(a) The main objective of Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 is to enable tribal society to assume control over…

(a) Implementation of the PESA Act, 1996

The Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA), enacted on the recommendations of the Dilip Singh Bhuria Committee, sought to extend democratic decentralization to Fifth Schedule areas. It recognized the traditional rights of tribal communities by positioning the Gram Sabha as the central institution of self-governance. Under PESA, the Gram Sabha was endowed with wide-ranging powers: mandatory prior consultation or consent for land acquisition, ownership of Minor Forest Produce (MFP), management of minor water bodies, enforcement of prohibition, control over local money lending, and preservation of customary laws and dispute resolution mechanisms.

However, a critical examination of its implementation reveals a stark gap between legislative intent and ground reality. Several state governments delayed framing state-specific PESA rules for decades, diluting the statutory powers of the Gram Sabha through subordinate legislation. Executive evasion is frequent: the mandatory consultation requirement for land acquisition has often been reduced to a procedural formality or bypassed using administrative coercion. Furthermore, entrenched bureaucratic resistance, particularly within the forest and revenue departments, has impeded the actual transfer of MFP ownership and natural resource management to local communities.

The implementation has also suffered from persistent conflicts with overarching sectoral legislations. Contradictions with the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, the Indian Forest Act of 1927, and state excise laws have consistently undermined PESA's primacy. While the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 (FRA) reinforced community tenure, institutional harmony between PESA Gram Sabhas and FRA Forest Rights Committees remains unresolved. Thus, despite its radical potential, PESA has largely been reduced to a paper tiger due to a lack of political will and institutional reluctance to surrender paternalistic administrative control.

(b) Law and Order Administration: Public Cooperation vs. Structural Reforms

The proposition that public cooperation is more critical than structural and procedural reforms is only partially valid. Public cooperation is indispensable for effective policing. In democratic governance, law enforcement cannot rely solely on coercion. Community policing initiatives, such as Kerala’s Janamaithri Suraksha and Tamil Nadu’s Friends of Police, demonstrate that citizen partnership enhances intelligence gathering, aids crime prevention, and de-escalates public unrest.

However, cooperative attitudes cannot develop in an institutional vacuum. The reluctance of citizens to engage with the police stems directly from deep-rooted structural and procedural deficiencies. The Indian police apparatus continues to operate largely under the colonial framework of the Police Act of 1861, which was designed to enforce regime security rather than citizen service. Structural pathologies—such as political interference in transfers, lack of separation between investigation and law-and-order duties, brutal interrogation methods, and opaque grievance mechanisms—foster widespread public distrust.

Structural reforms are therefore the essential prerequisite for building public cooperation. As emphasized by the National Police Commission and the Supreme Court in Prakash Singh v. Union of India (2006), reforming the machinery through functional specialization, the establishment of State Security Commissions, transparent Police Complaints Authorities, fixed tenures, and modernized forensic infrastructure is vital. Procedural overhauls, such as mandatory electronic FIR registration and time-bound investigations, generate institutional predictability. In conclusion, structural reforms and public cooperation are dialectically linked: structural and procedural modernization institutionalizes fairness and accountability, which in turn generates the public trust necessary for cooperative law and order administration.

(c) Lokpal and Administrative Accountability

The Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 established an apex, independent anti-corruption ombudsman to enhance transparency and integrity across Indian administration. The Lokpal's jurisdiction is broad, encompassing the Prime Minister (with specified safeguards), Union Ministers, Members of Parliament, and public servants across Groups A, B, C, and D. It possesses statutory powers of preliminary inquiry, full investigation, and prosecution, alongside superintendence over the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) for cases referred by it, aiming to overcome past limitations of executive influence.

Despite its robust design, the Lokpal's actual impact since its operationalization in 2019 has been modest. Its effectiveness is constrained by procedural bottlenecks, substantial delays in processing complaints, and an over-reliance on existing inquiry agencies rather than establishing its own autonomous investigative wing. The high rate of complaint dismissals on technical grounds has curtailed public confidence. Moreover, functional overlap and lack of synchronization with the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) and CBI dilute its institutional punch. While the Lokpal represents a vital constitutional-democratic instrument for checking high-level graft, fulfilling its mandate requires building an independent investigative cadre, rationalizing procedural scrutiny, and adopting a proactive stance toward systemic administrative accountability.