(a) How compatible is Buddhist theory of momentariness with their theory of Karma? In this regard how do Buddhists respond to…

(a) Momentariness and karma in Buddhism

Momentariness (kṣaṇikavāda): whatever exists is momentary, arising and perishing in the same instant. Later logicians (Dharmakīrti, Ratnakīrti) argue that to exist is to be causally efficient (arthakriyākāritva), and a permanent thing could produce effects neither all at once nor successively, so the real is momentary.

Karma requires that the doer of an act reaps its fruit, often in a later life. Opponents (Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, Jaina, Vedānta) object:

• Kṛtapraṇāśa: the agent perishes, so the deed is lost without fruit.
• Akṛtābhyāgama: a different later being enjoys or suffers what it did not do.
• Without a lasting self, memory, recognition (pratyabhijñā), moral responsibility and liberation become unintelligible. Mīmāṃsakas add that apūrva needs a lasting substratum.

Buddhist replies:

• Santāna (series): a person is a causally connected stream of momentary dharmas. The later moment is neither identical with nor wholly different from the earlier (na ca so na ca añño, Milindapañha). Fire passed from lamp to lamp, or milk turning to curd, show continuity without a permanent substance.
• Cetanā is karma: the intention leaves a trace (vāsanā, bīja) that ripens in the same series. Sautrāntikas speak of seeds, Theravāda of the bhavaṅga stream, Yogācāra of the ālaya-vijñāna as storehouse of seeds. Vasubandhu (Abhidharmakośa, chapter 9) argues that the series fully explains karma and memory, and refutes the Pudgalavāda self.
• Two truths: “agent” and “enjoyer” are conventionally true (saṃvṛti), while ultimately there are only dharmas.

Critical evaluation:

• The reply is coherent: karma is governed by causal continuity, not by an owner, and the Buddhist denies that strict identity is needed for responsibility, much as modern psychological-continuity theories of personal identity do.
• But opponents press that “same series” already presupposes a principle of unity. Why does a trace ripen only in this series? The ālaya-vijñāna looks like a substitute self.
• Moral desert is weakened if no one deserves the fruit in a strict sense. Buddhists accept this, as the goal is to see through the illusion of a self that owns deeds. So momentariness and karma are compatible within the Buddhist framework of dependent origination, though at the cost of revising what “the same agent” means.

(b) Jaina relativism and absolutism

Jaina anekāntavāda holds that reality has infinite aspects (ananta-dharmātmaka). Each judgement is from a standpoint (naya) and must be qualified by syāt (“in some respect”). Syādvāda gives seven predications (saptabhaṅgī): syād asti, syān nāsti, syād asti nāsti, syād avaktavya, and three combinations with avaktavya.

The view: Śaṅkara (Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya 2.2.33) says contradictory attributes cannot belong to one thing, and that the theory itself is asserted absolutely. Radhakrishnan argues that relativity cannot be logically sustained without an absolute: partial truths are known as partial only from the standpoint of the whole. Jainism, he says, stops halfway and should lead to monistic idealism.

Jaina replies:

• Anekānta is itself anekānta: from the standpoint of pramāṇa (comprehensive knowledge) it is definite, from the standpoint of naya it is partial (Samantabhadra).
• Syāt does not mean “perhaps” but “from a specified respect”. Each predication is certain within its respect, so the theory is not scepticism or self-refuting relativism.
• There is an absolute standpoint, kevala-jñāna, the omniscience of the liberated soul, which knows all aspects at once. But it is an integration of all aspects, not a single undifferentiated Absolute like Brahman.

My view: the claim is partly sound. Jaina relativism does need a non-relative anchor, and it supplies one in kevala-jñāna and in the real, many-sided object. What it rejects is a monistic absolute that denies plurality. So relativism is sustained by an epistemic absolute (complete knowledge), not a metaphysical one, which is consistent with Jaina realism and pluralism.

(c) Mīmāṃsā defence of arthāpatti

Arthāpatti (postulation) is the assumption of a fact without which a known fact cannot be explained. Fat Devadatta does not eat by day, so he eats at night. It is accepted by Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā and by Advaita.

Nyāya view: it is a negative (kevala-vyatirekī) inference: whoever does not eat by day or night is not fat, Devadatta is fat, so he eats at night.

Mīmāṃsaka refutation:

• Different instrument: inference proceeds from a mark (liṅga) known to be pervaded (vyāpti) by what is inferred. Arthāpatti arises from the inexplicability (anupapatti) of a known fact, and its instrument is that inexplicability, not knowledge of pervasion.
• Mīmāṃsakas reject purely negative inference: a vyāpti must be grasped through positive instances, and there are none of “eating at night” known in that way.
• Different experience: we say “I presume” (kalpayāmi), not “I infer” (anuminomi).
• Kumārila: two valid cognitions seem to conflict (Devadatta is alive, and he is not at home), and postulation reconciles them (he is outside). Prabhākara: the observed fact itself becomes doubtful until the postulate is made.
• Two kinds: dṛṣṭārthāpatti (from what is seen) and śrutārthāpatti (from what is heard, used for interpreting Vedic injunctions).

Critical assessment:

• Nyāya replies that the inexplicability is itself known only through general rules, so an implicit vyāpti is at work. Postulation is “inference to the best explanation”.
• The Mīmāṃsā point is strongest on the phenomenology and on scriptural interpretation, where meanings are supplied to make a sentence intelligible. On balance arthāpatti is logically reducible to inference, but the Mīmāṃsakas show it has a distinct starting point (a puzzle) and function, which explains why they count it as a separate pramāṇa.