Philosophy 2022 Paper I 50 marks Critically discuss

Q6

(a) How compatible is Buddhist theory of momentariness with their theory of Karma? In this regard how do Buddhists respond to objections raised by their opponents? Critically discuss. (20 marks) (b) 'The doctrine of 'Relativism' of Jain Philosophy cannot be logically sustained without postulating 'Absolutism'.' Critically examine this view and give reasons in the favour of your answer. (15 marks) (c) How do Mīmāṃsakas refute the Nyāya view that Implication (arthāpatti) is reducible to Inference (anumāna) and establish Implication as an independent means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) ? Critically discuss. (15 marks)

हिंदी में प्रश्न पढ़ें

(a) बौद्धों का क्षणिकवाद सिद्धान्त उनके कर्म सिद्धान्त से कितना सुसंगत है ? इस सम्बन्ध में बौद्ध उनके प्रतिपक्षियों द्वारा उत्थापित आक्षेपों का उत्तर किस प्रकार देते हैं ? समालोचनात्मक व्याख्या कीजिए । (20 अंक) (b) 'निरपेक्ष को अभिगृहीत किये बिना जैन दर्शन का सापेक्षतावादी सिद्धान्त तार्किक रूप से धारणीय नहीं हो सकता ।' इस मत का समीक्षात्मक परीक्षण कीजिये तथा अपने उत्तर के पक्ष में तर्क दीजिये । (15 अंक) (c) मीमांसक न्याय के इस मत का कि अर्थापत्ति का अन्तर्भाव अनुमान में हो जाता है, किस प्रकार खण्डन कर अर्थापत्ति की एक स्वतन्त्र वैद्य ज्ञान स्रोत (प्रमाण) के रूप में स्थापना करते हैं ? समालोचनात्मक व्याख्या कीजिए । (15 अंक)

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Directive word: Critically discuss

This question asks you to critically discuss. The directive word signals the depth of analysis expected, the structure of your answer, and the weight of evidence you must bring.

See our UPSC directive words guide for a full breakdown of how to respond to each command word.

How this answer will be evaluated

Approach

The directive 'critically discuss' demands balanced exposition with evaluative judgment across all three parts. Allocate approximately 40% of time/words to part (a) given its 20 marks, and roughly 30% each to parts (b) and (c). Structure: brief unified introduction on pramāṇa debates in Indian philosophy; then three distinct sections addressing each sub-part with thesis-antithesis-synthesis progression; conclude by identifying common threads regarding the nature of valid knowledge across these schools.

Key points expected

  • Part (a): Explanation of kṣaṇikavāda (momentariness) and its apparent tension with karma-rebirth continuity; Buddhist resolution through santāna (stream of consciousness) and bhāvāṅga (Theravāda) or ālayavijñāna (Yogācāra); specific objections from Nyāya (karma-phala saṃbandha problem) and Mīmāṃsā (apūrva continuity) with Buddhist responses
  • Part (a): Critical evaluation of whether santāna successfully bridges the gap or remains problematic; assessment of Sautrāntika-Svātantrika distinction in handling this issue
  • Part (b): Exposition of syādvāda/aneikāntavāda (Jain relativism) and nayavāda; the logical structure of saptabhaṅgīnaya; alleged need for absolute standpoint (kevalajñāna) to ground relative standpoints
  • Part (b): Critical examination of whether kevalajñāna functions as absolutist postulate or transcends the relativity-absolutivity binary; comparison with Madhyamika śūnyavāda on similar charges
  • Part (c): Nyāya reduction of arthāpatti to anumāna (through tātparya/jñāna mechanism); Mīmāṃsā counter-arguments distinguishing arthāpatti's unique pakṣa (unthinkability otherwise) and its abhidhāna vs. anumāna's liṅga-based operation
  • Part (c): Critical assessment of Kumārila's vs. Prabhākara's positions on arthāpatti; evaluation of whether Mīmāṃsā successfully establishes independence or merely semantic distinction

Evaluation rubric

DimensionWeightMax marksExcellentAveragePoor
Concept correctness20%10Precise exposition of kṣaṇikavāda, santāna, ālayavijñāna, syādvāda, saptabhaṅgīnaya, kevalajñāna, arthāpatti (śruta and dṛṣṭa), and anumāna; accurate distinction between Sautrāntika and Yogācāra solutions in (a), Kumārila and Prabhākara sub-schools in (c)Basic definitions correct but conflates key distinctions (e.g., treats all Buddhist schools identically on momentariness-karma; misses śruta/dṛṣṭa arthāpatti distinction); minor technical errors in Sanskrit terminologyFundamental misconceptions (e.g., treats momentariness as denying all continuity; confuses syādvāda with scepticism; equates arthāpatti entirely with presumption in Western logic); significant terminological errors
Argument structure20%10Clear logical progression in each part: for (a) tension → resolution → residual problems; for (b) relativism thesis → absolutism charge → Jain defence → critical assessment; for (c) Nyāya position → Mīmāṃsā refutation → independent establishment → evaluation; effective transitions between partsAdequate structure within parts but weak connections between (a), (b), (c); either descriptive without critical progression or critical without adequate exposition; some logical gaps in tracing implicationsDisorganised or fragmented; jumps between schools without clear argumentative purpose; mere listing of points; conclusion disconnected from body; significant imbalance (e.g., neglects part (c) entirely or gives cursory treatment)
Schools / thinkers cited20%10Specific citations: for (a) Vasubandhu (Abhidharmakośa), Saṃghabhadra, Candrakīrti on santāna; Uddyotakara/Nyāyavārttika on karma objection; for (b) Kundakunda (Pravacanasāra), Umasvati (Tattvārthasūtra), Mallavādin; for (c) Gaṅgeśa (Tattvacintāmaṇi), Kumārila (Ślokavārttika), Prabhākara (Bṛhatī); textual references where possibleGeneric school references without specific thinkers; mentions 'Nyāya critics' or 'Buddhists' without differentiation; no textual anchoring; misses key sub-school distinctions (e.g., Bhāṭṭa vs. Prābhākara on arthāpatti)Vague attributions or incorrect ascriptions (e.g., attributes ālayavijñāna to Theravāda; confuses Kundakunda with Digambara commentators on syādvāda); anachronistic or invented sources
Counter-position handling20%10For (a): presents Nyāya's karma-phala saṃbandha objection and Mīmāṃsā's apūrva-based continuity challenge with Buddhist responses (santāna-puṣṭi, bhāvāṅga-citta); for (b): addresses absolutism charge from Hindu/Buddhist critics and Jain counter that kevalajñāna is transcendent, not absolutist; for (c): fairly presents Nyāya reduction (Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara) before Mīmāṃsā refutation; evaluates strengths of both positionsMentions opponents but superficially; one-sided presentation favouring the school in question; inadequate treatment of at least one part (especially (b) or (c)); misses strongest version of opposing argumentsIgnores counter-positions entirely or caricatures them; no critical engagement with objections; partisan advocacy without philosophical balance; fails to address 'critically' directive in any part
Conclusion & coherence20%10Synthesises findings across all three parts: reflects on how pramāṇa debates reveal broader tensions in Indian epistemology (empiricism vs. transcendentalism, analysis vs. synthesis); offers nuanced judgment on whether Buddhist momentarism-karma reconciliation is ultimately satisfactory, whether Jain relativism escapes self-refutation, and whether arthāpatti's independence is substantively or merely nominally established; identifies methodological commonalities (e.g., all three schools' concern with preserving practical efficacy of knowledge-claims)Separate conclusions for each part without cross-connection; generic summary without evalative synthesis; or strong conclusion for (a) but weak for (b) and (c); misses opportunity for meta-philosophical reflectionNo conclusion or abrupt ending; mere repetition of points; contradictory judgments across parts without acknowledgment; fails to address the 'critically discuss' directive in summative assessment

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