Q8
(a) The main objective of Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 is to enable tribal society to assume control over their livelihoods and traditional rights. Critically examine the implementation of the Act. 20 (b) The effectiveness of law and order administration depends on cooperative attitudes of people towards police, than bringing reforms in the structure and procedures of law and order machinery. Do you agree ? Give reasons. 20 (c) Examine the role of Lokpal in ensuring transparency and accountability in Indian administration. 10
हिंदी में प्रश्न पढ़ें
(a) पंचायत (अनुसूचित क्षेत्रों का विस्तार) अधिनियम, 1996 का मुख्य उद्देश्य आदिवासी समाज को अपनी आजीविका एवं पारंपरिक अधिकारों पर नियंत्रण करने में सक्षम बनाना है। इस अधिनियम के क्रियान्वयन का समालोचनात्मक रूप से परीक्षण कीजिए। 20 (b) कानून एवं व्यवस्था प्रशासन की प्रभावशीलता लोगों की पुलिस के प्रति सहयोगी अभिवृत्ति पर निर्भर करती है, न कि कानून व्यवस्था की संरचना और कार्यविधि तंत्र में सुधार करने पर। क्या आप सहमत हैं ? कारण दीजिए। 20 (c) भारतीय प्रशासन में पारदर्शिता और जवाबदेयी सुनिश्चित करने में लोकपाल की भूमिका का परीक्षण कीजिए। 10
Directive word: Critically examine
This question asks you to critically examine. The directive word signals the depth of analysis expected, the structure of your answer, and the weight of evidence you must bring.
See our UPSC directive words guide for a full breakdown of how to respond to each command word.
How this answer will be evaluated
Approach
The directive 'critically examine' for part (a) demands balanced analysis with both achievements and failures; for (b) 'do you agree' requires a reasoned stance with arguments for and against; for (c) 'examine' needs comprehensive assessment of Lokpal's functioning. Allocate approximately 40% of time/words to part (a) given its 20 marks and complexity, 35% to part (b) as it requires nuanced argumentation, and 25% to part (c). Structure: brief introduction for each part, analytical body addressing specific demands, and integrated conclusion synthesizing insights across all three sub-parts on democratic governance and accountability.
Key points expected
- Part (a): PESA's core provisions (Gram Sabha powers, minor forest produce rights, land acquisition consent) and the gap between legislative intent and ground reality in Scheduled Areas
- Part (a): Critical analysis of implementation failures—state non-notification, dilution of powers, bureaucratic resistance, and conflict with Forest Rights Act, mining laws
- Part (b): Analysis of the proposition that public-police cooperation matters more than structural reforms—referencing community policing models vis-à-vis Police Commission recommendations
- Part (b): Counter-arguments on why structural reforms (Police Act reforms, accountability mechanisms, modernization) remain essential despite community cooperation
- Part (c): Lokpal's institutional design, powers of investigation/prosecution, and its actual performance since 2014 in handling corruption complaints against high functionaries
- Part (c): Limitations of Lokpal—staffing gaps, pendency, overlap with CVC/CBI, and its evolving role in administrative accountability
Evaluation rubric
| Dimension | Weight | Max marks | Excellent | Average | Poor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Concept correctness | 20% | 10 | Accurately defines PESA's self-governance mandate, distinguishes between 'law and order' and 'public order' in Part (b), and correctly identifies Lokpal's jurisdiction and powers under the 2013 Act; no conflation with Lokayuktas or Panchayat Raj Act | Basic definitions of PESA and Lokpal are correct but misses nuances like PESA's asymmetrical federalism implications or conflates police reforms with judicial reforms | Fundamental errors such as treating PESA as part of 73rd Amendment directly, confusing Lokpal with CVC, or misunderstanding the debate between structural vs. attitudinal reforms in policing |
| Theoretical anchor | 20% | 10 | For (a) applies Lipsky's street-level bureaucracy or Scott's 'weapons of the weak'; for (b) uses Wilson's police behavior typology or community policing theories; for (c) references Klitgaard's corruption control formula or principal-agent theory in accountability | Mentions generic concepts like 'participatory governance' or 'transparency' without specific theoretical grounding; limited linkage between theory and empirical analysis | No theoretical framework; purely descriptive treatment of all three parts without conceptual scaffolding to explain implementation gaps or institutional effectiveness |
| Indian administrative examples | 20% | 10 | For (a) cites specific cases like Niyamgiri (Odisha) or mining conflicts in Jharkhand/Chhattisgarh; for (b) references Janamaithri/Kerala, Mohalla committees/Maharashtra, or Punjab Police reforms; for (c) mentions specific Lokpal investigations, annual reports data, or compare with Karnataka Lokayukta's Santosh Hegde era | General references to 'tribal areas' or 'community policing' without specific state/district examples; mentions Lokpal's establishment year but no case details or performance metrics | No Indian examples at all; or factually wrong examples (e.g., citing PESA implementation in non-Scheduled Areas, confusing Lokpal with Lok Adalat) |
| Reform / policy angle | 20% | 10 | For (a) suggests harmonizing PESA-FRA-forest laws, state-specific PESA rules revision; for (b) proposes integrating community policing with Police Act reforms; for (c) recommends Lokpal-CBI merger, whistleblower protection linkage, and digital case management | Generic reform suggestions like 'better implementation' or 'more awareness' without specific policy mechanisms; no integration across the three sub-parts | No reform suggestions; or unrealistic/unconstitutional proposals like 'abolish PESA' or 'make Lokpal supreme over Parliament'; fails to address the 'critical' dimension of the question |
| Conclusion & forward look | 20% | 10 | Synthesizes all three parts into a coherent argument about democratic decentralization, state-society relations in governance, and accountability mechanisms—linking tribal self-governance, police legitimacy, and anti-corruption institutions as interconnected pillars of administrative reform in India | Separate conclusions for each part without synthesis; or generic conclusion on 'good governance' without specific forward-looking recommendations tied to the question's themes | No conclusion; abrupt ending; or conclusion that contradicts the body of the answer; fails to address the critical/examine directives by not taking a balanced final position |
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