(a) Doctrine of Pith and Substance, and the Doctrine of severability in the legislative relations between the Indian Union and…

(a) Pith and Substance and Severability The legislative relations between the Union and States are governed by the distribution of powers in the Seventh Schedule. The Doctrine of Pith and Substance and the Doctrine of Severability are judicial tools that manage these relations. They are supplementary in nature because both serve the presumption of constitutionality (ut res magis valeat quam pereat), aiming to save legislation rather than strike it down. However, they are distinct in application: Pith and Substance addresses the competence of the legislature, while Severability addresses the consequence of a partial invalidity.

Pith and Substance determines the true nature of a law to decide which List it falls under. In Profulla Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank of Commerce, Khulna (1947), the Privy Council held that if the true nature of a law is within a legislature’s competence, incidental encroachment on another List is permissible; the Supreme Court adopted the doctrine in State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara (1951), upholding prohibition as a State subject despite its incidental effect on imports. This is distinct from Colourable Legislation (K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa, 1953), which strikes down indirect usurpation of a power the legislature does not possess.

Severability operates under Article 13(1) and 13(2), which declare laws void only "to the extent of such inconsistency." In R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India (1957), the Court established that if an unconstitutional part is not so intertwined that the whole must fail, the rest of the law survives. Concrete illustrations include A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950), where Section 14 of the Preventive Detention Act was severed, and Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992), where Paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule was severed to save the anti-defection law.

The two therefore work in sequence: pith and substance first decides whether a law as a whole falls within the enacting legislature's List; where only some provisions exceed competence or violate Part III, severability saves the valid remainder. Balsara shows both at once - the Bombay Prohibition Act was upheld as a State law in pith and substance, while a few provisions were struck down and severed.

(b) Law and Order versus Development in District Administration District administration in India is the pivot of governance, characterized by a dichotomy between law and order maintenance (regulatory) and development management. This dichotomy has historical roots: the office of Collector was established by Warren Hastings in 1772; the Cornwallis Code (1793) separated revenue collection from judicial and magisterial functions, but Lord William Bentinck reunited magisterial powers with the Collector in 1831, creating the Collector-Magistrate whose regulatory role dominated colonial district administration. In contrast, the developmental function emerged post-independence with the Community Development Programme (2 October 1952) and the National Extension Service (1953).

Institutionally, this dichotomy is expressed through the District Magistrate (DM) under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 (replacing the CrPC, 1973), and the District Disaster Management Authority under Section 25 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005. Development is managed by the District Programme Coordinator (e.g., for MGNREGA, 2005, now succeeded by the VB-G RAM G Act, 2025), the Chief Executive Officer of the Zila Parishad, and district-level committees for flagship schemes, while the Aspirational Districts Programme (2018) has made the Collector the anchor for outcome-based development. The Balwantrai Mehta Committee (1957) and Ashok Mehta Committee (1978) addressed the integration of these functions through democratic decentralization. The G.V.K. Rao Committee (1985) proposed a District Development Commissioner, working as chief executive of the Zila Parishad, to separate development from the Collector’s regulatory duties. In big cities the commissionerate system of policing has similarly separated law and order from the Collector.

Despite this separation, the functions are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. The 2nd ARC’s 15th Report (2009) on State and District Administration emphasizes that law and order is a prerequisite for development; without security, infrastructure projects and welfare schemes cannot be delivered. Conversely, development management reduces the root causes of disorder—such as unemployment and poverty—thereby reinforcing law and order. The dual-hat system is a design feature, though the overload on the DM remains a challenge.

(c) Reasons for Governor-State Government Disagreements Disagreements between Governors and state governments stem from constitutional, political, and institutional sources.

Constitutional Reasons:

• Article 156: The Governor serves at the pleasure of the President, leading to concerns over arbitrary removal, as addressed in B.P. Singhal v. Union of India (2010).
• Article 200: The Constitution does not prescribe a time limit for the Governor to act on a bill, creating friction over delays. In State of Punjab v. Principal Secretary to the Governor (2023) the Supreme Court held that a Governor who withholds assent must return the bill to the House; in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor (April 2025) a two-judge bench fixed timelines and deemed ten bills assented; but in its November 2025 advisory opinion on a presidential reference, a Constitution Bench held that courts cannot impose fixed timelines or deemed assent, while allowing limited judicial scrutiny of prolonged, unexplained inaction.
• Article 163: Preserves the Governor’s residual discretionary functions, whose scope is contested even though Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974) held that the Governor ordinarily acts on ministerial advice.
• Article 356 and government formation: The history of recommending President's Rule (curbed by S. R. Bommai, 1994) and of discretion in inviting parties to form governments, as in Maharashtra (2019) and Karnataka (2018), fuels distrust; in Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016) the Supreme Court held that the Arunachal Governor could not advance the Assembly session on his own, without ministerial advice.

Political and Institutional Reasons:

• Partisan Appointments: Governors are often appointed from the ruling party at the Centre, leading to a lack of neutrality.
• Chancellor Role: The Governor serves as the Chancellor of state universities, leading to disputes over Vice-Chancellor appointments; Kerala and West Bengal have passed bills to remove Governors as Chancellors and Tamil Nadu to transfer Vice-Chancellor appointments to the state government, and the UGC's draft regulations of 2025 on VC selection intensified the dispute.
• Other flashpoints: Governors departing from the text of the customary address to the Assembly, delays in sanctioning prosecutions, and public criticism of elected governments.

Commission Recommendations: The Sarkaria Commission (1988) recommended transparent selection criteria and a fixed tenure. The Punchhi Commission (2010) suggested a defined appointment process, a fixed five-year tenure with removal only through a resolution of the State Legislature, and that Governors should not be burdened with the role of Chancellor; the NCRWC (2002) likewise favoured consulting the Chief Minister on the appointment. Recent flashpoints include delays in ministerial appointments and the exercise of discretionary powers in states with weak governments.