(a) Police-Public relations are poor in India. What measures are required to strengthen these relations? (20 marks) (b) The…

(a) Police–public relations

The claim that police–public relations are poor in India is broadly valid, though not absolute. The colonial legacy of the police as the ruler’s instrument persists in attitudes, laws and practice; the Police Act, 1861, or state laws modelled on it, still reinforce hierarchical control, and the public often sees the police as a coercive agency rather than a service. Structural problems deepen the deficit—overwork, understaffing (BPR&D data show actual strength of roughly 150 police per lakh population, well below the sanctioned level), custodial violence, politicization, weak accountability and VIP culture that diverts resources from ordinary citizens. This is not merely a law-and-order issue; it is a legitimacy issue. When citizens perceive the police as unaccountable, cooperation falls, crime reporting declines and the state’s capacity to protect weakens. Psychological barriers matter: fear psychosis makes people reluctant to report crimes, while police may respond with suspicion rather than empathy. Reforms must be both institutional and attitudinal. Community policing models such as Janamaithri in Kerala and Mohalla committees in Maharashtra can rebuild trust by involving residents in local safety. SMART policing, citizen feedback, online FIRs, CCTV and data-driven deployment can improve transparency and responsiveness. Police Act reforms, on the lines of the Model Police Act (2006) and the seven directions in Prakash Singh v. Union of India (2006), are needed to depoliticize transfers through State Security Commissions and Police Establishment Boards, separate investigation from law and order, strengthen Police Complaints Authorities and make accountability credible, as the Second ARC’s report on Public Order (2007) also urged. Training in soft skills, human rights and grievance redressal is essential. Yet reforms alone cannot succeed unless the police are seen as public servants, not an instrument of power.

(b) CAG’s constitutional importance

The CAG’s office is indeed less visible than the executive, but it is one of the most important constitutional offices. Its work is technical, often post-facto, and mediated through Parliament, which keeps it away from the public eye. Articles 148–151 establish the CAG, define duties, and regulate accounts and reports. The CAG is appointed by the President, removed only on grounds similar to a Supreme Court judge, and salary is charged on the Consolidated Fund of India, protecting financial independence. The CAG’s independence is essential because it audits the government that spends public money; without it, parliamentary control becomes formal. Unlike the UK Comptroller, who historically controlled expenditure before it was released, the Indian CAG is an auditor, not a controller; it examines whether money has been spent according to law and public purpose. Its audits—financial, compliance, and performance/efficiency—provide the evidence base for parliamentary scrutiny, especially through the Public Accounts Committee constituted under parliamentary rules, not under Articles 150–151. High-impact reports on 2G spectrum (2010) and coal block allocation (2012), and more recently on Rafale (2019), the Bharatmala Pariyojana (2023) and Ayushman Bharat–PMJAY (2023), have increased public visibility and shown the CAG’s role in checking misuse. Still, its functioning has limits: audits are largely post-facto, recommendations are not enforceable, governments may ignore or delay action, and the use of ‘presumptive loss’ figures in the 2G and coal reports drew criticism that audit had strayed into policy judgment. Its appointment by the executive alone, without a broad-based selection panel, is also questioned. Real-time audit, faster reporting and greater media engagement can strengthen its accountability role.

(c) Coalition administration

India has had coalition governments at the Centre from the Janata government (1977) through the United Front (1996–98), the NDA (1999–2004) and the UPA (2004–14), and again since 2024, when the ruling party depended on allies for a majority. Coalition regimes create distinctive administrative problems. Conflicting party manifestos can lead to policy paralysis, as ministries pull in different directions. Ministerial instability disrupts bureaucratic continuity, while pork-barrel politics and regional fragmentation can weaken national planning. Administrative capacity suffers when ministries negotiate every major decision, and bureaucratic morale declines due to frequent changes in policy direction. Federal tensions rise when regional parties enter national governance, seeking resources and symbols for their states. The anti-defection law has limited efficacy because it restricts individual defection but cannot resolve ideological or policy conflicts within coalitions. The 2G spectrum case was partly attributed to ‘coalition compulsions’ that weakened the Prime Minister’s control over allied ministers. Coordination devices such as the Common Minimum Programme, coordination committees and Groups of Ministers have mitigated but not removed these problems. Compared with Westminster stability, Indian coalitions often trade speed for consensus. However, this is not wholly negative: coalitions can broaden representation, moderate majoritarian impulses, and improve federal accommodation. The critical finding is that coalition administration is not inherently defective, but it demands stronger institutional discipline, clear policy priorities and cooperative federalism.