Indian Constitution has conferred the amending power on the ordinary legislative institutions with a few procedural hurdles. In…

The statement is broadly correct: Article 368 gives Parliament wide amending power, but it is not plenary.

Procedural hurdles. Some provisions (e.g., creating States under Article 4, or councils under Article 169) can be changed by a simple majority and are not deemed amendments under Article 368. An Article 368 bill can be introduced only in Parliament, there is no joint sitting, and the President must assent (24th Amendment). It must be passed by a special majority—majority of the total membership of each House and at least two-thirds of members present and voting. Where the amendment affects federal or institutional arrangements, such as the election of the President, legislative powers, High Courts, or certain tax and emergency provisions, it must also be ratified by the legislatures of at least half the States.

Substantive limits. The decisive limitation is judicial. Golak Nath (1967) initially held fundamental rights unamendable; Kesavananda Bharati (1973) overruled that, permitting amendment of fundamental rights but not the Constitution’s basic structure. Minerva Mills (1980) reinforced that harmony between fundamental rights and DPSP is basic. The NJAC judgment (2015) struck down the 99th Amendment, protecting judicial independence. Thus judicial review, federalism, secularism, judicial independence, rule of law, separation of powers, and free and fair elections are treated as unamendable.

Parliament responded to judicial limitations through the 42nd Amendment, which sought to shield amendments from judicial review; the 44th Amendment partially rolled this back, and Minerva Mills (1980) struck down the 42nd Amendment's expansion of Article 31C and Article 368(4)-(5).

The amending power is therefore flexible enough to adapt, but rigid enough to preserve the Constitution’s identity.