Philosophy

UPSC Philosophy 2026 — Paper I

All 8 questions from UPSC Civil Services Mains Philosophy 2026 Paper I (400 marks total). Every stem reproduced in full, with directive-word analysis, marks, word limits, and answer-approach pointers.

8Questions
400Total marks
2026Year
Paper IPaper

A

Q1
50M 150w Compulsory explain

Answer the following questions in about 150 words each : (a) How does Spinoza explain the relationship between states of mind and bodily processes? (10 marks) (b) Explain the distinction between Intuitive knowledge and Demonstrative knowledge as propounded by Locke. (10 marks) (c) Explain Hegel's idea that the concept of the Absolute as being is the concept of the Absolute as becoming as a process of self-development. (10 marks) (d) Compare and contrast the notion of entelechy as presented in Aristotle's and Leibniz's philosophy. (10 marks) (e) ‘‘I can prove now, for instance, that two human hands exist.’’ How does Moore use this illustration to prove the existence of an external world? Critically discuss. (10 marks)

हिंदी में पढ़ें

निम्नलिखित प्रत्येक प्रश्न का उत्तर लगभग 150 शब्दों में दीजिए : (a) स्पिनोज़ा मन की दशाओं तथा शारीरिक क्रियाओं के बीच संबंध की किस प्रकार व्याख्या करते हैं? (10 अंक) (b) लॉक द्वारा प्रतिपादित अंत:प्रज्ञात्मक ज्ञान तथा निदर्शनात्मक ज्ञान के बीच भेद की व्याख्या कीजिए। (10 अंक) (c) हेगेल के इस सम्प्रत्यय की व्याख्या कीजिए कि सत्ता के रूप में निरपेक्ष की अवधारणा, स्व-विकास की प्रक्रिया के रूप में निरपेक्ष के संभवन की अवधारणा है। (10 अंक) (d) अरस्तू तथा लाइब्निज़ के दर्शन में प्रस्तुत अन्तस्तत्त्व (एन्टेलेची) की अवधारणा में तुलना तथा विभेद कीजिए। (10 अंक) (e) ‘‘उदाहरणत: मैं अभी यह सिद्ध कर सकता हूँ कि दो मानव हाथ विद्यमान हैं।’’ मूर इस उदाहरण से बाह्य जगत् की सत्ता को कैसे सिद्ध करते हैं? आलोचनात्मक विवेचना कीजिए। (10 अंक)

Answer approach & key points

(a) Explain (state and make intelligible, with textual grounding) Spinoza's account of the mind-body relation, i.e. how mental states and bodily processes are related in the Ethics. 'How does he explain' requires the doctrine of one substance with two known attributes plus the parallelism/identity thesis, not a mere description of dualism. (b) Explain the DISTINCTION Locke draws between intuitive and demonstrative knowledge in Essay Concerning Human Understanding Book IV. The answer must first give Locke's definition of knowledge, then contrast the two degrees on immediacy, certainty, role of intervening ideas and liability to error, with Locke's own examples. (c) Explain Hegel's thesis that the Absolute conceived as Being is thereby the Absolute as Becoming, i.e. as a process of self-development. The answer must work through the opening of the Science of Logic (Being-Nothing-Becoming) and then show how this licenses the claim that the Absolute is Subject and a self-developing whole. (d) Compare AND contrast entelechy in Aristotle and in Leibniz. Both halves are required: the shared teleological, anti-mechanistic role of the notion, and the sharp differences in what bears it (form of a body vs simple substance/monad), its relation to matter, and the causal framework (immanent final causality vs pre-established harmony). (e) Two tasks. First, reconstruct Moore's proof of an external world using the two-hands illustration, including his three conditions for a rigorous proof. Second, 'critically discuss' - state at least two serious objections (question-begging; Wittgenstein's On Certainty) and Moore's or a Moorean reply.

  • Spinoza, Ethics (Ethica, 1677)
  • Deus sive Natura; one substance, infinite attributes
  • Attributes of Thought (cogitatio) and Extension (extensio)
  • Ethics II P7 - ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum
  • Ethics II P13 - the mind is the idea of the body
  • Ethics III P2 - mind and body cannot determine each other
  • Parallelism / dual-aspect identity (not interactionism)
  • Conatus; adequate vs inadequate ideas; activity and passivity
  • Descartes' interactionism and the pineal gland, rejected
  • John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), Book IV, chapters i-ii
  • Knowledge = perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas
  • Intuitive knowledge: immediate, no intervening idea; white is not black; a circle is not a triangle; three are more than two
  • Demonstrative knowledge: intervening ideas / proofs; angles of a triangle equal two right angles; existence of God
  • Every step of a demonstration must be intuitive
  • Role of memory and attention in demonstration; liability to error
  • Sensitive knowledge as the third and least certain degree
  • Science of Logic (Wissenschaft der Logik): Being (Sein) - Nothing (Nichts) - Becoming (Werden) - Determinate Being (Dasein)
  • Phenomenology of Spirit, Preface: the True as Substance and equally as Subject; the True is the whole
  • Aufhebung / sublation
  • an sich - fuer sich - an und fuer sich
  • Logic - Nature - Spirit triad; absolute spirit as art, religion, philosophy
  • Absolute idealism (contrast with Schelling's undifferentiated Absolute and Spinoza's static substance)
  • entelecheia (en + telos + echein); dynamis and energeia
  • Aristotle, De Anima II.1 412a27 - soul as first actuality of a natural body having life potentially
  • Hylomorphism: form (eidos/morphe) and matter (hyle); the four causes; internal final cause
  • Leibniz, Monadology (1714) paragraph 18 - monads as Entelechies
  • Monadology 7 (windowless monads), 15 (appetition as the tendency from one perception to another)
  • Pre-established harmony; complete individual concept; revival of substantial forms and vis viva against Descartes
  • G. E. Moore, 'Proof of an External World' (British Academy lecture, 1939)
  • Kant, Critique of Pure Reason B xxxix note - the 'scandal to philosophy'
  • 'Here is one hand ... and here is another'; things to be met with in space
  • Moore's three conditions for a rigorous proof
  • Moore's inability to prove the premiss / the dream argument
  • 'A Defence of Common Sense' (1925); the Moorean shift
  • Wittgenstein, On Certainty - hinge propositions
  • Petitio principii / begging the question
Q2
50M discuss

(a) What, according to Aristotle, is the fundamental problem of metaphysics? Discuss this in relation with Aristotle's account of the essence of the world, where he rejects the views of both the Atomists and Plato. (20 marks) (b) How does Hume account for ideas of reason? How does Kant respond to Hume's views in this regard? Critically discuss. (15 marks) (c) Describe Sartre’s notion of consciousness as ‘nothing’. How is it different from Husserl’s notion of consciousness? Discuss. (15 marks)

हिंदी में पढ़ें

(a) अरस्तू के अनुसार तत्त्वमीमांसा की मूलभूत समस्या क्या है? अरस्तू के जगत् के तत्त्वसार के विवरण के सम्बन्ध में इसकी विवेचना कीजिए, जिसमें वे परमाणुवादियों तथा प्लेटो दोनों के मत को नकार देते हैं। (20 अंक) (b) ह्यूम तर्क के संप्रत्ययों का विवरण किस प्रकार देते हैं? इस संबंध में कांट, ह्यूम के विचारों का किस प्रकार प्रत्युत्तर देते हैं? आलोचनात्मक विवेचना कीजिए। (15 अंक) (c) सार्त्र की चेतना की ‘शून्य (नथिंग)’ के रूप में अवधारणा का वर्णन कीजिए। यह किस प्रकार हुसर्ल की चेतना की अवधारणा से भिन्न है? विवेचना कीजिए। (15 अंक)

Answer approach & key points

(a) Three linked tasks: (i) identify what Aristotle takes to be the fundamental problem of metaphysics (what is being, which reduces to what is substance/ousia); (ii) expound his positive account of the essence of the world (hylomorphism, essence as form, the four causes, actuality/potentiality); (iii) show how that account is worked out by rejecting BOTH the Atomists' materialism and Plato's separate Forms. All three must appear. (b) Two parts plus an evaluation. (i) Hume's account of what reason can yield: the copy principle, Hume's fork, the analysis of causal necessity into custom, and the treatment of substance, self and God as products of imagination rather than ideas of reason. (ii) Kant's reply: synthetic a priori judgements, the Copernican turn, causality as a category vindicated in the Second Analogy, and the regulative status of the three Ideas of Reason. (iii) Critical assessment of how far Kant answers Hume. (c) Two directives. 'Describe' Sartre's thesis that consciousness (being-for-itself) is a nothingness - with the en-soi/pour-soi contrast, the rejection of contents and of the ego, and the consequence for freedom. Then 'discuss' how this differs from Husserl's conception of consciousness (noesis-noema, the transcendental ego, the epoche).

  • Metaphysics IV.1 - the science that studies being qua being
  • Metaphysics VII.1, 1028b2 - 'what is being?' = 'what is substance (ousia)?'
  • Being is said in many ways (pollachos legetai); the categories; substance as primary
  • Hylomorphism: hyle and eidos/morphe; synholon; to ti en einai (essence)
  • Four causes: material, formal, efficient, final; dynamis and energeia/entelecheia
  • Leucippus and Democritus - atoms and void; chance vs teleology; Physics II.4-6 and II.8; rejection of the void, Physics IV.6-9
  • Plato's Forms: chorismos, methexis as empty metaphor (Met. 991a20-22), Third Man argument (990b17, 1039a2), Met. VII.13 - no universal is a substance
  • Metaphysics XII - the unmoved mover, pure actuality, noesis noeseos, moving as final cause
  • Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) and An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748)
  • Copy principle; impressions and ideas
  • Hume's fork - relations of ideas / matters of fact
  • Constant conjunction; no impression of necessary connection; custom/habit; Treatise I.iii.14
  • Problem of induction; uniformity of nature
  • Bundle theory of the self
  • Kant, Prolegomena Preface - 'dogmatic slumber'
  • Synthetic a priori judgements; Copernican revolution (CPR B xvi)
  • Category of causality; Transcendental Deduction; Second Analogy of Experience
  • Transcendental Dialectic: Ideas of soul, world, God; regulative use; Paralogisms and Antinomies; postulates of pure practical reason
  • P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense (1966)
  • Sartre, Being and Nothingness (L'Etre et le neant, 1943)
  • etre-en-soi and etre-pour-soi; 'being is what it is'; the for-itself 'is not what it is and is what it is not'
  • neant / neantisation; nothingness comes into the world through man
  • Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego (1936-37); ego as transcendent, not an inhabitant of consciousness
  • pre-reflective cogito; non-positional consciousness
  • Existence precedes essence; freedom, anguish, bad faith (mauvaise foi); useless passion
  • Husserl, Ideas I (1913): epoche, phenomenological reduction, noesis-noema; Cartesian Meditations, the transcendental ego
  • Merleau-Ponty's critique (Phenomenology of Perception)
Q3
50M how

(a) Why are states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all and why are they ascribed to the same things to which we also ascribe physical properties? How does Strawson answer these questions in his work Individuals? (20 marks) (b) Explain Heidegger’s conception of authenticity and inauthenticity as modes of Dasein’s being. (15 marks) (c) Can words be viewed as the ideas in the mind of the person who uses them? Answer with reference to the philosophy of later Wittgenstein. (15 marks)

हिंदी में पढ़ें

(a) चेतना की अवस्थाओं को हम किसी भी वस्तु पर क्यों आरोपित करते हैं तथा हम इन्हें उन्हीं वस्तुओं पर क्यों आरोपित करते हैं, जिन पर हम भौतिक गुणों का भी आरोपण करते हैं? स्ट्रॉसन अपनी पुस्तक इन्डिविजुअल्स में इन प्रश्नों का किस प्रकार उत्तर देते हैं? (20 अंक) (b) मानव-अस्तित्व के पर्यायों के रूप में हाइडेगर की प्रामाणिकता (ऑथेन्टिसिटी) तथा अप्रामाणिकता (इनऑथेन्टिसिटी) की अवधारणा की व्याख्या कीजिए। (15 अंक) (c) क्या शब्दों की उनका प्रयोग करने वाले व्यक्ति के मनस् में स्थित प्रत्ययों के रूप में अवधारणा की जा सकती है? उत्तरवर्ती विट्गेन्स्टाइन के दर्शन के संदर्भ में उत्तर दीजिए। (15 अंक)

Answer approach & key points

(a) The two questions quoted are Strawson's own, from the chapter 'Persons' in Individuals (1959). The answer must (i) set up his framework - descriptive metaphysics, basic particulars, the concept of a person as logically primitive; (ii) give his answer to the first question by refuting the no-ownership theory; (iii) give his answer to the second by the argument that self-ascription requires other-ascription, which requires identifiable embodied subjects; (iv) explain M-predicates and P-predicates; (v) evaluate. (b) Explain authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) and inauthenticity (Uneigentlichkeit) as MODES OF DASEIN'S BEING in Being and Time - that is, as existentialia, not moral categories. Required: the das Man analysis with its three modes of falling, the call of conscience, Angst, being-towards-death and anticipatory resoluteness, and the explicit point that inauthenticity is a positive and usual mode. (c) Answer the yes/no question - the later Wittgenstein's answer is NO - and justify it from the Philosophical Investigations: rejection of the Augustinian picture, meaning as use, understanding is not an inner process, rule-following, and above all the private language argument with the beetle in the box. A bare exposition of 'meaning is use' without the private language argument will not meet the demand.

  • P. F. Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (1959), chapter 3, 'Persons'
  • Descriptive vs revisionary metaphysics
  • Basic particulars; material bodies; the unified spatio-temporal framework
  • The concept of a person as logically primitive
  • M-predicates and P-predicates
  • The no-ownership theory (associated with Schlick and the Tractatus-period Wittgenstein) and its self-refutation
  • Logically adequate criteria; the problem of other minds
  • Disembodied existence as logically secondary / attenuated
  • A. J. Ayer's criticism
  • Heidegger, Being and Time (Sein und Zeit, 1927)
  • Dasein; Being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein); care (Sorge)
  • Eigentlichkeit and Uneigentlichkeit; das Man and the they-self
  • Verfallen; Gerede, Neugier, Zweideutigkeit
  • Angst vs Furcht (fear); Unheimlichkeit
  • Call of conscience; Schuldigsein (Being-guilty)
  • Sein zum Tode; ownmost, non-relational, not-to-be-outstripped possibility
  • Vorlaufende Entschlossenheit (anticipatory resoluteness); Augenblick; Wiederholung
  • Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (1953)
  • Augustinian picture of language, PI 1 (Confessions I.8)
  • PI 43 - meaning is use in the language
  • Language-games (Sprachspiele); forms of life (Lebensform); family resemblance (PI 65-67)
  • Rule-following, PI 201 and PI 202; rule-following as a practice/custom
  • Private language argument, PI 243-271; PI 258 criterion of correctness; PI 293 beetle in the box
  • PI 244 - the word replaces the natural expression of sensation
  • PI 307 - not a behaviourist in disguise
  • Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982)
Q4
50M discuss

(a) “Wittgenstein’s difficulty about not being able to say anything within a given language about the structure of that language can be met by the idea of a hierarchy of languages.” Do you agree with this statement? Give reasons and justifications for your answer. (20 marks) (b) Analyze and discuss the different ways in which Kant and Hegel conceived the relationship between reality and our thinking about reality. (15 marks) (c) How did the logical positivists try to make philosophy a handmaid to science and establish a unified language of science? Why did their project fail? Discuss. (15 marks)

हिंदी में पढ़ें

(a) “विट्गेन्स्टाइन की किसी भाषा की संरचना के विषय में उसी भाषा में कुछ न कह पाने की अक्षमता की समस्या को भाषा की सोपानिकी (हाइरार्की) के प्रत्यय/अवधारणा से हल किया जा सकता है।” क्या आप इस कथन से सहमत हैं? अपने उत्तर के पक्ष में तर्क तथा प्रमाण प्रस्तुत कीजिए। (20 अंक) (b) कान्ट तथा हेगेल यथार्थता तथा यथार्थता विषयक हमारी सोच के बीच सम्बन्ध को जिन विभिन्न प्रकारों से अवधारणा करते हैं, उसका विश्लेषण तथा विवेचना कीजिए। (15 अंक) (c) तार्किक भाववादियों ने किस प्रकार दर्शनशास्त्र को विज्ञान की सहायिका (हैंडमेड) बनाने तथा विज्ञान की एकीकृत भाषा स्थापित करने का प्रयास किया? उनकी यह योजना क्यों असफल हुई? विवेचना कीजिए। (15 अंक)

Answer approach & key points

(a) Take a reasoned position on whether Russell's hierarchy-of-languages proposal solves the Tractatus say/show difficulty. Required: (i) accurate statement of Wittgenstein's difficulty (picture theory, logical form cannot be said but only shown, the ladder of 6.54); (ii) Russell's proposal in his Introduction to the Tractatus and its development by Tarski and Carnap; (iii) arguments for and against; (iv) a clear verdict with reasons. (b) Analyse and compare the DIFFERENT ways Kant and Hegel conceive the relation between reality and our thought of it. Required: Kant's Copernican turn with its phenomena/noumena limit, and Hegel's rejection of the thing-in-itself and his identification of the categories with the self-developing structure of reality itself. A bare summary of each philosopher without the specific contrast will not do. (c) Two parts. (i) How the logical positivists tried to make philosophy a servant of science (verification principle, philosophy as logical clarification/logic of science, elimination of metaphysics) and to build a unified language of science (physicalism, protocol sentences, unity of science programme). (ii) Why the project failed - at least three substantive, correctly attributed reasons.

  • Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921/1922); picture theory of the proposition
  • 4.12, 4.121, 4.1212 - logical form shown not said; 6.54 the ladder; proposition 7
  • Russell's Introduction to the Tractatus (1922) - hierarchy of languages
  • Russell's theory of types; vicious-circle principle; Russell's paradox; Principia Mathematica
  • Tarski, The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages (1933/1935); object language and metalanguage; undefinability theorem; Convention T; semantically closed languages and the Liar
  • Carnap, The Logical Syntax of Language (1934); Godel arithmetisation; principle of tolerance
  • Wittgenstein's 1919 letter to Russell on the cardinal problem of philosophy
  • Tractatus 6.421 (ethics is transcendental), 5.632 (the subject does not belong to the world)
  • Kripke, 'Outline of a Theory of Truth' (1975) as a non-hierarchical alternative
  • Kant, Critique of Pure Reason; Copernican revolution (B xvi)
  • Forms of intuition (space and time); twelve categories in four groups; transcendental unity of apperception (B131)
  • 'Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind' (A51/B75)
  • Phenomena and noumena / thing-in-itself; transcendental idealism and empirical realism; regulative Ideas; Antinomies
  • Hegel, Encyclopaedia Logic and Science of Logic; the thing-in-itself as caput mortuum (Enc. Logic 44)
  • The swimming analogy (Enc. Logic 10); the argument that to know a limit is to be beyond it
  • The Concept (Begriff); dialectic; absolute idealism
  • Philosophy of Right, Preface - the rational is actual, the actual is rational
  • Vienna Circle; Moritz Schlick; Carnap, Neurath, Hahn, Feigl, Waismann; Reichenbach; A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (1936)
  • The 1929 manifesto, The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle
  • Verification principle; analytic/synthetic; elimination of metaphysics; Carnap 1932 on Heidegger; emotivism
  • Tractatus 4.112 - philosophy as an activity of clarification
  • Neurath's physicalism; protocol sentences; Neurath's boat; Carnap's Der logische Aufbau der Welt (1928); International Encyclopedia of Unified Science
  • Self-refutation of the verification principle; Church's 1949 objection to Ayer's revised criterion
  • Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' (1951); Duhem-Quine confirmation holism
  • Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934) - falsifiability as demarcation, not meaning
  • Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962); theory-ladenness of observation; Sellars on the Myth of the Given

B

Q5
50M 150w Compulsory discuss

Answer the following questions in about 150 words each : (a) According to Nyāya view of inference (Anumāna), what are the characteristics that ascertain the validity of inferential sign (Hetu)? Discuss. (10 marks) (b) How does the Buddhist theory of momentariness problematize the issue of human action and responsibility? Critically discuss. (10 marks) (c) Is Puruṣa one or many? Explain and examine the Sāṁkhya position in this context. (10 marks) (d) Critically explain the nature of Samavāya (inherence) as propounded in Vaiśeṣika philosophy. (10 marks) (e) Explain, as per Yoga philosophy, the nature of Samādhi with special reference to the difference between Samprajñāta Samādhi and Asamprajñāta Samādhi. (10 marks)

हिंदी में पढ़ें

निम्नलिखित प्रत्येक प्रश्न का उत्तर लगभग 150 शब्दों में दीजिए : (a) न्याय के अनुमान विषयक मतानुसार वे क्या विशेषताएँ हैं, जो हेतु की वैधता को सुनिश्चित करती हैं? विवेचना कीजिए। (10 अंक) (b) बौद्धों का क्षणिकवाद किस प्रकार मानव कर्म तथा उत्तरदायित्व-सम्बन्धी विषय का समस्यायीकरण कर देता है? समालोचनात्मक व्याख्या कीजिए। (10 अंक) (c) क्या ‘पुरुष’ एक है या अनेक? इस संदर्भ में सांख्य दर्शन की मान्यताओं की व्याख्या तथा परीक्षण कीजिए। (10 अंक) (d) वैशेषिक दर्शन में प्रतिपादित ‘समवाय’ के स्वरूप की समालोचनात्मक व्याख्या कीजिए। (10 अंक) (e) ‘सम्प्रज्ञात समाधि’ तथा ‘असम्प्रज्ञात समाधि’ के बीच विभेद के विशेष संदर्भ में योग दर्शन में ‘समाधि’ के स्वरूप की व्याख्या कीजिए। (10 अंक)

Answer approach & key points

(a) State and discuss the characteristics (rūpa) that a hetu/liṅga must possess for a Nyāya inference to be valid. The expected core is the pañcarūpa (five-featured) hetu of Nyāya, contrasted with the Buddhist trairūpya, with the corresponding hetvābhāsas named. (b) Show HOW kṣaṇikavāda creates a problem for agency and moral responsibility - the two classical difficulties are kṛtahāni (loss of the deed performed) and akṛtābhyāgama (accrual of a deed not performed) - then critically discuss, i.e. give the Buddhist replies (santāna, two truths, ālayavijñāna) and assess whether they succeed. (c) Answer the question directly - Sāṁkhya holds puruṣa to be MANY (puruṣa-bahutva) - expound the arguments of Sāṁkhyakārikā 18 together with the nature of puruṣa, and then EXAMINE, i.e. assess the arguments critically, principally against the Advaita objection. (d) Explain samavāya as Vaiśeṣika propounds it - its definition, its five loci, its status as one, eternal and a distinct padārtha, and its contrast with saṁyoga - and then criticise it, above all with the regress objection and Śaṅkara's use of it. (e) Explain samādhi in Yoga (Pātañjala) philosophy, with the DIFFERENCE between samprajñāta and asamprajñāta as the organising focus: object-supported versus objectless, sabīja versus nirbīja, their stages and their respective fruits.

  • Anumāna; pakṣa, sādhya, hetu/liṅga, vyāpti, parāmarśa, pakṣadharmatā
  • Pañcarūpa hetu: pakṣadharmatva, sapakṣasattva, vipakṣāsattva, abādhitatva, asatpratipakṣatva
  • Sapakṣa and vipakṣa; the kitchen and the lake as standard instances
  • Hetvābhāsa; the five fallacies of Nyāyasūtra 1.2.4-9: savyabhicāra/anaikāntika, viruddha, prakaraṇasama/satpratipakṣa, sādhyasama/asiddha, kālātīta/bādhita
  • Upādhi; nirupādhika vyāpti
  • Dignāga's trairūpya as the Buddhist three-featured mark
  • Kṣaṇikavāda; yat sat tat kṣaṇikam; anitya, anātmavāda, pratītyasamutpāda
  • Dharmakīrti's arthakriyākāritva argument; niranvaya-vināśa
  • Kṛtahāni and akṛtābhyāgama
  • Santāna / santati (the causal series); Milindapañha - Nāgasena and King Milinda, 'na ca so na ca añño'; flame, milk-curd and chariot analogies
  • Buddhaghosa, Visuddhimagga - deeds exist but no doer
  • Saṃvṛti-satya and paramārtha-satya; Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 24.8-10
  • Bīja (seeds) in Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa; ālayavijñāna and vāsanā in Yogācāra
  • Critics: Udayana (Ātmatattvaviveka), Śaṅkara (Brahmasūtrabhāṣya II.2.18-27), Kumārila
  • Puruṣa-bahutva; Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Sāṁkhyakārikā 18 and 19
  • janana-maraṇa-karaṇānāṁ pratiniyamāt; ayugapat pravṛtteḥ; traiguṇya-viparyayāt
  • Sattva, rajas, tamas; prakṛti and its evolutes
  • Sākṣin, draṣṭṛ, kevala/kaivalya, madhyastha, akartṛ; nirguṇa, niṣkriya, kūṭastha-nitya, cetana
  • Śaṅkara's objection in Brahmasūtrabhāṣya II.2 - no principle of individuation among quality-less selves
  • Liṅga-śarīra / buddhi as what the arguments really individuate
  • Yogasūtra 1.24 - Īśvara as puruṣa-viśeṣa
  • Samavāya as the sixth padārtha; Kaṇāda's Vaiśeṣikasūtra; Praśastapāda's Padārthadharmasaṁgraha
  • Ayutasiddha (inseparable); iha-pratyaya ('here' cognition)
  • The five loci: avayavī-avayava, dravya-guṇa, dravya-karma, sāmānya-vyakti, nitya-dravya-viśeṣa
  • Samavāya as eka, nitya, partless, asymmetric
  • Saṁyoga as a guṇa, anitya, many, between yutasiddha relata
  • Anavasthā (infinite regress); svarūpa-sambandha as the reply
  • Śaṅkara, Brahmasūtrabhāṣya II.2.13; Buddhist rejection of inherence
  • Patañjali, Yogasūtra; Vyāsa's Yogabhāṣya
  • Yogasūtra 1.2 - yogaś citta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ; 1.3 - the seer abides in its own nature
  • Citta-bhūmis: kṣipta, mūḍha, vikṣipta, ekāgra, niruddha
  • Aṣṭāṅga-yoga; saṁyama (dhāraṇā + dhyāna + samādhi, Yogasūtra 3.4)
  • Samprajñāta / sabīja; vitarka, vicāra, ānanda, asmitā (Yogasūtra 1.17); savitarka-nirvitarka, savicāra-nirvicāra
  • Ṛtambharā prajñā (Yogasūtra 1.48)
  • Asamprajñāta / nirbīja; Yogasūtra 1.18 saṁskāra-śeṣa; 1.51 nirbīja samādhi
  • Abhyāsa and vairāgya (1.12); para-vairāgya (1.16); bhava-pratyaya and upāya-pratyaya (1.19-20)
  • Dharma-megha-samādhi (4.29); kaivalya (4.34)
Q6
50M explain

(a) “A mango tree is grown out of a mango seed.” How do the Sāṁkhya philosophers explain this process through their theory of causation by rejecting their rival perspectives? (20 marks) (b) Explain the basic characteristics of Sri Aurobindo's Integral Yoga for the realization of supramental consciousness through triple transformation. (15 marks) (c) Bring out the main points of contestation between Naiyāyikas and Prabhākara Mīmāṃsakas with reference to knowledge through words (Śābdabodha). (15 marks)

हिंदी में पढ़ें

(a) “आम का वृक्ष, आम के बीज से विकसित होता है।” अपने विरोधी परिप्रेक्ष्यों का प्रतिकार करते हुए सांख्य दार्शनिक इस प्रक्रिया की किस प्रकार अपने कारणता सिद्धान्त से व्याख्या करते हैं? (20 अंक) (b) त्रिरूपान्तरण के माध्यम से अतिमानसिक चेतना की प्राप्ति हेतु श्री अरविन्द के सकल योग की मूलभूत विशेषताओं की व्याख्या कीजिए। (15 अंक) (c) शब्दों द्वारा ज्ञान (शाब्दबोध) के संदर्भ में नैयायिकों तथा प्रभाकर मीमांसकों के बीच विवाद के प्रमुख बिन्दुओं को उजागर कीजिए। (15 अंक)

Answer approach & key points

(a) Use the seed-to-tree example to expound satkāryavāda (in its Sāṁkhya form, pariṇāmavāda): state the doctrine, give the five arguments of Sāṁkhyakārikā 9, apply them to the mango case, and - as the question expressly requires - show how Sāṁkhya REJECTS its rivals (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ārambhavāda, Buddhist momentarist asatkāryavāda, Advaita vivartavāda), closing with the standard objection to satkāryavāda and Sāṁkhya's reply. (b) Explain the basic characteristics of Sri Aurobindo's Integral Yoga specifically as the means to supramental consciousness THROUGH the triple transformation. Both elements are required: the distinguishing features of Pūrṇa Yoga (aspiration, rejection, surrender; synthesis of the yogas; rejection of world-negation) and the three stages - psychic, spiritual and supramental transformation - in order. (c) Bring out the MAIN POINTS OF DISPUTE between Naiyāyikas and Prābhākara Mīmāṁsakas on śābdabodha (verbal knowledge). The central axis is anvitābhidhānavāda (Prabhākara) versus abhihitānvayavāda (which Nyāya broadly shares with the Bhāṭṭas); further axes are tātparya and the authorship of the Veda, intrinsic versus extrinsic validity, the chief qualificand of the sentence-meaning, and whether śabda conveys only what is to be done.

  • Satkāryavāda; pariṇāmavāda; abhivyakti / āvirbhāva and tirobhāva
  • Sāṁkhyakārikā 9 and its five reasons: asad-akaraṇāt, upādāna-grahaṇāt, sarva-sambhavābhāvāt, śaktasya śakya-karaṇāt, kāraṇa-bhāvāt
  • Mūlaprakṛti, avyakta and vyakta; sattva, rajas, tamas; the twenty-five tattvas
  • Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ārambhavāda / asatkāryavāda; avayavī; samavāya
  • Buddhist asatkāryavāda with kṣaṇikavāda and niranvaya-vināśa
  • Advaita vivartavāda (Śaṅkara); rope-snake and clay-pot illustrations
  • Yogasūtra 4.3 - the farmer who removes the obstruction (kṣetrikavat)
  • Sri Aurobindo; The Life Divine; The Synthesis of Yoga; Integral or Pūrṇa Yoga
  • Sachchidananda (Sat-Chit-Ananda); involution and evolution; the Inconscient and the Ignorance
  • The gradation: Higher Mind, Illumined Mind, Intuition, Overmind, Supermind (Vijñāna / Truth-Consciousness)
  • Aspiration, rejection, surrender (ātma-samarpaṇa); the Divine Mother/Shakti
  • 'All life is Yoga'; the refusal of the ascetic and the materialist denial
  • Triple transformation: psychic, spiritual, supramental
  • Psychic being (caitya puruṣa), distinguished from the jīvātman
  • The gnostic being; divine life on earth
  • Śābdabodha; śabda as pramāṇa
  • Anvitābhidhānavāda (Prabhākara) and abhihitānvayavāda (Kumārila/Bhāṭṭa, broadly shared by Nyāya)
  • Ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā, sannidhi/āsatti, tātparya
  • Vṛddha-vyavahāra; āvāpa-udvāpa
  • Kārya / niyoga; vidhi and arthavāda
  • Apauruṣeya versus pauruṣeya Veda; āptatva; Īśvara as author for Nyāya
  • Svataḥ-prāmāṇya and parataḥ-prāmāṇya
  • Nyāyasūtra 2.2.66 - vyakti, ākṛti and jāti as what a word denotes
  • Mukhya-viśeṣya (chief qualificand) of the verbal cognition
Q7
50M critically explain

(a) Critically explain the arguments presented by the Akhyātivādins for explaining erroneous cognition. Evaluate the arguments against Akhyātivādins by the Anyathākhyātivādins. (20 marks) (b) Explain the meaning of seven steps of judgement (Saptabhaṅgīnaya) and its application in Jaina's Syādvāda for advocating a philosophy of non-absolutism (Anekāntavāda). (15 marks) (c) Do you agree with Nimbārka's explanation of the nature of God, Souls and Matter? Justify your answer. (15 marks)

हिंदी में पढ़ें

(a) अख्यातिवादियों द्वारा भ्रान्त संज्ञान की व्याख्या के लिए प्रस्तुत युक्तियों की समालोचनात्मक व्याख्या कीजिए। अन्यथाख्यातिवादियों द्वारा अख्यातिवादियों के विरुद्ध दिए गए तर्कों का मूल्यांकन कीजिए। (20 अंक) (b) ‘सप्तभंगीनय’ के अर्थ तथा ‘अनेकान्तवाद’ को सिद्ध करने हेतु जैनों के ‘स्याद्वाद’ में इसके अनुप्रयोग की व्याख्या कीजिए। (15 अंक) (c) क्या आप निम्बार्क द्वारा दी गई ईश्वर, आत्मा तथा जड़ के स्वरूप की व्याख्या से सहमत हैं? अपने उत्तर का औचित्य सिद्ध कीजिए। (15 अंक)

Answer approach & key points

(a) Two explicit tasks. (i) Critically explain the Akhyātivādins' (Prabhākara Mīmāṁsā) account of erroneous cognition - the two-cognitions analysis, bheda-agraha and smṛti-pramoṣa, and the motive of preserving the validity of all cognition. (ii) Evaluate the Anyathākhyātivādins' (Nyāya) arguments AGAINST akhyāti, and assess whether the Nyāya alternative fares better. (b) Explain the MEANING of the seven-fold predication (saptabhaṅgī) - all seven bhaṅgas, in order, with the sense of 'syāt' - and its APPLICATION in syādvāda to establish anekāntavāda. The standard objection (Śaṅkara's charge of contradiction and of mere doubt) and the Jaina reply should be included. (c) Take and justify a position on Nimbārka's account of God, souls and matter. The answer must first expound svābhāvika-bhedābheda (dvaitādvaita) accurately - Brahman, cit and acit, difference and non-difference both real and natural - and then argue for or against it, using the standard objections and the comparison with Bhāskara, Rāmānuja and Madhva.

  • Khyātivāda; śukti-rajata (shell-silver) and rajju-sarpa (rope-snake)
  • Akhyāti / vivekākhyāti; Prabhākara Mīmāṁsā
  • Bheda-agraha (vivekāgraha, asaṁsargāgraha); smṛti-pramoṣa
  • Triputī-saṁvit; svataḥ-prāmāṇya; all cognition is valid
  • Anyathākhyāti; Nyāya; anyatra and anyathā
  • Jñāna-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti (with sāmānya-lakṣaṇa and yogaja as the other alaukika sannikarṣas); doṣa
  • Bādhaka-jñāna / the sublating cognition 'nedaṁ rajatam'; parataḥ-prāmāṇya
  • Viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa structure of the erroneous judgement
  • Other theories: ātmakhyāti (Yogācāra), asatkhyāti (Mādhyamika), viparītakhyāti (Kumārila), satkhyāti (Rāmānuja), anirvacanīyakhyāti (Advaita)
  • Anekāntavāda; Syādvāda; Saptabhaṅgīnaya
  • Umāsvāti, Tattvārthasūtra 5.29 - utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya-yuktaṁ sat; dravya and paryāya
  • The seven nayas: naigama, saṁgraha, vyavahāra, ṛjusūtra, śabda, samabhirūḍha, evaṁbhūta; durnaya/nayābhāsa
  • Syāt as 'in a certain respect' (apekṣā), with eva; svadravya, svakṣetra, svakāla, svabhāva
  • The seven bhaṅgas including syād avaktavyam
  • Kramārpita and sahārpita (successive and simultaneous predication)
  • Śaṅkara, Brahmasūtrabhāṣya II.2.33; the charge of saṁśayavāda
  • Samantabhadra (Āptamīmāṁsā), Siddhasena Divākara (Sanmatitarka), Kundakunda
  • Nimbārka; dvaitādvaita / svābhāvika-bhedābheda; Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha; Śrīnivāsa's Vedānta-kaustubha
  • Tattva-traya: Brahman (Īśvara/Kṛṣṇa), cit, acit
  • Aṁśa and śakti; para-tantra dependence; Brahman as upādāna and nimitta cause
  • Souls as aṇu, many, eternal, jñātṛ, kartṛ, bhoktṛ
  • Bhakti, prapatti, gurūpasatti; mokṣa as likeness, not identity
  • Bhāskara's aupādhika bhedābheda; Rāmānuja's śarīra-śarīri-bhāva; Madhva's dvaita; Caitanya's acintya-bhedābheda
  • The objection that bheda and abheda cannot both be real of the same relata; doṣa-prasaṅga
Q8
50M discuss

(a) Present an account of Upamāna as an instrument of knowledge (Pramāṇa). How is Nyāya view of Upamāna different from Mīmāṃsā view? Discuss. (20 marks) (b) Critically explain Rāmānuja's conception of Brahman with special reference to the difficulties in explaining the relation of Brahman to Spirit (Cit) and Matter (Acit). (15 marks) (c) Why does the Dualistic School of Vedānta consider that differences (Bhedas) have separate existence and constitute the unique nature of things? Answer with reference to the theory of five-fold difference (Pañcavidhabheda). (15 marks)

हिंदी में पढ़ें

(a) उपमान का एक प्रमाण के रूप में विवरण दीजिए। उपमान के विषय में न्याय मत किस प्रकार मीमांसा मत से भिन्न है? विवेचना कीजिए। (20 अंक) (b) ब्रह्म के ‘चित्’ तथा ‘अचित्’ से संबंध की व्याख्या में आने वाली कठिनाइयों के विशेष संदर्भ में रामानुज की ब्रह्म की अवधारणा की समालोचनात्मक व्याख्या कीजिए। (15 अंक) (c) वेदांत का द्वैतवादी मत यह क्यों मानता है कि ‘भेदों’ की पृथक् सत्ता है तथा वे वस्तुओं के अद्वितीय स्वरूप की निर्मिति करते हैं? ‘पंचविधभेद’ सिद्धांत के संदर्भ में उत्तर दीजिए। (15 अंक)

Answer approach & key points

(a) Two tasks. (i) Give an account of upamāna as a pramāṇa: its definition, the gavaya illustration, what it yields, and why it is irreducible to perception, inference or testimony. (ii) Show how the Nyāya view differs from the Mīmāṁsā view - what each takes to be the object of upamiti, the direction of the cognition, and the role (or absence) of an authoritative statement. (b) Explain Rāmānuja's conception of Brahman (saguṇa, personal, possessor of infinite auspicious qualities, the sole reality with cit and acit as its body) and then, as the question specifically requires, set out and assess the DIFFICULTIES in explaining Brahman's relation to cit and acit - the transfer of defects, the instability between monism and dualism, the limits of the body-soul analogy, and the problem of agency and evil. (c) Answer the 'why': give Madhva's reasons for holding that bheda is real and constitutes the very nature (svarūpa) of a thing - the perceptual givenness of difference, the self-refutation of any denial of difference, and the regress that follows from treating difference as a relation - and set this out through the five-fold difference (pañcavidhabheda).

  • Upamāna as the third pramāṇa of Nyāya; the four pramāṇas of Nyāya
  • Nyāyasūtra 1.1.6 - prasiddha-sādharmyāt sādhya-sādhanam upamānam; Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya
  • Upamiti as saṁjñā-saṁjñi-sambandha-jñāna; sādṛśya-jñāna as karaṇa (Tarkasaṁgraha)
  • Gavaya (the wild ox / nīlgai) and the atideśa-vākya of the forester
  • Śabara on Jaimini 1.1.5; Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Ślokavārttika, Upamāna-pariccheda
  • Sādṛśya of the remembered and absent cow as the object of Mīmāṁsā upamiti
  • Schools that reject or subsume upamāna: Vaiśeṣika, Sāṁkhya, Buddhists, Cārvāka; Advaita's six pramāṇas following the Bhāṭṭas
  • Rāmānuja; Viśiṣṭādvaita; Śrībhāṣya; Vedārthasaṁgraha; predecessors Nāthamuni and Yāmunācārya
  • Saguṇa, saviśeṣa Brahman; ananta-kalyāṇa-guṇa; antaryāmin
  • Saptavidha-anupapatti (the seven untenables against avidyā)
  • Cit and acit; jīvas as aṇu, jñātṛ, kartṛ, bhoktṛ; baddha, mukta, nitya; prakṛti and the guṇas
  • Śarīra-śarīri-bhāva; niyāmya, dhārya, śeṣa; aprthak-siddhi
  • Sāmānādhikaraṇya reading of tat tvam asi; brahma-pariṇāma; kāraṇāvasthā and kāryāvasthā
  • Doṣa-prasaṅga (transfer of defects)
  • Brahmasūtra II.1.34-35 on God's impartiality and beginningless karma; anumati
  • Mukti as sāmya/communion, not identity; the mukta lacks jagad-vyāpāra
  • Madhvācārya (Ānandatīrtha); Dvaita Vedānta; Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, Anuvyākhyāna; Jayatīrtha, Vyāsatīrtha
  • Svatantra and paratantra/asvatantra tattva; Viṣṇu as the sole independent reality
  • Bheda as svarūpa of the thing; difference given in perception; sākṣin as self-validating witness
  • Viśeṣa as Madhva's distinguishing principle (distinct from the Vaiśeṣika viśeṣa)
  • Pañcavidhabheda: jīva-īśvara, jaḍa-īśvara, jīva-jīva, jaḍa-jīva, jaḍa-jaḍa
  • Tāratamya (gradation of souls); jīva-traividhya - mukti-yogya, nitya-saṁsārin, tamo-yogya
  • Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva; mokṣa as svarūpānanda without identity; bhakti
  • Advaita objections: pratiyogin and mutual dependence (Śrīharṣa, Citsukha, Madhusūdana's Advaitasiddhi vs Vyāsatīrtha's Nyāyāmṛta)
  • Madhva's reading of tat tvam asi as sa ātmā atat tvam asi

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