Public Administration 2024 Paper II 50 marks Discuss

Q3

(a) "The role of State Finance Commission in distribution of finances between state and local governments is vital." Discuss. (20 marks) (b) "Centre-state relations are undergoing a drastic change." Elaborate. (20 marks) (c) "There has been a strain in relations between Governor and State governments in the recent past." Examine. (10 marks)

हिंदी में प्रश्न पढ़ें

(a) "राज्य एवं स्थानीय सरकारों के मध्य वित्त के वितरण में राज्य वित्त आयोग की भूमिका महत्वपूर्ण है।" विवेचना कीजिए। (20 अंक) (b) "केंद्र-राज्य संबंधों में व्यापक बदलाव आ रहा है।" विस्तार से समझाइए। (20 अंक) (c) "हाल ही में राज्यपाल और राज्य सरकारों के मध्य संबंधों में तनाव आया है।" परीक्षण कीजिए। (10 अंक)

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Directive word: Discuss

This question asks you to discuss. The directive word signals the depth of analysis expected, the structure of your answer, and the weight of evidence you must bring.

See our UPSC directive words guide for a full breakdown of how to respond to each command word.

How this answer will be evaluated

Approach

The directive 'discuss' for part (a) requires balanced argumentation with evidence; parts (b) and (c) use 'elaborate' and 'examine' respectively, demanding detailed expansion and critical scrutiny. Allocate approximately 40% of time/words to part (a) given its 20 marks, 40% to part (b) for its equal weightage, and 20% to part (c). Structure with a composite introduction addressing federalism context, separate analytical sections for each sub-part with constitutional provisions and contemporary developments, and a unified conclusion synthesizing cooperative federalism challenges.

Key points expected

  • Part (a): Article 243I and 280-I mandate for SFCs; principles of tax devolution, grants-in-aid, and measures to augment Consolidated Funds of Panchayats/Municipalities; distinction from Finance Commission under Article 280
  • Part (a): Vertical and horizontal devolution challenges; SFC recommendations often not implemented by states; 3rd and 4th SFC reports highlighting untied grants and own revenue enhancement
  • Part (b): Evolution from cooperative to competitive federalism; GST Council as institutional innovation; NITI Aayog replacing Planning Commission; increased centralization during COVID-19 and post-2014 era
  • Part (b): Political asymmetry and opposition-ruled states' grievances; use of Article 356, CBI, ED, and Governor's office as instruments of central pressure; demands for GST compensation and fiscal autonomy
  • Part (c): Constitutional position of Governor under Article 153-167; discretionary powers under Article 163(2); recent controversies in Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, West Bengal regarding government formation, bill assent, and reservation of bills
  • Part (c): Sarkaria Commission and Punchhi Commission recommendations on Governor's role; need for fixed tenure, removal process, and consultation with Chief Minister in appointment
  • Synthesis: Interconnected nature of fiscal federalism (SFC), political federalism (centre-state), and constitutional federalism (Governor-state) in India's asymmetric federal structure
  • Forward look: 15th Finance Commission recommendations on SFC follow-up; need for institutional mechanisms to depoliticize inter-governmental relations

Evaluation rubric

DimensionWeightMax marksExcellentAveragePoor
Concept correctness20%10Precise articulation of constitutional provisions: Articles 243I, 243Y, 280 for SFCs; Articles 256-263, 352-356 for centre-state; Articles 153-167 for Governor; distinguishes between Finance Commission and SFC mandates; correctly identifies fiscal, administrative, and legislative dimensions of federalismBasic mention of constitutional articles with some inaccuracies; conflates Finance Commission and State Finance Commission functions; limited clarity on Governor's discretionary vs. constitutional powersSignificant factual errors on articles, commissions, or constitutional roles; confuses SFC with CAG or Planning Commission; misrepresents Governor's position as purely ceremonial or absolute
Theoretical anchor20%10Applies K.C. Wheare's cooperative federalism, S.P. Aiyar's bargaining federalism, or M.P. Singh's multi-level federalism framework; uses Granville Austin's 'seamless web' for constitutional interpretation; references Rajamannar Committee or Sarkaria/Punchhi Commission theoretical underpinningsGeneric mention of federalism types without application; limited commission references without theoretical integration; basic description of centre-state relations without conceptual frameworkNo theoretical framework; purely descriptive answer; confuses unitary and federal features without analytical purpose; irrelevant theoretical references
Indian administrative examples20%10Specific SFC examples: 4th SFC of Kerala (2020) or Karnataka's pioneering SFC; centre-state: GST Council functioning, COVID-19 vaccine distribution conflicts, Tamil Nadu's NEET exemption bill; Governor-state: Maharashtra 2022 government formation, Tamil Nadu Governor-Raj Bhavan conflicts, Punjab Governor's bill reservation; cites actual commission report recommendationsGeneral references to 'some states' or 'recent events' without specifics; mentions GST or Governor issues without concrete instances; limited SFC state examplesNo contemporary examples; outdated or invented incidents; irrelevant examples from other countries or unrelated constitutional bodies
Reform / policy angle20%10Evaluates 15th Finance Commission's SFC index and conditionalities; assesses GST Council's voting mechanism reforms; critically examines Punchhi Commission's Governor reforms (fixed tenure, removal by impeachment); proposes institutional mechanisms like Inter-State Council strengthening or permanent SFC secretariatsLists some commission recommendations without critical evaluation; mentions need for 'cooperative federalism' without concrete reform proposals; generic call for Governor's neutralityNo reform perspective; purely critical or purely laudatory stance; unrealistic or unconstitutional proposals; ignores existing reform mechanisms completely
Conclusion & forward look20%10Synthesizes three dimensions into coherent federalism crisis diagnosis; proposes actionable path: constitutional amendment for SFC enforceability, GST Council reform, Governor appointment collegium; balances realism with normative vision; ends with specific reference to current federalism challenges (2024-25)Separate conclusions for each part without synthesis; generic 'need for cooperation' ending; no forward-looking element or contemporary relevanceMissing conclusion; abrupt ending; contradictory final statements; purely summary conclusion without analytical value or future orientation

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