(a) Inspite of accepting the intrinsic validity of knowledge, why and how Prabhākara and Kumārila differ in their interpretation of erroneous cognition ? Discuss. (20 marks)
(b) Explain Buddhist concept of Trīratna and their internal relation. Critic

Question

(a) Inspite of accepting the intrinsic validity of knowledge, why and how Prabhākara and Kumārila differ in their interpretation of erroneous cognition ? Discuss. (20 marks)
(b) Explain Buddhist concept of Trīratna and their internal relation. Critically examine the consistency of Trīratnas with the Buddhist concept of No-soul (Nairātmyavāda). (15 marks)
(c) How do Naiyāyikas respond to Cārvāka's objections against inference (anumāna) and establish inference as an independent means of knowledge ? Critically discuss. (15 marks)

UPSC Answer Check · Accepted Answer

The common thread is functional validity: cognition, refuge and inference are accepted by their efficacy, not by ultimate substance.

Prabhākara and Kumārila on error. Both Mīmāṃsakas accept svataḥ-prāmāṇya: a cognition is valid in itself, not because of later verification. Their difference lies in what error is. Prabhākara, beginning with nirvikalpa perception, holds akhyāti: error is non-apprehension of the real object or relation. In shell-silver, the mistake is not a positive cognition of an unreal silver; it is the failure to cognize that the shell is not silver. Ontologically, there is no positive erroneous object, only absence of cognition of the real. Kumārila, by contrast, stresses savikalpa realism: determinate cognition presents real attributes, and error is viparītakhyāti, a positive cognition that is contrary to the real state of affairs. It is not mere absence; it has determinate content, but it misrepresents reality. Thus, despite shared intrinsic validity, Prabhākara reduces error to a defect in apprehension, while Kumārila treats it as a positive wrong cognition.

Trīratna and no-soul. The Trīratna are Buddha, Dharma and Saṅgha. The Buddha is the awakened teacher who reveals the path; Dharma is the teaching and path; Saṅgha is the community that preserves, practices and embodies that teaching. Their internal relation is functional: the Buddha points to the Dharma, the Dharma is actualized in the Saṅgha, and the Saṅgha preserves the Buddha’s Dharma. As refuge, they are not three independent substances but a soteriological triad: the guide, the path, and the supportive community.

The apparent tension with Nairātmyavāda is that the Trīratna may seem to imply enduring entities: a permanent Buddha, an eternal Dharma, or a substantial Saṅgha. Buddhism, however, denies a substantial self in persons and phenomena, not conventional functional designations. The Buddha is a conventional designation over aggregates, not an eternal soul; Dharma is a causal process and teaching, not an immutable substance; Saṅgha is a collection of momentary aggregates. Dharmakīrti’s arthakriyā resolves the issue: the Trīratna are conventionally real because they have causal efficacy in producing liberation. Prajñāpāramitā adds that all three are empty of intrinsic nature yet functionally effective. Hence the Trīratna are consistent with no-soul: they are refuges because they work, not because they possess permanent selfhood.

Nyāya against Cārvāka. Cārvāka rejects anumāna. Its objections are sādhāraṇa, asādhāraṇa and kalātyayāpadiṣṭa: a reason is either common to many things and cannot pick out the particular conclusion, or unique and cannot be known to be universally related; and the time-gap between hetu and sādhya makes concomitance uncertain. Nyāya responds by distinguishing svārtha and parārtha anumāna, showing that inference is a distinct cognitive operation, and by defending vyāpti. Vyāpti is established through repeated observation, absence of counterexample, and tarka. Gaṅgeśa clarifies vyāpti as the absence of the hetu in the absence of the sādhya, a negative concomitance known through perception and exclusion. Udayana’s Nyāyakusumāñjali argues that the Cārvāka objections fail: common properties can be restricted by the locus and the universal relation, unique properties can be known through perception and memory, and the time-gap does not destroy vyāpti because the relation is not dependent on simultaneity.

Critically, Nyāya’s success depends on whether vyāpti can be known independently of inference. If repeated observation is merely inductive, the Cārvāka charge of circularity remains. Yet for Nyāya, inference is an independent pramāṇa because its validity rests on vyāpti, a real universal relation known through perception and tarka, not on another pramāṇa. It is therefore not derivative from perception or testimony, though it remains conditional on the correct establishment of vyāpti and the absence of defects.

(a) Inspite of accepting the intrinsic validity of knowledge, why and how Prabhākara and Kumārila differ in their interpretation…

Model answer

What "Discuss" is asking you to do

Structure that answers it

Where marks are lost

How this answer will be evaluated

Approach

Key points expected

Evaluation rubric

Must cover

Loses marks

Earns more

Extra mark

Must cover

Loses marks

Earns more

Extra mark

Must cover

Loses marks

Earns more

Extra mark

Practice this exact question

More from Philosophy 2022 Paper I