(a) NATO, the oldest surviving collective security system, is facing challenge of transactional coercion from its own biggest member. What future does NATO have amidst such developments ? (20 marks)

(b) Theories of international relations which clai

Question

(a) NATO, the oldest surviving collective security system, is facing challenge of transactional coercion from its own biggest member. What future does NATO have amidst such developments ? (20 marks)

(b) Theories of international relations which claim objectivity inevitably harbour subjective biases. Elucidate. (15 marks)

(c) Does power transition theory reflect the dynamics of US-China relations ? (15 marks)

UPSC Answer Check · Accepted Answer

(a) NATO's future amid transactional coercion
Strictly, NATO is a collective defence alliance, not a collective security system (a role reserved for the UN). Established in Washington on 4 April 1949 with twelve founding members, the alliance now comprises 32 states, following the accession of Finland (4 April 2023) and Sweden (7 March 2024). Its core mechanism, Article 5, has been invoked only once, after 11 September 2001.

The "transactional coercion" from the United States manifests primarily through the burden-sharing dispute: Washington has publicly tied its protection to allies' spending and, in 2025, pressed Denmark over Greenland. The 2014 Wales Summit pledged 2 per cent of GDP for defence, while the 2025 The Hague Summit raised the target to 5 per cent by 2035 (3.5 per cent core plus 1.5 per cent related). This pressure, combined with the 2022 Madrid Strategic Concept identifying Russia as the "most significant and direct threat," has triggered European hedging. Responses, foreshadowed by Macron's 2019 "brain death" remark, include Germany’s Zeitenwende, the EU Strategic Compass (2022), and PESCO.

NATO’s future is one of conditional survival rather than collapse. While the alliance’s value flows back to the US through extended deterrence, the credibility of Article 5 depends on the perceived political will of its members. Three futures are plausible: a Europeanised NATO with a stronger European pillar; a hollowed alliance if US guarantees become openly conditional; or renewed cohesion driven by the Russian threat. The first is the most likely, with NATO persisting within a more transactional framework.

(b) Objectivity and bias in IR theory
The claim that International Relations (IR) theories harbour subjective biases challenges the positivist assertion of value-freedom. Robert Cox’s seminal 1981 argument that "theory is always for someone and for some purpose" distinguishes "problem-solving" theory—which manages the status quo—from "critical" theory, which questions the underlying social forces.

This bias is evident across multiple traditions. Stanley Hoffmann’s "An American Social Science" (1977) demonstrated that the discipline’s focus on the nation-state reflected American hegemony. Feminist scholars like J. Ann Tickner (1988) and Cynthia Enloe (1989) revealed that "objective" principles, such as Morgenthau’s, were constructed through gendered assumptions. Furthermore, post-colonial critiques, including Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978) and Amitav Acharya’s "Global IR," argue that the discipline’s "objectivity" is a Western-centric bias that marginalises non-Western ontologies.

Even constructivists like Alexander Wendt (1992) argue that "anarchy is what states make of it," suggesting that the social world is constituted by intersubjective ideas rather than existing objectively. A fair reading concedes the positivist reply that method and intersubjective testing reduce, though they cannot eliminate, bias. The appropriate response is therefore not relativism, but reflexivity: scholars must disclose their standpoints and engage in theoretical pluralism to achieve a more robust understanding of global politics.

(c) Power transition theory and US-China relations
Power Transition Theory, formulated by A.F.K. Organski in 1958 and refined with Jacek Kugler in The War Ledger (1980), posits that war is most likely when a rising challenger reaches parity with a dominant hegemon and is "dissatisfied" with the status quo. In the US-China context, China overtook the US in GDP at purchasing power parity around 2014, though its nominal GDP remains lower. China’s rejection of the 2016 South China Sea arbitral award and the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (2013) and AIIB suggest a dissatisfied challenger challenging the existing hierarchy.

However, the theory does not fully reflect the current dynamics. Unlike Organski’s historical cases, the US-China relationship is constrained by nuclear deterrence and deep economic interdependence; even the 2025 tariff escalation was followed by a negotiated truce rather than rupture. Furthermore, the "peaking-power thesis" (Brands and Beckley, 2022) suggests China's relative power is peaking, which may make it more risk-acceptant in a near-term "danger zone". While Graham Allison’s "Thucydides's Trap" (2017) highlights the risk of miscalculation, the theory’s determinism is limited by the measurement problem of "dissatisfaction."

In conclusion, Power Transition Theory provides a useful analytical frame for identifying the structural risks of US-China parity. However, it is not a destiny; the presence of nuclear weapons and the high costs of conflict suggest that the "dynamics" of the relationship are more complex than a simple transition to war.

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