(a) Examine and evaluate the proofs given by Sāmkhya philosophy to prove the existence of Puruṣa. (10 marks) (b) What is the…

(a) Sāṃkhya proofs for the existence of Puruṣa

Sāṃkhya Kārikā 17 gives five inferential proofs:

1. Saṅghāta-parārthatvāt: composite things (body, senses, intellect) exist for the sake of another, as a bed exists for a sleeper. That other must be non-composite, Puruṣa.
2. Triguṇādi-viparyayāt: whatever is composed of the three guṇas implies something devoid of them, a pure consciousness.
3. Adhiṣṭhānāt: unconscious Prakṛti needs a guiding presence, as a chariot needs a charioteer.
4. Bhoktṛbhāvāt: pleasure and pain imply an experiencer (bhoktā), which cannot be the insentient buddhi.
5. Kaivalyārthaṃ pravṛtteḥ: scriptures and sages strive for liberation (kaivalya), which presupposes someone to be liberated.

Evaluation:

• The proofs rest on analogy and teleology. The first assumes that a purpose must belong to a conscious being.
• The third is awkward, since Puruṣa is a passive witness (sākṣī), not an agent. Sāṃkhya answers with mere proximity (sannidhi), like a magnet moving iron, which Vedāntins call unexplained.
• The fourth and fifth are the strongest, as they rest on the undeniable fact of experience and the goal of liberation.

(b) Ontological status of sāmānya in Vaiśeṣika

Sāmānya (universal) is one of the six (later seven) padārthas. It is eternal (nitya), one (eka) and inheres in many (anekānugata) through samavāya. It is the ground of the common cognition “this is a cow” across different cows (anuvṛtti-pratyaya). It exists only in substance, quality and action.

Kinds (Praśastapāda): para (highest, sattā or existence), apara (lowest, such as ghaṭatva) and parāpara (intermediate, such as dravyatva, wider than ghaṭatva but narrower than sattā).

Status: universals are real and objective, not mental constructs (against Buddhist apoha) nor mere names, and not identical with particulars (against Jaina and Mīmāṃsaka identity-in-difference).

Critical examination:

• Udayana’s jātibādhakas limit universals: no universal where there is only one individual (ākāśatva), where classes overlap, or where it would lead to infinite regress (no universal of universals).
• Buddhists object that a single entity wholly present in many places at once is incoherent, and that apoha explains common naming more economically.
• Samavāya itself is a problem: if it is a relation it seems to need a further relation (regress), a point pressed by Śaṅkara.

(c) Samādhi in Pātañjala Yoga and the role of Īśvara

Yoga is citta-vṛtti-nirodha (Yoga Sūtra 1.2). Samādhi is the eighth limb, in which the mind shines with the object alone, empty of its own form (3.3).

Stages:

1. Samprajñāta (with object, sabīja): accompanied by vitarka (gross object), vicāra (subtle object), ānanda (bliss) and asmitā (pure I-sense) (1.17). Nirvicāra clarity yields ṛtambharā prajñā, truth-bearing insight (1.48).
2. Asamprajñāta (without object, nirbīja): reached by supreme dispassion (para-vairāgya) when all vṛttis cease and only saṃskāras remain (1.18). When even the saṃskāras of samprajñāta are restrained, it is seedless (1.51) and leads to kaivalya.

Role of Īśvara:

• Īśvara is a special Puruṣa untouched by afflictions, actions, their fruits and latent impressions (1.24), the teacher of the ancients, denoted by Om (1.26-27).
• Devotion to Īśvara (īśvara-praṇidhāna) is an alternative route to samādhi (1.23), part of niyama and kriyā-yoga, and samādhi is perfected through it (2.45). Evaluation: Īśvara is not creator, nor the goal. Liberation is Puruṣa’s isolation, not union with God. Critics therefore see Īśvara as loosely attached to an essentially Sāṃkhya system, while defenders note that grace-like aid adds a devotional path for practitioners.

(d) Jaina karma and soteriology

Karma is subtle matter (pudgala) that flows into the soul (āsrava) and binds it (bandha) because of mithyātva (wrong belief), avirati (non-restraint), pramāda (carelessness), kaṣāya (passions) and yoga (activity of body, speech and mind) (Tattvārtha Sūtra 8.1).

Eight kinds: four ghātiyā (destructive: jñānāvaraṇīya, darśanāvaraṇīya, mohanīya, antarāya) obscure knowledge, perception, right attitude and energy. Four aghātiyā (vedanīya, nāma, gotra, āyu) govern feelings, body, status and lifespan.

Bearing on soteriology:

• Since bondage is material, liberation is the soul’s physical freeing from karma: saṃvara (stopping inflow through vows, samitis, guptis) and nirjarā (shedding old karma through tapas).
• The path is the three jewels, samyag-darśana, jñāna and cāritra, and the soul climbs fourteen guṇasthānas.
• Destruction of ghātiyā karma gives kevala-jñāna, and of all karma, mokṣa: the soul rises to siddha-śilā with infinite knowledge, perception, bliss and energy.
• No God grants liberation. It is entirely the soul’s own effort, which makes ahiṃsā and austerity central.

Critical view: the theory is consistent and ethically strong. But how immaterial consciousness is bound by matter is not fully explained.

(e) Is vivartavāda the logical development of pariṇāmavāda?

• Pariṇāmavāda: the effect is a real transformation of the cause, as milk becomes curd. Sāṃkhya applies it to Prakṛti, and Bhartṛprapañca, Bhāskara and Rāmānuja to Brahman.
• Vivartavāda: the effect is only an apparent transformation, as a rope appears as a snake. Advaita: “real change is vikāra, unreal change is vivarta” (Vedāntasāra).

For the view:

• Both rest on satkāryavāda: the effect pre-exists in its cause. Vivarta pushes this further: if the effect is not new, its difference from the cause is only appearance.
• Real change of Brahman faces objections: if all of Brahman changes it loses its nature, if a part changes it becomes divisible (Brahma Sūtra 2.1.26). Vivarta keeps Brahman changeless and one, while explaining the world as appearance.

Against:

• Vivarta is a new thesis about the reality of the effect, not a deduction from pariṇāma. Pariṇāmavādins reject it: Rāmānuja’s seven objections to avidyā (where does it reside, what is its nature) and Bhāskara’s defence of a real world.

My view: I agree in a qualified sense. Vivartavāda is the logical refinement of satkāryavāda that resolves the difficulties of Brahma-pariṇāmavāda, but it is a critical transformation, not a necessary consequence. Its value depends on accepting māyā, which the pariṇāma schools reject.