UPSC Law 2026 — Paper II

(a) 'Comment' requires a reasoned verdict, not a description: the candidate must state the maxim and its conditions, then answer the specific question asked — whether it reverses the burden of proof COMPLETELY — by distinguishing the legal (persuasive) burden, which stays on the plaintiff, from the evidential burden (onus of adducing evidence), which alone shifts. (b) 'Discuss' here has a concrete statutory anchor: community service is a new sixth species of punishment introduced by Section 4(f) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The candidate must identify the provision and the offences to which it attaches, and then show HOW it can be deployed against local problems — decongesting prisons, repairing civic harm caused by the offence, and reintegrating petty first-time offenders. (c) 'Discuss' with a comparative edge: the candidate must show what specifically CHANGED in the definition of 'consumer' when the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 replaced the 1986 Act, and then demonstrate the alignment of that change with e-commerce — the Explanation to Section 2(7), the definitions of 'e-commerce' and 'electronic service provider', and the supporting machinery (CCPA, e-commerce rules, e-filing, product liability). (d) 'Explain with the help of examples' requires a yes/no answer plus illustration: the candidate must define public and private nuisance separately, answer that a single act CAN constitute both, identify the bridging requirement — special or particular damage over and above that suffered by the public generally — and support it with at least two concrete examples or decided cases. (e) 'Explain how the law has changed' demands a point-by-point comparison of Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 with Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 — the protected object, the actus reus, the means, the mens rea, the punishment and the saving Explanation — followed by an assessment of whether the change is substantive or nominal.

• Meaning of the maxim and its three conditions (control, accident not ordinarily without negligence, cause unknown)
• Legal burden stays on the plaintiff — Sections 104 and 105 BSA, 2023 [ss. 101, 102 IEA]
• Only the evidential burden shifts; the defendant discharges it by a reasonable non-negligent explanation
• At least one Indian authority applying the maxim
• Conclusion: no complete reversal; a rule of evidence, not of liability
• Section 4(f) BNS — community service as a new punishment
• Explanation to Section 23 BNSS [s. 29 CrPC] — unremunerated work benefiting the community; Magistrates' power
• Offences carrying it, e.g. proviso to Section 303(2), Sections 355, 356(2), 202, 209, 226 BNS
• Application to local issues with concrete examples (sanitation, plantation, water bodies, traffic)
• Reformative rationale and limits: Articles 21 and 23; supervision; need for rules
• Section 2(7), Consumer Protection Act, 2019, replacing s. 2(1)(d) of the 1986 Act
• Explanation (b) to Section 2(7) — online transactions, teleshopping, direct selling, multi-level marketing
• Section 2(16) 'e-commerce' and Section 2(17) 'electronic service provider'; E-Commerce Rules, 2020
• Supporting machinery: CCPA (Sections 10-27), e-filing and home-forum jurisdiction (Sections 34-35), product liability (Chapter VI)
• Commercial-purpose exclusion and its judicial narrowing
• Definitions: public nuisance (Section 270 BNS [s. 268 IPC]) and private nuisance
• Answer: a single act can be both
• Special or particular damage as the bridge
• At least two concrete examples
• Remedies: Section 292 BNS [s. 290 IPC]; Section 152 BNSS [s. 133 CrPC]; Section 91 CPC; private suit
• Section 124A IPC: 'Government established by law', 'disaffection'; punishment
• Section 152 BNS: protected object now the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India
• New conduct (secession, armed rebellion, subversive activities, separatist feelings) and means (electronic, financial)
• Mens rea 'purposely or knowingly'; punishment of life or up to seven years, with fine
• Explanation saving lawful criticism
• Kedar Nath Singh (1962) reading down, and an assessment whether the change is substantive

(a) 'Critically analyse in the light of decided cases' requires the candidate to test a proposition, not merely describe vicarious liability: state the doctrine and its conditions, marshal the cases showing that a blameless master is held liable (which supports the public-policy thesis), then present the fault-based counter-arguments (control, negligent selection, course-of-employment limits), and arrive at a reasoned conclusion. (b) 'Discuss in the light of relevant legislative enactments and judicial pronouncements' requires a chronological account of how Article 17 has been given effect: the constitutional text and its horizontal reach, the Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955 as renamed the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955, the SC and ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 with its 2015 and 2018 amendments, the manual-scavenging statutes, and the case law that has interpreted them. (c) Two mandatory parts: first 'discuss' the defence of volenti non fit injuria — its meaning, its two essentials (knowledge of the risk and free, voluntary consent to run it) and its operation; second, and carrying equal weight, state the limitations on its scope (consent not free, mere knowledge, rescue cases, negligence of the defendant, illegal acts, statutory and no-fault regimes).

• Doctrine: respondeat superior / qui facit per alium facit per se; master liable though personally blameless
• Tests: the relationship (control, integration, multiple test) and course of employment (Salmond)
• Policy rationales: enterprise risk, deep pocket, loss distribution; qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus
• Cases showing a blameless master held liable (Lloyd v. Grace, Smith & Co.; Limpus)
• Modern close-connection expansion (Lister v. Hesley Hall, 2002)
• Fault-based limits: course of employment; acts outside its scope ('frolic of his own')
• Indian position including State liability (Vidhyawati; Kasturi Lal; Nagendra Rao)
• Reasoned conclusion: policy in justification, fault-derived in boundaries
• Article 17 and Article 35(a)(ii)
• Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955, renamed the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 in 1976
• SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and its 2015 and 2018 amendments
• Subhash Kashinath Mahajan (2018), Section 18A and Prathvi Raj Chauhan (2020)
• Horizontal enforceability (PUDR, 1982) and meaning of untouchability (Devarajiah, 1958)
• Manual scavenging: the 2013 Act and Safai Karamchari Andolan (2014)
• Assessment of the enforcement deficit
• Meaning; two essentials — knowledge and free, voluntary consent; a complete defence, distinct from contributory negligence
• Illustrations (sports spectators; an Indian example)
• Limitation: knowledge is not consent (Smith v. Baker, 1891)
• Limitation: consent must be free (Bowater v. Rowley Regis, 1944)
• Limitation: rescue cases (Haynes v. Harwood, 1935)
• Limitation: consent to risk is not consent to negligence; unlawful acts; breach of statutory duty
• Limitation: informed consent in medical cases; no defence to absolute liability

(a) The question asks HOW EFFECTIVELY the law distinguishes premeditated killing (murder under Section 101 BNS, 2023) from a killing in a sudden fight (Exception 4 to Section 101), and requires the answer to be anchored in statutory provisions: the candidate must set out both, apply the four ingredients of Exception 4, and then critically assess the workability of the test. (b) Three distinct sub-questions, all of which must be answered: (i) how far does a mistake of fact negate mens rea; (ii) does it operate as a justification or an excuse; and (iii) should it be allowed as a defence in strict liability offences. Each requires a position supported by statute and authority. (c) Two linked demands: set out the procedural safeguards for voluntariness in the plea bargaining chapter of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (Sections 289 to 300), and separately discuss the role of the judiciary — both the pre-2005 hostility to plea bargaining and the court's active statutory duty to verify voluntariness in camera.

• Section 100 BNS [s. 299 IPC] and Section 101 BNS [s. 300 IPC] — genus and species
• Exception 4 to Section 101 BNS [Exception 4 to s. 300 IPC]: four cumulative ingredients and the Explanation
• Punishments: Section 103(1) BNS [s. 302 IPC] and Section 105 BNS [s. 304 IPC]
• Premeditation as the dividing line; intention inferred from weapon, injury and conduct
• Application through decided cases on Exception 4
• Critical assessment of how effectively the line is drawn
• Ignorantia facti excusat, ignorantia juris non excusat
• Section 14 BNS [s. 76 IPC] and Section 17 BNS [s. 79 IPC]; good faith under Section 2(11) BNS [s. 52 IPC]
• Illustrative cases on honest mistake (e.g. Tolson; Chirangi)
• Justification v. excuse — mistake as an excuse / failure-of-proof defence
• Strict liability: presumption of mens rea and its displacement, with authority on both sides (Nathulal; Mayer Hans George)
• Reasoned position on allowing the defence in strict-liability offences
• Sections 289-300 BNSS [ss. 265A-265L CrPC]; Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2005
• Section 289 BNSS [s. 265A CrPC] — seven-year ceiling and exclusions
• Section 290 BNSS [s. 265B CrPC] — application with affidavit; thirty-day limit; in-camera examination
• Mutually satisfactory disposition, compensation and reduced sentence (Sections 291-293 BNSS)
• Finality (Section 295 BNSS) and non-use of statements (Section 299 BNSS); Article 20(3)
• Judicial role: pre-2005 hostility (at least two decisions) and the present duty to verify voluntariness

(a) A problem question with two mandatory parts: (i) identify the offence, if any, committed by X on these facts — sexual intercourse obtained from an adult woman on a promise of marriage that is repudiated fifteen days later; and (ii) explain the provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 in the light of the recent amendments relating to sexual offences. The answer must reason to a conclusion, not merely list provisions. (b) Two parts of roughly equal weight: 'comment' on the proposition that theft protects possession rather than ownership, proving it from the definition, its Explanations and illustrations and decided cases; and then explain what the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 has changed in the law of theft. (c) A problem question: identify the offence committed by X, a public servant who demands Rs. 10,000 for processing a routine and legitimate application, explain it under the relevant statutory provisions — the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 as amended in 2018 — and support the analysis with leading cases.

• Section 69 BNS — sexual intercourse by deceitful means or false promise of marriage; up to ten years and fine
• Y is an adult: the age clause of Section 63 BNS [s. 375 IPC] and POCSO not attracted; consent under misconception — Section 28 BNS [s. 90 IPC]
• False promise ab initio v. genuine promise later broken — the Pramod Suryabhan Pawar two-limb test
• Application to the facts and a reasoned conclusion on X's liability
• Recent amendments: Criminal Law (Amendment) Acts, 2013 and 2018
• BNS changes: Section 69, marital-exception age raised to eighteen, Sections 65 and 70(2)
• Section 303(1) BNS [s. 378 IPC] — definition and ingredients; 'dishonestly' (Section 2(7) BNS [s. 24 IPC])
• Illustration: an owner taking his own property from a bailee or pawnee commits theft
• Temporary dispossession suffices (Pyare Lal Bhargava; K.N. Mehra)
• BNS changes: 'corporeal' dropped from Section 2(21); snatching under Section 304; enhanced punishment for repeat theft under Section 303(2); community-service proviso
• Contrast with criminal misappropriation and criminal breach of trust
• Section 7, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (as amended in 2018) — three to seven years and fine
• Explanation 1 to Section 7 — offence even if the duty is performed properly ('speed money')
• Section 2(d) 'undue advantage'; demand or attempt to obtain suffices
• Proof of demand — at least one leading case
• Section 20 presumption; Section 17A (trap proviso) and Section 19 sanction
• Bribery is outside the BNS: ss. 161-165A IPC repealed by Section 31 of the PC Act

(a) 'Discuss' a specific proposition: that the Competition Act, 2002 moved Indian law from a structural, size-based control of monopoly (the MRTP Act, 1969) to an effects-based regime whose object is consumer welfare. The answer must prove that shift from the Preamble, Sections 3, 4, 18 and 19, and not merely describe the Act. (b) 'Discuss' a jurisprudential distinction: the candidate must show that contraventions under Chapter IX of the Information Technology Act, 2000 are civil wrongs of strict liability adjudicated by an Adjudicating Officer and compensated in damages, whereas offences under Chapter XI are criminal wrongs requiring mens rea, investigated by the police and tried by criminal courts — and must demonstrate the difference with paired provisions. (c) A note with a precise statutory target: the four categories in Explanation 2 to Section 6 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 who may receive a share of profits without becoming partners, together with the other statutory non-partners — the minor admitted to the benefits of partnership, the transferee of a partner's interest and the sub-partner — and the reason, namely that mutual agency and not profit-sharing is the test. (d) Two parts: state the essential ingredients of a hire-purchase transaction, and then distinguish it from an agreement to buy. The pivot is the hirer's option, as opposed to obligation, to purchase, and the consequences of that difference for the passing of property and the power to pass title. (e) Two precise questions: what the plaintiff must prove to avoid a contract for undue influence under Section 16 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and in what circumstances undue influence is presumed so that the burden shifts to the defendant. The answer should also correct the premise — such a contract is voidable under Section 19A, not void.

• MRTP Act, 1969 repealed (Section 66): structural size control replaced by an effects-based regime
• Preamble and Section 18 — protection of the interests of consumers
• Section 4 — abuse of dominance prohibited, not dominance itself; Section 19(4) factors
• Section 3(3) presumption for horizontal agreements; Section 3(4) rule of reason; Section 19(3) benefits to consumers
• Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023 and enforcement (Section 27, Section 46, appeals to the NCLAT)
• Chapter IX (Sections 43-47) contraventions: civil wrongs, compensation, Adjudicating Officer (Section 46)
• Chapter XI (Sections 65-78) offences: crimes requiring mens rea, police investigation, criminal courts
• Section 43 / Section 66 pairing — 'dishonestly or fraudulently'
• Different standards of proof; Section 77 — both may proceed concurrently
• Illustrative offences (e.g. Sections 66C, 66D, 66F, 67)
• Mutual agency, not profit-sharing, is the test (Sections 4 and 6)
• Explanation 2 to Section 6 — all four categories
• Explanation 1 — joint owners sharing returns
• Other non-partners: minor admitted to benefits (Section 30), transferee (Section 29), sub-partner
• Hire-purchase as bailment with an option to purchase
• Ingredients: delivery, hire instalments, ownership retained, option, repossession, right to return
• Agreement to buy — obligation to purchase (Sale of Goods Act, 1930)
• Option v. obligation and its consequence for passing title (Section 30(2) SGA; Helby v. Matthews)
• Hire-Purchase Act, 1972 never brought into force (repealed in 2005)
• Section 16(1) — two limbs: position to dominate the will and its use to obtain an unfair advantage
• Contract voidable under Section 19A, not void
• Section 16(2)(a) and (b) — when a person is deemed able to dominate
• Section 16(3) — unconscionable transaction shifts the burden
• Pardanashin women; no presumption between husband and wife

(a) "Discuss the essential features of a partnership" — but anchored to the quoted proposition, so the answer must do two linked things: set out every essential element of partnership under Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, and demonstrate why profit-sharing is only prima facie evidence while mutual agency (the words 'carried on by all or any of them acting for all' in Section 4) is the conclusive or 'true' test. A pure list of essentials without engaging the prima facie / conclusive distinction does not answer the question. (b) Two linked demands: (i) 'explain the applicability of the rule of privity of contract in India' — state the rule, note the critical Indian departure that privity of consideration is NOT required because Section 2(d) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 allows consideration to move from the promisee 'or any other person', while privity of contract is nonetheless applied; and (ii) 'discuss the circumstances in which the rule does not prevent a person from enforcing a contract without his being a party to it' — the recognised exceptions, each with authority. (c) Explain, with statutory provisions and decided cases, how the law has moved from caveat emptor plus freedom to contract out (Sections 16 and 62 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930) to a positive duty on the seller to deliver goods of the required description, quality and fitness. The answer must cover (i) the implied conditions and warranties, (ii) the seller's freedom under Section 62 to negative them and the judicial techniques that cut exclusion clauses down, and (iii) the statutory overriding of exclusion clauses by the Consumer Protection Act, 2019.

• Section 4 — definition; 'carried on by all or any of them acting for all' as the source of mutual agency
• Section 6 — real relation of the parties; profit-sharing only prima facie evidence (Explanations)
• Contract, not status (Section 5); capacity; minor admitted to benefits (Section 30)
• Lawful business actually carried on (Section 2(b)); agreement to share profits
• Mutual agency — Sections 18, 19, 22 and 25
• Firm not a separate legal person; reasoned conclusion on the quoted statement
• Section 2(d) — consideration from 'the promisee or any other person': no privity of consideration
• Privity of contract nevertheless applies (Tweddle v. Atkinson; Dunlop v. Selfridge)
• Indian authority on both points (Chinnaya v. Ramayya; M.C. Chacko)
• Exception: trust or charge (Khwaja Muhammad Khan v. Husaini Begum)
• Other exceptions with authority: family arrangements, acknowledgement or estoppel, agency, covenants running with land, assignment
• Statutory exceptions: Section 2(7) CPA, 2019; Section 6, Married Women's Property Act, 1874; third-party motor insurance
• Section 16 SGA — caveat emptor and its exceptions: 16(1) fitness (trade-name proviso), 16(2) merchantable quality (examination proviso)
• Sections 14, 15 and 17 — title, description, sample; Sections 12, 13 and 59 — remedies
• Section 62 — freedom to exclude, and judicial control (strict construction, contra proferentem)
• Decided cases on fitness and merchantability (at least two, with facts)
• Consumer Protection Act, 2019: Sections 2(10), 2(11), 2(46); Sections 49(2) and 59(2); product liability (Chapter VI)
• Indian control of unfair terms (Section 23 of the Contract Act)

(a) A two-part critical question: first answer the question asked — can ADR effectively adjudicate disputes with public law elements, constitutional rights or significant public interest? — and then critically discuss the role of ADR in the light of the limitations built into the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 'Critically' requires a reasoned position with both sides: the doctrine of non-arbitrability (rights in rem, erga omnes effect, sovereign functions, statutory bars) and the countervailing case for ADR's efficiency, alongside the residual supervisory role of the constitutional courts. (b) 'Elucidate' the doctrinal shift from the assimilative capacity principle to the precautionary principle in international environmental jurisprudence, and connect it to sustainable development. The answer must explain what the assimilative capacity principle was (Stockholm, 1972, Principle 6), why it failed, what the precautionary principle says (Rio, 1992, Principle 15), and how Indian law absorbed both through Vellore Citizens' Welfare Forum and A.P. Pollution Control Board v. M.V. Nayudu, which is the case that expressly describes the shift. (c) Explain how the conflict between the right to a fair trial (Article 21) and the freedom of the press (Article 19(1)(a)) arising from 'trial by media' can be balanced. The answer must identify the two constitutional rights and their sources, show concretely how media trial prejudices a fair trial, and then set out the balancing mechanisms — principally the postponement order evolved in Sahara India Real Estate Corpn. Ltd. v. SEBI — together with statutory and self-regulatory controls, rather than simply condemning the media.

• Reasoned answer to the opening question: contractual side arbitrable, public-law core not
• Non-arbitrability: Section 2(3) and Section 34(2)(b)(i); Booz Allen (2011) / Vidya Drolia (2021) fourfold test
• Public policy ground (Section 34(2)(b)(ii), Section 34(2A); Section 48(2)) and its shifting content
• No writ or erga omnes relief from tribunals; residual supervision under Articles 226/227
• Other ADR limits: Section 89 CPC and Afcons; Mediation Act, 2023 (Section 6, First Schedule); Lok Adalats
• Critical balance: efficiency and government-contract arbitration v. exclusion of third parties, cost and neutrality
• Assimilative capacity principle — Stockholm Principle 6 (1972) — and why it failed
• Precautionary principle — Rio Principle 15 (1992): serious or irreversible damage; scientific uncertainty no excuse
• Sustainable development — Brundtland (1987); Rio Principles 3 and 4; inter-generational equity
• Reversal of the burden of proof onto the developer
• Indian absorption: Vellore (1996) and M.V. Nayudu (1999)
• Section 20, NGT Act, 2010; Articles 21, 48A and 51A(g)
• Article 21 fair trial and Article 19(1)(a) press freedom; Article 19(2) names contempt of court and defamation
• How media trial prejudices a fair trial (confessions, witnesses, pressure)
• Sahara v. SEBI (2012) — postponement orders; real and substantial risk; necessity and proportionality
• Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 — Sections 2(c), 3, 4 and 13
• Statutory protections: Sections 72-73 BNS [s. 228A IPC]; Section 366 BNSS [s. 327 CrPC]
• Regulatory and reform measures (Law Commission 200th Report; Press Council; Programme Code; 2021 IT Rules)

(a) 'Critically examine' — so first establish the premise that copyright confers exclusive rights (Sections 13, 14, 17 and 22 of the Copyright Act, 1957), then demonstrate with precision the internal and external limits that make those rights non-absolute in the public interest: the idea–expression dichotomy and originality threshold, the fair dealing exceptions in Section 52, the compulsory and statutory licences in Sections 31 to 32B, term limits, and competition and constitutional constraints — and finally take a reasoned view on whether the present balance is satisfactory. (b) Two express demands: identify the exploitation inherent in standard form contracts (contracts of adhesion offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis by a party with superior bargaining power), and then discuss, with decided cases, the protective devices courts use — reasonable notice, notice of onerous or unusual terms, contra proferentem and strict construction, fundamental breach, non est factum and misrepresentation, undue influence and unconscionability under Sections 16(3) and 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 — supplemented by the statutory protection now available under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. Cases are compulsory: 'refer to decided cases'. (c) 'Discuss the nature of agency' in the light of the quoted proposition that representative character and derivative authority are the distinguishing features of an agent. The answer must therefore do three things: state the statutory definition and essentials of agency under the Indian Contract Act, 1872; establish that the true test is the agent's power to create legal relations between the principal and third persons; and use that test to distinguish an agent from others who act for another — a servant, an independent contractor, a bailee, a trustee, a buyer or distributor.

• Exclusive rights: Sections 13, 14 and 17; copyright a statutory right (Section 16)
• Internal limits: idea–expression dichotomy; originality threshold
• Fair dealing — Section 52 with specific clauses (e.g. 52(1)(a), 52(1)(i), 52(1)(zb))
• Compulsory and statutory licences — Sections 31 to 32
• Term limit (life plus sixty years, Section 22) and the public domain; competition law (Section 3(5), Competition Act, 2002)
• Critical evaluation and a reasoned conclusion
• Nature of standard form contracts and the risk of exploitation
• Reasonable notice and special notice of onerous terms, with cases (e.g. Olley; Thornton; Spurling v. Bradshaw)
• Contra proferentem and strict construction; fundamental breach after Photo Production
• Indian Contract Act: Sections 16(3), 23 and 28; Brojo Nath Ganguly (1986)
• Consumer Protection Act, 2019: Sections 2(46), 2(47), 49(2) and 59(2)
• Balance: standard forms not objectionable per se; no general unfair-terms law in India
• Section 182 — agent and principal; qui facit per alium facit per se
• Representative character: Sections 226, 230 and 231-232
• Derivative authority: Sections 183-185; express, implied and emergency authority (Sections 186-189)
• True test: power to create legal relations with third parties
• Agent distinguished from servant, independent contractor, bailee, trustee and buyer/distributor
• Delegation, ratification, ostensible authority and irrevocable agency (Sections 190-200, 237, 202)