(a) The recommendations of National Finance Commissions are more norms based than the need based. In the light of this statement…

(a) 15th NFC ToR: Norms over Needs

The ToR asked for principles for sharing net proceeds of taxes and grants-in-aid between the Union and States, and for local-body grants. It mandated use of 2011 census population (replacing the 1971 base used since the Seventh FC) and suggested performance incentives such as progress in population control, GST and tax-collection efficiency, DBT adoption, sanitation and ease of doing business, and even the ‘control or lack of it’ over populist spending, a 2019 addition asked it to consider a dedicated fund for defence and internal security, criteria like area, forest/ecological assets and income distance were chosen by the Commission itself. These are mostly normative: population, area and forest cover are fixed, easily measurable and politically stable. The components interact: fixed population/area norms anchor the formula, while income distance and demographic factors adjust it, fiscal consolidation and local-body grants extend the same normative logic. The ToR did not assign weights, the 15% population, 15% area, 10% forest/ecology, 45% income distance, 12.5% demographic performance and 2.5% tax effort figures, with a 41% vertical share, were the Commission’s final award, not ToR mandates, and the 16th Finance Commission (2026–31) has retained the 41% share. This matters because the population criterion freezes shares around 2011 demographics, limiting response to later demographic transition costs, urbanisation or disaster vulnerability. Income distance and demographic performance are need-based, but the ToR gives them no hierarchy or explicit weight, and disaster vulnerability is absent. The 14th FC had given income distance a 50% weight, and the 15th FC retained it at 45%. Other ToR items reinforce norm-based control: fiscal consolidation and performance incentives are framed as compliance with targets, while local-body grants were distributed among states largely on population (90%) and area (10%) rather than local service deficits. Yet need is not absent: the 15th FC recommended revenue-deficit grants of about ₹2.95 lakh crore for 17 states and sector-specific grants for health and other gaps, and since the Ninth FC commissions have used a normative assessment of revenues and expenditure precisely to avoid rewarding fiscal indiscipline, which a pure ‘gap-filling’ (needs) approach would do. The ToR creates a rules-based architecture in which need-based factors are present but subordinate.

(b) Mission Karmayogi: Capacity and Governance

Mission Karmayogi, the National Programme for Civil Services Capacity Building approved in September 2020, with a Prime Minister’s Public Human Resources Council, the Capacity Building Commission (2021) and the company Karmayogi Bharat running its digital platform, operationalises this need for better administration by shifting civil services from rule-based to role-based HR management. Its iGOT Karmayogi platform provides role-specific, competency-based learning, while the Framework of Roles, Activities and Competencies (FRAC) maps each post's roles and competencies, enabling continuous upskilling rather than one-time training. The objective is governance outcomes: a civil servant trained in data analytics, grievance redressal, project management and citizen-centric delivery can implement schemes more effectively. This linkage is visible in programmes such as PM Gati Shakti, where integrated logistics and last-mile delivery require trained officers to coordinate departments, and the Aspirational Districts Programme, where district-level monitoring, data use and capacity building have improved service delivery in lagging districts. By making competencies explicit, Mission Karmayogi connects individual capacity to institutional accountability. Its success will depend on state participation, on linking training to postings and appraisal, and on measuring changes in behaviour rather than course completions.

(c) Parliamentary and Judicial Control: Complementary, Not Substitutes

Parliamentary control is political and prospective: Question Hour, budget, Estimates Committee, Public Accounts Committee, departmental related committees and no-confidence motions hold the executive accountable for policy and resources. Judicial control is legal, rights-based and rooted in the rule of law: Articles 32 and 226 provide writ jurisdiction, judicial review tests executive action against the Constitution, and PILs allow courts to address maladministration. The 2G spectrum allotment case illustrates the difference: parliamentary debates and a Joint Parliamentary Committee examined policy concerns, but the Supreme Court’s February 2012 judgment in Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India cancelled 122 licences and required auctions, providing immediate, enforceable relief. Cases such as S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981) and Vineet Narain v. Union of India (1997) expanded judicial activism to fill accountability gaps. Separation of powers limits substitution: courts do not allocate budgets, set policy or command bureaucracy, while Parliament cannot issue writs or enforce fundamental rights. The two controls are mutually reinforcing, parliamentary control ensures political responsibility, judicial control ensures constitutional legality.