improved service delivery in lagging districts. By making competencies explicit, Mission Karmayogi connects individual capacity to institutional accountability.

(c) Parliamentary and judicial control: complementary, not substitutes Parliamentary control is political and prospective: Question Hour, budget, Estimates Committee, Public Accounts Committee, departmental related committees and no-confidence motions hold the executive accountable for policy and resources. Judicial control is legal, rights-based and rooted in the rule of law: Articles 32 and 226 provide writ jurisdiction, judicial review tests executive action against the Constitution, and PILs allow courts to address maladministration. The 2G spectrum allotment case illustrates the difference: parliamentary debates exposed policy concerns, but the Supreme Court’s stay and directions provided immediate, enforceable relief. Cases such as S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981) and Vineet Narain v. Union of India (1981) expanded judicial activism to fill accountability gaps. Separation of powers limits substitution: courts do not allocate budgets, set policy or command bureaucracy, while Parliament cannot issue writs or enforce fundamental rights. The two controls are mutually reinforcing; parliamentary control ensures political responsibility, judicial control ensures constitutional legality.

Thus, the 15th NFC’s ToR shows that fiscal federalism remains largely norms-based, with need-based criteria underweighted. Mission Karmayogi addresses the resulting administrative gap by building role-based capacity. Effective governance requires both: formulaic fiscal norms must be supplemented by need-sensitive implementation, and parliamentary accountability must be paired with judicial oversight.