(a) Sociologists argue for democratization of science and technology for inclusive development. Comment. (20 marks) (b) Are…

(a) Democratization of science and technology for inclusive development Sociologists make a strong case for it, though with limits.

The case for democratization:

• Science is a social institution, not value-neutral. Merton described its norms of universalism and communalism, but Kuhn, Bloor's strong programme and the social shaping of technology (Winner; Pinch and Bijker) show that research priorities, designs and benefits reflect the interests of funders and elites.
• Technocracy cannot judge risk alone. Beck's risk society shows that expert systems create hazards that need public scrutiny; Funtowicz and Ravetz's post-normal science calls for an extended peer community of affected citizens; Wynne's study of Cumbrian sheep farmers after Chernobyl showed the value of lay knowledge.
• Top-down technology can exclude: the Green Revolution benefited irrigated regions and larger farmers more than others, and large projects have displaced communities.
• Indigenous and local knowledge (farmers' seed and water management, medicinal plants) complements formal science, and recognising it with fair benefit sharing is part of inclusion.

Democratic alternatives:

• People's science movements such as the Kerala Sastra Sahitya Parishad, participatory technology assessment, and community control over technology choices.
• Grassroots innovation: the Honey Bee Network (1988-89), SRISTI (1993) and the National Innovation Foundation (2000) document and reward the innovations of farmers and artisans.

Comment:

• Access remains unequal: in NFHS-5 (2019-21), 33.3% of women and 57.1% of men had ever used the internet, so digital technology can widen gaps without literacy, affordable access and regulation.
• Participation can be captured by elites, and patents and corporate control restrict access.
• Democratization should widen participation and accountability without rejecting expertise.

(b) Traditional institutions as agents of social change The evidence shows weakening as primary agents, but not disappearance.

Evidence of weakening:

• Family: urbanisation, migration and individualisation favour nuclear households and choice in marriage, loosening family control over occupation and marriage.
• Caste: the jajmani system declined with land reform, markets and wage labour; Article 17, education and reservations reduced the hold of ritual hierarchy; and statutory panchayats (73rd Amendment, 1992) displaced caste panchayats as legal authority.
• The state and courts now set limits: in Shakti Vahini v. Union of India (2018) the Supreme Court held that khap interference in the marriage of consenting adults is illegal.
• Religion: secular law, reform movements and the spread of education have reduced the hold of ritual authority over everyday life.
• Modern agents (state, market, media, education and social movements) initiate most change today.

Evidence of persistence and adaptation:

• Caste endogamy remains strong: only about 5% of marriages were inter-caste in IHDS-II (2011-12), no change since 2004-05.
• Caste associations work as modern interest groups and political vehicles (Rudolph and Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition, 1967).
• Kinship and caste networks channel migration, jobs and credit, and also mobilise voters.
• The joint family persists functionally, through economic and care support across households (I. P. Desai).
• Religious and community institutions provide education, welfare and relief, and religious reform movements have driven change; Srinivas's Sanskritisation shows that tradition itself can be a channel of mobility.

Judgment: traditional institutions are weakened as exclusive, hierarchical authorities and as initiators of change, but they adapt, bargain and sometimes resist, so they still shape the direction and pace of change.

(c) Patriarchy and social development Patriarchy, male dominance in family, economy, state and culture (Walby's six structures; Chakravarti's "Brahmanical patriarchy" for India), shapes development and is reshaped by it.

• It obstructs development: son preference and sex selection (sex ratio at birth 919 in NFHS-4 and 929 in NFHS-5), unequal education and nutrition, unpaid care burdens, low female employment, violence and under-representation waste half the population's capabilities. Sen's "missing women" and capability approach treat gender inequality as unfreedom, and women's agency lowers fertility and child mortality.
• Development can loosen it: schooling, paid work, self-help groups, and property and political rights (Hindu Succession Amendment, 2005; one-third reservation in panchayats, and in legislatures under the 106th Amendment, 2023).
• Growth alone does not remove it: female labour force participation rose from 23.3% (2017-18) to 41.7% (2023-24) in PLFS, yet analysts note that much of it is self-employed or unpaid family work. Modernisation can also reproduce patriarchy, as in dowry and technology-enabled sex selection.